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This dissertation argues that the U.S. government employs multiple rhetorical 
strategies to manage discourse about the Hanford Site, a nuclear site located on the 
Columbia River in Washington State. Hanford produced plutonium for the U.S. nuclear 
weapons program from 1944 until 1989 and in doing so emitted a massive amount of 
chemical and radioactive pollution. Today, Hanford is home to one of the largest 
environmental remediation projects in the world. Since the project began, journalists, 
advocacy groups, and whistleblowers have revealed numerous instances in which the 
government has mismanaged Hanford cleanup and misrepresented the Site’s dangers. To 
counter these claims and argue that it is operating safely and transparently, the 
government publicizes Hanford’s remediation successes, offers evidence that Site 
operations have been protective of nature, and invites private citizens to visit Hanford on 
public tours. Federal agencies adopt these rhetorical strategies to pacify private citizens, 
who might be concerned about Hanford’s impact on the local environment and human 
health. 
In three chapters, I argue that the government uses new and social media, wildlife 





Each chapter offers close readings of texts the government has made widely available to 
the public through the Internet. The first of these chapters explains how the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE), the agency that manages Hanford’s waste, uses new and 
social media to craft a reassuring virtual image of the Site operations. This chapter 
investigates how the DOE has used such media to distract the public from revelations 
about leaking nuclear waste tanks at Hanford. The second illustrative chapter contends 
that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which manages the Hanford Reach 
National Monument, works to extend the Department of Energy’s argument that Hanford 
operations are protective of, and not threatening to, environmental and public health. The 
third illustrative chapter details how federal agencies, including the DOE, FWS, and the 
National Park Service, are commodifying Hanford and repackaging the Site as a tourist 
destination. These strategies for discursive containment ultimately mislead the public and 
foreclose opportunities for meaningful public participation. 
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: RHETORICAL STRATEGIES 
In 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) released a series of short videos 
about the Hanford Site, an area of land so contaminated by World War II and Cold War 
nuclear weapons production that it now hosts one of the largest environmental 
remediation projects in the world.1 Lockheed Martin Creative and Strategic Services 
produced the first chapter of the series, The Hanford Story: Overview, which won a 
Northwest Emmy for best Historical or Cultural Program or Special. The program’s host 
introduces the Hanford Site by explaining that Hanford’s history “has everything a 
storyteller would want, from intrigue and patriotism, to controversy and science faction.” 
(Here, the host substitutes “faction” for “fiction” to emphasize that even Hanford science 
was fascinatingly controversial.) Indeed, Lockheed Martin and the DOE prove to be 
masterful storytellers, spinning a compelling and visually stunning narrative from 
carefully chosen fragments of Hanford’s history.   
 The Hanford Story begins with an equivocation about the Site’s history of 
environmental devastation.2 An unidentified man sitting at a desk asserts with 
monumental vagueness, “A lot of people come here with a lot of questions. A lot of 
people come here with some concerns.” The man behind the desk does not elaborate on 
those “concerns,” which relate to Hanford’s record of releasing radioactive contaminants 
into the air, soil, groundwater, and nearby Columbia River, as well as the government’s 
history of avoiding questions about how those contaminants might threaten public health. 
  Instead, the scene shifts to what looks like the opening credits of a nature 
documentary. Fleeting shots of the non-human landscape around Hanford flash on the 
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screen. The sun rises over dim-lit grasslands as birds and insects sing. Stirring violin 
music begins. The camera rushes in tilting, fast motion flight over the Columbia River as 
a coyote gallops along the riverbank. Then, in the next scene, construction equipment 
smashes concrete, momentarily disrupting the tranquility of the previous scenes. Still, the 
spell cast by the exhilarating beauty of the natural world remains unbroken: the camera 
focuses on a dragonfly, lingers on the silhouettes of grazing elk, follows geese flocking 
over the river, and stops only momentarily on another scene of demolition. Then, the 
video shifts into time-lapse mode, making radiant white clouds race across a vast, open 
sky. Towards the end of the sequence, ominous scenes return: people in gas masks battle 
an unseen blaze with industrial fire hoses, and a backhoe claws the earth at a massive 
excavation site.   
The fleeting images of humans at war with the earth are unsettling, but everything 
in this sequence happens under Hanford’s enormous blue skies, and the vast, 
undeveloped expanses of land dwarf human alterations of the landscape. In this sublime 
portrait, even violence done to the landscape is beautiful. Machine and garden seem to be 
in harmony. Though the program goes on to describe Hanford’s role in U.S. nuclear 
weapons production and to deliver sobering news about the government’s effort to clean 
up after it—including the fact that “cleanup will never result in the complete elimination 
of all contamination”—the video’s ending features shadows rolling over mountains, 
salmon bobbing underwater, geese gathering in the sky, and another high-speed flight 
over the river.   
The video’s close attention to Hanford’s natural beauty serves an obvious 
rhetorical function for the DOE. Nature is an appealing distraction from Hanford’s 
 3 
dangerous, decades-long, multibillion-dollar environmental cleanup project, and it 
provides an attractive incentive to continue funding the Site’s remediation work. 
Furthermore, the DOE can avoid accountability by arguing that it is cleaning up Hanford 
to save nature. If the agency were to admit that weapons production negatively impacts 
human health, citizens would undoubtedly protest and the government would be forced to 
pay damages to local people. Thus, instead of confronting problems, the DOE denies 
them and offers diversions in place of information. In The Hanford Story: Overview, the 
agency strategically denies the politics of Hanford’s contested landscape and the threats it 
poses to public health by turning away from human impacts and towards the uncultivated 
landscape. 
Reading the DOE’s publications with a critical eye is necessary and important 
work, given everything the agency leaves out of its descriptions of Hanford, including the 
government’s deliberate deceptions, missed cleanup deadlines, threats to worker and 
public health, and its continued colonization and ongoing pollution of an area where 
several Native American tribes have treaty rights. That the DOE hired a notorious 
weapons manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, to produce a program that foregrounds nature, 
when the DOE’s work at Hanford is in fact focused on dangerous waste remediation, is 
no coincidence. Even so, The Hanford Story’s juxtaposition of remediation site and wild 
nature is both spin and reality; at Hanford, decommissioned nuclear reactors line the 
banks of the only stretch of the Columbia River to be designated as part of the National 
Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and a two-lane highway separates the irrevocably 
contaminated nuclear site from the Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (ALE), an area of 
“nearly pristine” shrub-steppe vegetation set aside for scientific use (Pacific Northwest 
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National Laboratory). We tend to see pristine nature and the contaminated spaces of the 
military-industrial complex as fundamentally different and disconnected, but Hanford’s 
“hybrid geography” challenges us to see them as two aspects of one place (Havlick, 
“Disarming” 184). 
These habits of thought about nature and culture allow the DOE to use Hanford’s 
natural qualities to “green” the site and write over its history of violence. In The Hanford 
Story and other publications about the Hanford Site, the DOE and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS), which manages the adjacent Hanford Reach National 
Monument, draw on discourses of wilderness purity, patriotism, and environmentalism to 
cleanse Hanford of its former sins (including its production of plutonium for the bomb 
the U.S. dropped on Nagasaki). For instance, the agencies use the contradictions of 
Hanford’s landscape to argue that weapons production has been beneficial to the local 
area. When the government built the Hanford Site in 1943, it made several hundred 
square miles of uncultivated land inaccessible to the public. As a consequence, native 
plant and animal species were inadvertently protected. Though this preservation was 
accidental, the DOE and FWS now suggest—implausibly—that the natural spaces around 
Hanford were purposefully preserved by decades of environmentally destructive 
militarization. This “seeming compatibility of military practices and environmental 
protection” is what David Havlick refers to as “ecological militarization” 
(“Militarization” 114). 
The DOE nuclear weapons complex—which includes nuclear production, testing, 
waste storage, and laboratory sites across the U.S.—accounts for a large portion of 
federally managed public lands in the U.S., but its presence and activities are little known 
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except in communities dependent on it for jobs. Despite this, journalists writing for 
publications like The New York Times and High Country News, nonfiction authors like 
Rebecca Solnit and Terry Tempest Williams, and scholars from a variety of disciplines 
have written about the complicated relationship between nature and human culture at 
DOE sites across the country. Some scholars, including David Havlick, William J. 
Kinsella, and Joseph Masco, have written with close attention to the language used by the 
DOE, FWS, and other federal agencies, but few have looked at the particular 
characteristics of government rhetoric about the Hanford Site. This dissertation will 
examine how that rhetoric has been shaped by a legacy of secrecy, local conditions and 
politics, contemporary preservationist sentiment, the government’s recent use of new and 
social media, and the need for long-term management of Hanford’s astonishingly 
extensive, complex, and persistent nuclear waste problems.  
This work seeks to address an array of readers: nuclear critics who work in 
history, anthropology, communications, and cultural geography, as well interdisciplinary 
scholars working on environmental issues; environmental and nuclear activists who 
interpret government discourse to the public and construct their own counter-narratives; 
and others who have a general interest in environmental remediation, Hanford, and the 
Atomic West. While humanistic inquiry about the U.S. nuclear weapons complex has 
“typically directed its attention to cases of literature, popular culture, and political 
discourse,” my dissertation will engage in rhetorical analysis of documents that the DOE 
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) have made readily available to the public 
(Taylor and Kinsella 9). Several scholars working in the interdisciplinary field of nuclear 
criticism have argued that institutional discourse about nuclear technologies works to 
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pacify rather than engage the public (7). My work will use government documents about 
Hanford to test that argument. 
The unique contribution of “Strategies for Containment: The U.S. Federal 
Government at the Hanford Nuclear Site” is an analysis of the DOE’s most recent 
attempts to engage in “discursive containment” by controlling the meanings associated 
with Hanford (Kinsella, “Nuclear Boundaries” 165). William J. Kinsella notes that the 
DOE experienced a “discursive leakage” in the mid-1980s when thousands of pages of 
newly declassified documents revealed what had been going on for decades at the 
formerly top-secret nuclear site (164). Since that leakage, the DOE has pursued “a more 
complex strategy in which information about Hanford is far less restricted, but the 
meanings of that information and the authority to make those meanings are rhetorically 
contained” (164). My dissertation illuminates how the federal government makes 
information about Hanford more accessible and yet maintains control over how Hanford 
is interpreted through the use of websites, social media pages, preservation, and public 
tours.  
Nuclear communication scholars have shown how government agencies, 
politicians, and contractors working in the weapons complex have shaped nuclear 
discourse to their ends, making it nearly impossible for the public to understand nuclear 
concepts and weigh in on relevant policy. In 1989—the same year the federal government 
agreed to begin cleanup at Hanford—Edward Schiappa published a seminal essay on 
nuclear discourse, “The Rhetoric of Nukespeak.” Schiappa defines nukespeak as “the use 
of metaphor, euphemism, technical jargon, and acronyms to portray nuclear concepts in a 
‘neutral’ or positive way” (253). Government agencies, politicians, and contractors 
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working in the weapons complex employ nukespeak to avoid directly addressing the 
realities of nuclear weapons and to prevent the public from engaging in thoughtful 
deliberations about them (254). They do this through two different strategies, 
domestication and bureaucratization. Domestication is “the use of ‘friendly’ metaphors 
drawn from ordinary language to name otherwise objectionable nuclear weapons, 
strategy, and war” (255). Domestication “normalizes extraordinary technology” (256). 
Bureaucratization, on the other hand, is used “either to sanitize [a] concept so that it 
appears neutral and inoffensive, or to technologize [a] concept by applying technical 
terms or acronyms that only insiders or ‘experts’ can ‘really’ understand” (256-57). This 
strategy is used to “mystify—to render nuclear policy irrelevant or inaccessible to public 
investigation and deliberation” (257). This atmosphere, in which the public can neither 
interpret nor investigate nuclear issues, has enabled the U.S. government continuously to 
prepare for war and to mismanage the vast quantities of nuclear waste left over from 
weapons production. 
Today, the DOE and the other federal agencies operating at Hanford use 
nukespeak to contain scandal and constrain the public’s ability to participate in decision-
making about the Site. In print publications about Hanford, on government-managed 
websites, at public meetings, and wherever else these agencies operate, they employ the 
strategies of domestication and bureaucratization to ensure that Hanford does not seem 
like a threat to the public. The DOE’s “Hanford Site” Facebook page domesticates 
Hanford by making it appear as if workers are safely and even enthusiastically engaged in 
the Site’s cleanup. In other publications, the government employs euphemisms like 
“long-term stewardship,” which refers to the program that monitors nuclear waste after 
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the DOE has finished cleanup at a given site, to make its activities appear benign and 
even environmentalist. The ways the government has bureaucratized Hanford are 
innumerable. One has to learn the meaning of dozens of acronyms just to gain a basic 
grasp of how waste is managed at the Site.  
In response to these rhetorical strategies that ultimately disenfranchise the public, 
communication scholars have developed the field of nuclear criticism, which is 
“generally concerned with understanding, evaluating, and transforming the nuclear 
condition” (Taylor and Kinsella 3-4). The field thus has an ethical imperative; nuclear 
critics operate under the assumption that “institutional discourse about nuclear weapons 
should be ethically evaluated in order to decenter the dominant voices of technical 
rationality and militarism that have historically controlled their meaning” (Taylor, 
“Revis(it)ing” 124). To displace those voices, one needs to examine government rhetoric 
about not only the nuclear weapons program but also the DOE-controlled sites where 
huge quantities of nuclear waste persist in the environment. 
These sites require close and prolonged attention because they are home to a kind 
of environmental disaster that cannot be understood through our typical frames of 
reference. Hanford, for example, has never given rise to a spectacular disaster that could 
easily be sensationalized by the news media. In fact, the government has been able to 
maintain the appearance of order at Hanford, and that façade has convinced many people 
that the Site is not a significant threat to people living downwind and downstream. 
Because Hanford has done its damage so continuously (the Site is still actively releasing 
contaminants into the Columbia River even though plutonium production ended decades 
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ago) and so covertly, its particular type of destruction can be understood as a form of 
what Rob Nixon calls “slow violence”: 
By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, 
a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, 
an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. 
Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate 
in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant 
sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of 
violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but 
rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out 
across a range of temporal scales.” (2) 
Unlike Chernobyl, which erupted into “instant sensational visibility” (seen both in the 
fiery explosion and in the damaged bodies of its victims), Hanford has released its 
poisons quietly and gradually. Thus, we must engage with its “incremental and accretive” 
violence and acknowledge that, without our intervention, that violence will continue well 
beyond a human timescale.  
 
The slow violence at Hanford has taken place largely without the public’s 
knowledge. From the beginning, the Site’s isolation from large population centers 
enabled Hanford’s part in the Manhattan Project to operate in extreme secrecy. When 
deciding where to locate plutonium production facilities, the War Department chose 
Hanford for three essential qualities: its proximity to a large body of water (the Columbia 
River) that could be used to cool nuclear reactors, access to a massive supply of electric 
 10 
power (provided by the completion in 1942 of the Grand Coulee Dam, which is 150 miles 
upriver of the Hanford Site), and maximum distance from large population centers. 
Government officials also viewed Hanford as an inexpensive place to locate a nuclear 
site: “The costs of condemning [the land at Hanford] and moving out the approximately 
fifteen hundred people living within the tract of interest, they believed, would not be 
prohibitive” (Gerber 23).  
Of course, this estimation of potential costs took only financial costs into account, 
and even the amount the government paid in dollars reflected its devaluation of the land. 
General Leslie R. Groves, who was the head of the Manhattan Engineering District for 
the Army Corps of Engineers, famously dismissed the small farming communities of the 
1940s Columbia Basin, saying: “I was pleased with the relatively small amount of 
cultivated land we would have to take over.  Most of the area was sagebrush suitable only 
for driving sheep to and from summer pastures in the mountains” (74-75). This callous 
and myopic assessment—which completely disregarded Native Americans and non-
indigenous settlers, who made their homes in Hanford’s harsh landscape—set the tone for 
the U.S. government’s mistreatment of the land and people of the mid-Columbia Basin 
for decades to come. To illustrate the loss suffered by local people, histories of Hanford 
often mention that, in 1943, the government forced about 2,000 Euro-American settlers 
out when it condemned the 670-square-mile area of land and that many of those people 
were given only thirty days to leave (Findlay and Hevly 20). This is to say nothing of the 
losses suffered by Native American people from at least six local tribes who had long-
standing cultural and spiritual ties to the area as well as needs to access Hanford land for 
food and medicine.3 
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Groves was not alone in his condemnation of the arid lands of the western United 
States. Euro-Americans’ perceptions of nature led white settlers and the U.S. government 
to view deserts as barren wastelands that could only be redeemed through irrigation and 
cultivation. Patricia Nelson Limerick explains how this mentality paved the way for 
environmental disaster at Hanford:  
Since arid land was already, in the common phrase of the nineteenth 
century, a wasteland, what could be more appropriate than to put it to use 
as a place for containing real waste, a place simply to dig a trench, dump in 
contaminated water, and feel comforted in the belief that there was nothing 
much to injure anyway in land so tough and uncompliant? (60)4 
Manhattan Project leaders saw the Columbia Basin as desolate and dreary, and this 
became justification initially for government takeover and ultimately for wholesale 
destruction of the land.5 
Hanford is merely one set of facilities and waste burial grounds in a toxic 
archipelago of nuclear sites that are spread out across the U.S. Many of these sites are 
clustered in the western part of the country, forming what Bruce Hevly and John Findlay 
have termed the “Atomic West.” The U.S. federal government already owned vast tracts 
of land in the West prior to the development of nuclear weapons, and it “regarded the 
region as relatively empty,” so each federal agency in charge of U.S. nuclear activities 
was able to acquire huge areas of land in that region (Hevly and Findlay 4). Thus, the 
West encompasses over a dozen sites associated with nuclear weapons production and 
waste disposal, including Hanford, Lawrence Livermore Lab and U.C. Berkeley in 
California, Idaho National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site and nearby Yucca Mountain 
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in Nevada, Rocky Flats and Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado, the Pantex Plant in 
Texas, and Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and the 
Trinity Site in New Mexico.6 Each of these sites has been subject to transformations in 
the U.S. nuclear economy, which—like other boom-bust economies in the West—has 
expanded and contracted in response to political and economic conditions (Limerick 60).  
Many communities that grew up around the weapons complex (such as eastern 
Washington’s Tri-Cities, which are just downriver from Hanford) have benefited 
financially from expansions in the nuclear economy and they therefore embrace nuclear 
technologies. This economically motivated optimism is enabled by the invisibility of 
radiation and the difficulty of tracing its effects on human health and the environment.  
Though Manhattan Project leaders could not have predicted the scope of the 
contamination that would one day permeate the Hanford Site, they knew that nuclear 
production presented a risk to local people and the environment. At the end of WWII, the 
War Department acknowledged that it had understood the dangers of plutonium 
processing when the Manhattan Project began. Military leaders claimed that Hanford was 
selected for its “‘isolation [. . . because] at that time [late 1942], it was conceivable that 
conditions might arise under which a large pile might spread radioactive material over a 
large enough area to endanger neighboring centers of population’” (qtd. in Gerber 25). 
The site’s supposedly “remote” location did not protect Hanford workers or nearby 
inhabitants, let alone the local ecosystem or future generations. Radioactive and chemical 
contaminants did their invisible work on people and landscapes as military leaders 
labored to conceal Hanford’s operations from the American public and the press. 
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 Maintaining secrecy required not only a remote, well-guarded location but also 
elaborate and well-coordinated deceit. After Pearl Harbor was attacked in December of 
1941, U.S. journalists were subject to a “Code of Wartime Practices for the American 
Press,” issued on January 15, 1942. The code gave specific instructions about which 
types of news could be reported, and the government relied on the patriotism of 
journalists, who were expected to adhere to it. Reporting about Hanford was no 
exception; indeed, the Manhattan Project’s secrets were guarded more closely than those 
of any other aspect of the war effort. When workers began to build the production 
facilities, military officers from Hanford paid visits to all of the major newspapers in the 
Pacific Northwest to inform editors of their patriotic duty not to leak information about 
the Site. If a Northwest newspaper planned to print an article that discussed Hanford’s 
mission, it had to consult with the Army.  
For example, in April of 1944, the Seattle Times wanted to print a story about the 
military’s rush to build housing in Richland, Washington for scientists and managers 
working at Hanford. Colonel Franklin T. Matthias, an Army Corps engineer who 
presided over construction at Hanford, blocked the story, arguing that though the Times 
“‘article is not specifically objectionable in the material included, it is bad in that it 
emphasizes the speed and importance of the project’” (qtd. in Williams 88). Even high-
ranking politicians were not to inquire about what was going on at Hanford. Harry 
Truman—who was still a senator in 1943—became well known for investigating 
profiteering during WWII. When he tried to advocate on behalf of Hanford area residents 
who were displaced by the nuclear site, Secretary of War Henry Stimson convinced him 
that secrecy was fundamental to Hanford’s mission. It was only after President 
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Roosevelt’s death and Truman’s ascent to the presidency that the former senator was 
briefed about the Manhattan Project. Project leaders were concerned that questioning 
would slow down or even halt their efforts, and they were determined not only to build an 
atomic bomb before the Communists could do the same but also to use the bomb before 
the end of the war. 
 Hanford’s mission was revealed on August 6, 1945 when the U.S. dropped the 
first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On that day, the cover of the Richland, Washington 
paper The Villager read, “It’s Atomic Bombs: President Truman Releases Secret of 
Hanford Product.” Only then did the majority of workers at the Hanford plant learn that 
they were building atomic bombs and that their labor had altered the course of history. 
The U.S. government had conducted the entire operation—the extent of which covered 
much of the U.S., from sites in Tennessee to New Mexico to Washington State—in secret 
and thus without the consent of the American public. The extreme classification of 
information at Hanford is merely one instance of the secrecy maintained across the 
nuclear weapons complex.  
 That secrecy had a profound impact on the way the Department of Energy 
operated when it was created, and it continues to influence the way it operates today. 
Though the DOE is the current manager of Hanford, the agency did not exist when the 
nuclear weapons complex began to take shape in the 1940s. After WWII, President 
Truman signed an act that transferred the nuclear weapons program from military to 
civilian control. This created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was ordered 
to supervise the development of nuclear energy during peacetime. By the mid 1970s, 
Congress decided that the regulatory and promotional functions of the AEC should be 
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divided. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 created the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC)—which still regulates the U.S. nuclear industry today—and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), which was created to 
oversee energy research and development as well as nuclear weapons. Shortly after this 
shift in management, the energy crisis of the 1970s led to passage of The Department of 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, which essentially combined the Federal Energy 
Administration and ERDA to create the U.S. Department of Energy.  
These organizational changes made the DOE responsible for the nuclear weapons 
complex, which has colonized an enormous area of land and employed hundreds of 
thousands of people. The complex is massive and has spent billions of dollars preparing 
for war: it consists of 
seventeen primary sites occupying 3,900 square miles in thirteen states, as 
well as approximately 300 smaller sites contributing to an elaborate, 
dispersed network of activities including research and development, 
industrial production, and testing [. . .]. By 1992, this system had 
employed approximately 650,000 people, spent approximately $370 
billion, and produced more than 70,000 nuclear weapons. (Taylor and 
Kinsella 14-15) 
Despite being charged with the monumental task of managing this complex and its 
nuclear activities, the DOE also works on energy conservation, energy-related research, 
and domestic energy production as well as high-profile scientific programs like the 
Human Genome Project. 
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 The DOE’s creation story explains several things about how the agency operates 
today. At its moment of inception, the DOE became responsible for nuclear sites that 
already had deeply entrenched wartime cultures characterized by secrecy, rash decision-
making, and reckless use of federal funds. While the military no longer controlled the 
weapons complex (in name) after WWII, the agencies in charge of the complex during 
the Cold War—a period that served as justification for an unprecedented level of 
weapons-building activity—were similarly secretive and wasteful. Despite the benefit of 
many years of reflection on the costs of nuclear production to human health and the 
environment, the government ramped up production after WWII. During the Cold War, 
the government built six new nuclear reactors at Hanford (bringing the total number of 
reactors at the site to nine) as well as many other new processing facilities. A culture of 
deception grew up around this effort, and that culture ultimately prevented the public 
from learning about the pollution at Hanford until decades after the facility was built. The 
DOE had inherited a tendency to emphasize production over safety, and it was only in the 
late 1980s when a citizen group used the Federal Freedom of Information Act to pressure 
the DOE that the agency released thousands of pages of previously classified documents 
that revealed decades of abuse at Hanford.7 These documents created a widespread sense 
of betrayal, especially among people living near the Site. Similar events occurred at other 
nuclear sites throughout the country. 
 An examination of the DOE’s origins also reveals that several transfers of power 
ultimately made the agency responsible for both the nuclear weapons complex and the 
development and promotion of nuclear energy (as well as other types of energy). This 
tension between the DOE’s contradictory roles as cleanup engineer, nuclear stockpile 
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steward, and nuclear energy advocate is still obvious today. Robert Alvarez, a former 
senior official in the DOE’s Office of Policy and a senior policy adviser to former 
Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, highlights the immense challenges created by this 
tension and offers his view on giving one agency control over so many critical 
government programs: 
The Energy Department maintains the U.S. nuclear arsenal and protects its 
nuclear secrets while remaining responsible for the largest concentration of 
radioactivity in the world, which requires stewardship for hundreds of 
centuries. Perhaps no single agency should have so many missions and be 
in charge of solving so many different problems and running so many 
programs. (34) 
The complexities of the DOE’s innumerable missions, the inefficiency with which the 
agency has carried out those missions, and its decaying infrastructure have led some to 
call for its dismantlement, but Alvarez notes that before the U.S. could redistribute the 
DOE’s duties to different agencies, the U.S. would have to answer pressing questions 
about what we are going to do with the country’s “backlog” of nuclear waste and spent 
nuclear fuel, how we are going to clean up and close down sites that are threatening the 
environment and public health, and how the country is going to deal with the “human 
health legacy” of the nuclear age (35). The current structure for decision making in the 
nuclear weapons complex is ill equipped for dealing with these questions, which require 
examination of the weapons complex’s history and negotiation of competing values. 
 The DOE has been forced to deal with those legacies, but it has also assiduously 
avoided blame for them. The agency’s ability to trace the birth of the nuclear weapons 
 18 
complex back to the Army Corps and the War Department (who managed the Manhattan 
Project) allows the DOE to dissociate itself from the early years of Hanford’s weapons 
production activities. What the DOE does not emphasize is that it took charge during the 
Cold War, when the majority of the nuclear waste at Hanford was produced. The DOE is 
implicated in the environmental crimes it is now charged with rectifying; still, the agency 
expresses a paradoxical mixture of faith in its own innocence and pride in its descent 
from the Manhattan Project. 
The DOE rarely admits to these tensions, and it seldom engages in critical 
analysis of its own history. Instead, the agency emphasizes the nuclear weapons 
complex’s patriotic accomplishment of its WWII and Cold War missions and ignores its 
most disastrous consequences. As of July 2013, Energy.gov—the DOE’s website—hosts 
a series of pages about the DOE’s relationship to the Manhattan Project.8 On a page 
devoted to interpretation of the Manhattan Project, the DOE Office of Management 
explains that the agency “traces its origins to World War II and the Manhattan Project 
effort to build the first atomic bomb” (“Manhattan”). Though the DOE was not created 
until 1977 and though it today engages in a variety of non-nuclear activities, it still 
portrays itself as a “direct descendent of the Manhattan Engineer District.” The agency 
attempts to imbue the Manhattan Project with mythological qualities and then use that 
myth to establish its own credibility. 
And yet, not everyone shares the DOE’s interpretations of the Manhattan Project. 
On the same webpage, the DOE claims that the country was unified behind the 
development of nuclear weapons: “the Manhattan Project is the story of some of the most 
renowned scientists of the century combining with industry, the military, and tens of 
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thousands of ordinary Americans working at sites across the country to translate original 
scientific discoveries into an entirely new kind of weapon.” In this description, the DOE 
proposes to define what the Manhattan Project has meant for Americans. It artfully 
suggests that the scientists, military personnel, and “ordinary Americans” working on the 
bomb were engaged in a voluntary, collaborative effort that united the nation. The DOE 
offers this inspiring account of the Manhattan Project despite two central facts: first, most 
of the “ordinary Americans” building nuclear weapons had no idea what they were 
building and, second, the government manufactured and used the Bomb with neither the 
knowledge nor the consent of the American people.  
Everything about the agency’s portrayal of the Manhattan Project is strikingly 
sanguine. The agency ignores the most obvious and devastating consequences of the 
nuclear weapons program (which have materialized in landscapes and bodies at 
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and a host of nuclear sites across the U.S.) in order to depict the 
bomb as a scientific achievement that saved American lives and created a thriving 
national scientific culture. Though the DOE may be more familiar with the immense 
financial, health-related, and environmental costs of nuclear weapons production than any 
other organization, the agency still insists that the creation of the bomb was a triumph for 
twentieth-century science: 
The legacy of the Manhattan Project is immense. The advent of nuclear 
weapons not only helped bring an end to the Second World War but 
ushered in the atomic age and determined how the next war, the Cold War, 
would be fought. In addition, the Manhattan Project became the 
organizational model behind the remarkable achievements of American 
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“big science” during the second half of the twentieth century. Without the 
Manhattan Project, the Department of Energy, with its national 
laboratories—the jewels in the crown of the nation’s science establishment, 
would not exist as it does in its present form. (“Manhattan”) 
According to this narrative, the Manhattan Project can be justified by its contributions to 
the country’s “science establishment.” The Manhattan Project offered science an 
“organizational model,” bestowed the DOE with national laboratories, and provided the 
conditions necessary for the flourishing of “big science.” It is not surprising that the DOE 
employs the language of empire (“jewels in the crown”) here; like an enormous empire 
feeding on the wealth of its colonies, the Manhattan Project made use of valuable 
resources provided by the nuclear weapons complex (including raw materials like 
uranium, vast quantities of clean water, human knowledge, and labor). The patriotic 
mission, nearly unlimited sums of money, and the vast tracts of appropriated land were 
already there—scientists just had to make use of them. 
 Scientists and managers working in the DOE complex today still exploit those 
resources, though much of that wealth is today being used to clean up after WWII and the 
Cold War. In 1989, the DOE, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington 
State Department of Ecology signed the Tri-Party Agreement, which set legal milestones 
for environmental remediation at Hanford.9 Though this type of cleanup agreement would 
have been “unthinkable twenty years earlier,” Congress and the voting public had applied 
enough pressure to convince the DOE to pursue better practices (Findlay and Hevly 257). 
Hanford historians have also pointed out that shifting its focus to health and safety was 
also “pragmatic” for the DOE; in the late 1980s, DOE officials “were receptive to 
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cleanup in large part because doing so was the only way they could continue to operate 
their facilities and produce more nuclear weapons” (257). In other words, cultivating the 
appearance of a change in mission allowed the agency to continue preparing for nuclear 
war without the public’s knowledge.  
 In part because the government is not fully committed to cleanup, the nuclear 
weapons complex has been in chaos for decades. Bryan C. Taylor offers an abbreviated 
list of crises the weapons complex has been “rocked” by in recent years: “by repeated 
shutdowns of its aging and contaminated plants, by EPA fines levied against its waste-
management programs, by widely-publicized allegations of fraud, mismanagement and 
harassment of whistleblowers, and by litigations involving liability for birth defects, 
illnesses, and deaths of plant workers, military personnel and local civilian residents” 
(“Revis(it)ing” 120). Hanford has seen all of these crises and more. Today, the Site’s 
most serious emergencies include leaks in underground waste tanks holding 56 million 
gallons of liquid radioactive waste, problems with construction of the Waste Treatment 
Plant being built to stabilize that liquid waste, and worker exposure to toxic vapors from 
the waste tanks. Despite the fact that Hanford poses an active threat to the region, most 
people are completely unaware of its existence because the DOE works so effectively to 
contain scandal. To examine how the agency hides a 586-square mile nuclear site from 
public scrutiny, this dissertation examines some of the micro-moments in the DOE’s 
recent publications as well as its large-scale strategies for containment, which include 
both preservation and tourism.  
 Hanford provides a useful case study for examination of the government’s 
practice of discursive containment because the DOE and the other agencies that manage 
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Hanford lands are so actively working to control the discourse about Hanford. While the 
DOE has been able to clean up and shut down several sites in the nuclear weapons 
complex (such as Fernald in Ohio), Hanford is permeated by such an enormous amount 
of chemical and radioactive contamination that it now hosts the largest environmental 
cleanup project in the world. In order to manage the discourse about that project and 
Hanford’s nuclear history, the government is constantly generating new promotional 
materials about the Site. Those materials will be the subjects of this dissertation.  
 
Each of the three main chapters of the dissertation performs rhetorical analysis of 
texts that shape the discourse about Hanford. Chapter II, “Discursive Containment in the 
Information Age: The Department of Energy at Hanford,” examines the DOE’s recent 
attempts to shape public perceptions of Hanford through new and social media. In the last 
few years, the agency and its contractors have reduced Hanford’s active cleanup area, 
invested in new remediation technologies to address the Site’s most intractable waste 
problems, and begun preparing the public for the transition away from cleanup and 
towards new land uses. As those changes have occurred at the local level, the new 
Presidential administration (which took office in 2008) has transformed the Department 
of Energy at the national level. Besides reshaping energy policy, the Obama 
administration has changed the way the DOE communicates with the public. Energy.gov 
now hosts Hanford.gov, and both websites have been revamped. The new Hanford 
website now clearly explains different periods in the nuclear site’s history, describes 
dozens of facilities located within the site, and catalogs hundreds of documents related to 
environmental cleanup. To some, these changes to the website—as well as Hanford’s 
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recently acquired Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube accounts—represent an increase in 
transparency at a nuclear site that was long shrouded in secrecy.   
Chapter II analyzes these new developments in the way the DOE communicates 
with the public and asks whether the Obama administration’s commitment to pursuing 
“open government” via web communication has increased transparency or given the 
DOE a new platform for disseminating easily accessible propaganda about Hanford. New 
forms of web communication should be a significant area of study since they make 
government documents easily accessible to the public, and they may therefore either 
increase public participation or create the illusion of it. Moreover, such documents are 
ephemeral; the DOE can alter the information it has posted or make it disappear forever. 
In light of these aspects of web communication, Chapter II looks at how the Hanford 
website has changed over time, how the DOE interacts with the public on Facebook, and 
how the agency shapes viewer beliefs about the Site via videos posted on YouTube. 
In addition to examining the new forms the DOE’s communication with the 
public has taken, Chapter II analyzes what the agency says and fails to say about 
Hanford. The DOE has demonstrated the unique ability to make the deserts of the Atomic 
West “take on the appearance of pristine possibility” by engaging in a “continual 
emptying out of dystopian realities,” including “nuclear weapons, waste, and war” 
(Masco, “Desert”). In this dissertation, I analyze the DOE’s discourse about the Hanford 
Site—its emphasis on engineering feats, contributions to the local economy, and 
environmental stewardship—and what it consistently avoids mentioning—engineering 
failures, the billions of federal dollars it spends every year, and threats to public health. In 
this way, the DOE’s work represents a type of environmental discourse John Dryzek 
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calls, “administrative rationalism.”  According to Dryzek, this discourse—often 
employed by government agencies—suggests that, “environmental problems are serious 
enough to warrant attention, but not serious enough to demand fundamental changes in 
the way society is organized. Thus the rhetoric combines a mixture of concern and 
reassurance” (88). The DOE employs this discourse throughout its publications by 
registering distanced concern, approaching Hanford with a rational, scientific tone, and 
reassuring the public that the Site’s wastes can be contained. Chapter II examines how 
the government has used these strategies to control the discourse about Hanford as new 
revelations have been made about waste tank leaks at the Site. 
Chapter III, “Nature-Induced Amnesia: The Hanford Reach National Monument,” 
examines the rhetoric of preservation: how the FWS justifies its management of the lands 
within the Hanford Reach National Monument (HRNM) to the public. Bill Clinton 
established the Monument by Presidential Proclamation in 2000, ending protracted 
political battles about what should be done with Hanford’s former security buffer zone. 
Though many locals thought the HRNM’s lands—which were seized by eminent domain 
when construction of the Hanford Engineer Works began in 1943—should be returned to 
civilians for agriculture and development, the government found it more pragmatic to 
create a nature reserve there. Hanford is not the only military site to have been 
redesignated as a monument or wildlife refuge. In the last few decades, the Departments 
of Defense and Energy have transferred over a million acres of former military sites to 
FWS for conservation and preservation of native and rare species. In some cases, species 
that formerly inhabited these sites returned once military activities ceased, and in other 
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cases, native flora and fauna were accidentally preserved by the initial creation of a 
military or nuclear site. 
My study, which is especially concerned with texts that are most accessible to the 
public, seeks to track how agencies have characterized Hanford over time. Thus, I 
analyze three iterations of FWS’s Hanford Reach website (one that was live from 2006 
through 2009, another that was live from 2009 through 2013, and the one that is currently 
online). Each version of the site uses different rhetorical strategies to explain how the 
Monument came to be managed by FWS, but all three interpret preservation as a way to 
redeem the U.S. for its former nuclear activities.  In this chapter, I examine the explicit 
and implicit connections the agency makes between war and preservation.    
The transformation of post-nuclear sites like Hanford into state-controlled wildlife 
refuges presents what Joseph Masco calls a “uniquely modern contradiction”: lands that 
will be contaminated far into the future are also preserved by the government “for future 
generations” (“Mutant” 532). To smooth over this contradiction and legitimize the 
protection of wildlife at nuclear sites, the government employs the FWS, an agency that 
preserves and enhances habitat at hundreds of sites across the country and can therefore 
employ an apolitical, naturalist discourse more persuasively than can the DOE. By 
depicting Hanford Reach as “pristine” habitat for native plants and wildlife, FWS extends 
the DOE’s claims about the effectiveness of cleanup and conceals the continued 
colonization of Hanford lands by hiding it under the guise of environmental protection. 
Though the FWS characterizes Hanford Reach as a wildlife refuge, the area continues to 
serve as a buffer between Hanford’s deadly wastes and surrounding communities. This 
chapter analyzes how FWS has—not coincidentally—increased its online interpretation 
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of Hanford Reach in recent years, further constraining discourse about the Site at a time 
when multiple waste-related emergencies might otherwise convince the public that 
Hanford is an unmitigated disaster. 
 Chapter IV, “Denial and Commodification: Nuclear Tourism at Hanford,” 
explores how the government has used historic preservation and nuclear tourism to 
maintain control over the discourse about Hanford and other sites in the nuclear weapons 
complex. The DOE and its predecessors have been engaged in interpretation of U.S. 
nuclear sites since the first atomic museum was established in 1949, and these DOE-
supported museums have always advanced a pronuclear narrative. Nuclear tourism, on 
the other hand, is a relatively new phenomenon. The U.S. government is opening sites 
like the Nevada Test Site and Hanford to the public, partially because the 
commodification of nuclear disaster serves a rhetorical purpose. The DOE offers tours to 
create the illusion of transparency even as it uses them to placate the public with 
propaganda about Hanford’s role in WWII and the Cold war and the DOE’s current 
cleanup work at the Site. 
 Even outside the DOE-sponsored tour program, there has been a remarkable 
growth in the number of interpretive sites at Hanford. Since the creation of the Hanford 
Reach National Monument in 2000, the government has designated the Site’s B 
Reactor—the world’s first, full-scale nuclear reactor—as a National Historical Landmark 
and funded exhibits at the Hanford Reach Interpretive Center, a natural and cultural 
history museum currently under construction. In addition, Congress is considering a bill 
that would establish a multi-site Manhattan Project National Historical Park at Los 
Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Hanford. This frenzy of preservationist activity—some of which 
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has been initiated by Hanford boosters in the Tri-Cities—has provided cover for the 
DOE, which has been trying to manage a variety of scandals associated with its 
underground waste tanks and vitrification plant (some of which will be described in 
Chapter II).10 Indeed, all the transformations in online communication, preservation, and 
tourism at Hanford have come about in direct response to the DOE’s need to distract and 
appease the public.    
 Several scholars writing about the nuclear weapons complex, including Rebecca 
Solnit and Joseph Masco, have argued that Americans exhibit “national amnesia” about 
the country’s nuclear weapons program. These writers show how, during the long years 
of the Cold War, “U.S. citizens seemed to forget or repress the implications of living 
within a national nuclear complex” (Masco, “Mutant” 523). The nation remembers that 
its military dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 but forgets that a much larger 
number of nuclear weapons have been manufactured and tested here at home. Many 
would blame the voting public for its apathy, but the truth is that the U.S. government has 
carefully cultivated Americans’ indifference to nuclear weapons, waste, and war. This 
dissertation will investigate the government’s rhetorical strategies and show how they 




1 Hanford produced plutonium for the U.S. nuclear weapons program from 1944 
through 1989. Since the Department of Energy began environmental cleanup in 1989, it 




contractors have identified more than 1,900 distinct waste sites at Hanford, ranging from 
small areas of surface contamination to hundreds of solid waste burial grounds. When the 
cleanup began 25 years ago, there were about 500 contaminated buildings (including the 
nine reactors), five chemical processing buildings, and multiple laboratories and research 
facilities. Site workers dumped an estimated 444 billion gallons of contaminated liquid 
into the soil, causing extensive contamination of Hanford’s soil and groundwater” (Niles 
38).  
2 The capitalized word “Site” refers in my text to the Hanford Site. 
3 The Hanford project removed Native people and contaminated land, water, and 
food to which they have traditional ties and treaty rights. Affected groups include the 
Yakama, Colville, Warm Springs, Umatilla, Wanapum, and Nez Perce tribes. Sources 
that offer in-depth information about Hanford’s impact on local Native American tribes 
can be difficult to locate, and no single publication documents all of the impacts. This is 
due, in part, to the U.S. government’s efforts to cover up Hanford’s effects on human and 
ecosystem health and in part to the effects of institutionalized racism on government 
funding for large-scale studies. For more information on how the nuclear weapons 
complex has impacted Native American tribes, see References Cited for works by 
Churchill and LaDuke, Kuletz, LaDuke, and Ortiz. For specific details on Hanford’s 
impacts on local tribes, see the films Tribal Perspectives on the Hanford Nuclear Site and 
Arid Lands, the latter of which features an interview with Russell Jim, an outspoken 
advocate for Hanford cleanup who works for the Environmental Restoration and Waste 




4 Limerick argues that Hanford created something new in the world, but that its 
story fits neatly into the American West’s history of colonization, boom-bust expansion, 
and resource extraction: “the explosion of the first bomb near Alamogordo—with 
Hanford plutonium—did, in truth, inaugurate a whole new era in human history. And yet, 
in other ways, the story of Hanford makes a firm and close match with the basic 
configurations of western expansion” (58).  
5 This phenomenon of destruction justifying further destruction persists today 
when the federal government proposes to store more nuclear waste or reprocess spent 
nuclear fuel at sites like Hanford that are already de facto waste storage sites (despite the 
fact that the government has made a legal commitment to remediate Hanford rather than 
pollute it further). 
6 This list is not exhaustive, and it does not include all the sites where the U.S. has 
mined and milled uranium for weapons production.  
7 The Hanford Education Action League (HEAL) and Robert Alvarez from the 
Environmental Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. filed a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request for information about waste released at Hanford. In response to pressure 
from HEAL, bad press, and whistleblowers’ accounts of waste releases at the Site, the 
DOE released nineteen thousand pages of documents in 1986 (Brown 290-1).  
8 Since the DOE sporadically moves or alters its web pages, I note which pages 





9 Cleanup still operates according to guidelines established by the Tri-Party 
Agreement, though the DOE regularly misses legally mandated deadlines for particular 
cleanup operations. 
10 The Hanford Vitrification (Vit) Plant, also known as the Tank Waste Treatment 
and Immobilization Plant (WTP), is currently under construction near the center of the 
Hanford Site. If completed, the WTP will be the “world’s largest radioactive waste 
treatment plant.” Waste from Hanford’s tanks will be pumped to the WTP, separated into 
different waste streams, blended with “glass-forming materials,” heated, and then poured 
into stainless steel canisters. The goal is to stabilize the waste in glass rods that can be 
shipped to a deep geological repository. Bechtel, the country’s biggest construction and 




DISCURSIVE CONTAINMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE DEPARTMENT 
OF ENERGY AT HANFORD 
The nuclear weapons complex, which the U.S. government once tried to conceal 
from the world, now publicizes itself online. Like many other government agencies, the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) now communicates directly with the public through 
an extensive website, Energy.gov, as well as social media sites like Facebook and 
Twitter. The DOE also maintains websites for individual facilities within the U.S. nuclear 
weapons complex, including the Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. Whereas 
most DOE documents describe the former plutonium processing facility with alienating 
technical jargon, Hanford.gov and Hanford’s Facebook and Twitter pages use language 
that makes the complicated environmental remediation projects at Hanford appear 
intelligible to the public. Occasionally, on these pages, accessible language becomes 
surprisingly informal. For example, when the DOE uses Facebook (FB) to communicate 
about recent events at Hanford, the agency frequently employs the excessively positive, 
truncated form of the typical FB status update. Thus, on July 13, 2012, to take just one 
example, the Hanford Site FB page posted: “A big high five to Hanford workers for their 
high rad moves!! They moved the first high-rad sludge off the Columbia River today 
(from a facility near the river).” This was followed by a link to a DOE news release and 
three comments from readers of the Hanford Site FB page: “nice,” “Hanford High-Five!” 
and “Good work!” Supportive comments like these often come from Hanford insiders 
who are involved with the work being discussed. (See Figure 1.)  
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Figure 1. Status update posted by Hanford public affairs officers on Hanford Site’s 
Facebook page July 13, 2012.1 
 
 
 Though the DOE would like us to imagine Hanford employees as scientists, 
engineers, and skilled tradespeople who are making efficient use of tax dollars to “clean 
up” the Site, the carefully crafted Hanford Site FB page makes it clear that another 
category of workers labors behind the scenes to shape public perceptions of the 
government’s work at Hanford. (The capitalized word “Site” refers in my text to the 
Hanford Site rather than the Hanford website.) In the curiously enthusiastic status update 
quoted above, Hanford public affairs officers (who maintain the Hanford Site FB page) 
attempt to allay concern about the dangers of nuclear waste by offering a “high five” to 
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the workers who moved highly radioactive sludge from an area near the Columbia River 
to dry storage near the center of the Site.2 The status update conveys no information 
about how or why the radioactive waste was moved. Instead, it distracts readers from the 
dangers of transporting waste by shortening “radioactive” to “rad,” strategically 
confusing a word that signifies extreme hazard with slang for something impressive.3 FB 
status updates like this one give readers the false impression that the public has real-time 
access to major events at Hanford and that the DOE holds itself accountable to the public 
via social media. In fact, the DOE offers very little substantive information about the 
state of the Site’s major environmental threats.  
Instead of using social media to achieve transparency or encourage productive 
conversation about how to address Hanford’s most pressing challenges, the DOE uses 
them to pacify the public. The agency routinely offers manic reassurances that workers 
are achieving extraordinary remediation feats at the Site. In its exuberant praise of 
workers in the status update above, the DOE accomplishes two sleights of hand: first, it 
emphasizes progress rather than the long-term problem inherent in simply moving waste 
from one area to another. Second, it rallies readers on behalf of industrious employees 
who risk their lives to handle radioactive waste at Hanford, displacing attention from the 
work to the workers. Rhetorical moves like these are typical for the DOE, which does 
two contradictory things when representing Hanford to the public: it acknowledges the 
tremendous hazards created by radioactive waste at the Site in order to continue receiving 
federal money for cleanup and yet downplays those hazards to avoid inviting public 
scrutiny. 
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 The Hanford DOE’s current practice of updating its FB status every few days 
represents a significant departure from the Site’s former security policies, which were 
very effective at keeping the Site hidden from public view. Because Hanford was 
considered to be a crucial part of the war effort during WWII, and its plutonium 
production activities required secrecy, the War Department blocked any potential 
revelations about the Site by maintaining firm control of employees and appealing to the 
patriotism of politicians and the press. Such regulation was relaxed toward the end of the 
Cold War when Hanford’s mission switched from weapons building to environmental 
remediation. The tremendous change in the personal freedom of a typical Hanford worker 
exemplifies this shift: whereas Hanford employees were forbidden from talking about 
their jobs during WWII and the Cold War, today, they can invite their friends and family 
members to visit the Site on an official DOE tour.4 These changes came about not only 
with the transition from production to cleanup but also with the DOE’s relatively recent 
adoption of “open government” policies that are intended to increase both transparency 
and democratic involvement in decision making at the site. The DOE claims that it is 
more transparent about operations at Hanford than it was during the WWII and Cold War 
eras, but the agency has actually developed more sophisticated means of discursively 
containing the scandals at Hanford. Through new communication tools, the DOE has 
worked to maintain its controlling narratives, thereby ensuring the perpetuation of the 
slow violence unfolding within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.  
 The DOE is required by law to inform the public about proposed waste cleanup 
and storage actions and to give people the chance to deliver comments at open meetings, 
by email, and by mail.5 Thus, public meetings and comment periods provide the most 
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meaningful opportunities for exchange between the DOE and the public. But the DOE 
engages in other forms of communication that are less about dialogue and more about 
constructing an image of Hanford that counters the public’s negative perceptions. In this 
chapter, I will discuss three forms of electronic communication that the DOE uses to 
convey information about Hanford: Hanford.gov (the Hanford DOE’s homepage), the 
“Hanford Site” Facebook page, and the Hanford Story video series (the latter of which is 
posted at Hanford.gov and on the Hanford YouTube Channel).6 These three means of web 
communication are intended to legitimize the DOE’s work at Hanford, and so they ignore 
much of the bad press about the Site, thereby creating an alternative reality (or at least an 
alternative Hanford) that is free from scandal. By using several different means of online 
communication, the agency appeals to a variety of audiences—those who would seek out 
an official website to learn about Hanford, those who get their news through Facebook, 
and those who are looking for a visual narrative to explain Hanford’s history and 
remediation projects. These three means of communication also establish three different 
kinds of authority. First, Hanford.gov appears to be an official, authoritative source of 
information about Hanford that also invites public participation and input. In its upgraded 
form, this website offers more detailed information on the Site than it did in the past, and 
that information is neatly organized and intelligible to a non-expert audience. Second, in 
contrast, the “Hanford Site” FB page offers fragments of news delivered in a casual tone 
as well as thousands of photos that depict both the beauty of the natural world at Hanford 
and visible signs that the agency is making progress on waste cleanup. Through 
Facebook, the DOE broadcasts frequent updates on its work to other FB users who 
subscribe to its page. The third part in this trio of web publications, The Hanford Story, 
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differs from both Hanford.gov and the Hanford Site FB page in its lack of immediacy. At 
over an hour in length, the seven-part video series requires more attention than today’s 
typical Internet offering. Since many people are only familiar with the Site from 
occasional news reports, The Hanford Story fulfills the need for a coherent narrative 
about Hanford’s past, present, and future. 
 All three of these forms of communication present the DOE with the opportunity 
to convey substantive news about Hanford’s seemingly endless succession of crises, but 
all three instead divert attention away from events that require the most explanation and 
context. This chapter was written as several disasters and scandals unfolded at Hanford, 
the most significant of which was the detection of multiple leaks in tanks containing 
high-level chemical and radioactive waste. Even as cleanup advocacy organizations 
revealed details about these incidents, Hanford.gov and the Hanford Site FB page 
essentially ignored them, and The Hanford Story continued to be available on the web 
despite the fact that its claims have become increasingly untenable. The DOE’s proposed 
solutions to Hanford’s waste problems have become less viable in the last few months 
and years, and many people have lost faith in the agency. Still, the DOE clings to the 
absurdly optimistic projections it makes in The Hanford Story, and it continues posting to 
Hanford.gov and the Hanford Site FB page as if it were oblivious to criticism. In one 
sense, these three forms of web communication function as sleek diversions by using 
popular forms of new and social media to make the DOE appear to be operating 
transparently even as it withholds information from the public. In another sense, the DOE 
has merely been compelled by present-day customs to use such web communication, and 
it has done so clumsily, with the assumption that the public will not be able to see 
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through its propaganda. Fortunately for the DOE, many of its web-based blunders will be 
erased from the historical record. Though the Internet seems to archive some things 
forever, many web artifacts simply disappear. Much of Hanford’s web communication 
will be intentionally or accidentally lost. This chapter will record and examine some of 
the micro-moments in that communication with the intention of elucidating how the DOE 
uses the web to neutralize public concern and stall effective containment of the Site’s 
hazardous wastes.  
To begin, I will trace how the public’s knowledge and perceptions of Hanford 
have been shaped by the tone and content of revelations made about the nuclear weapons 
complex in the 1980s and 90s and how the DOE has worked to maintain control over 
Hanford’s story by continually intensifying its claims to transparency. Before the Internet 
and before the government’s large-scale disclosures about the nuclear weapons complex, 
Hanford’s story was communicated in classified blueprints, technical reports, and 
memos. Beginning in the 1990s, it was told in activists’ mailings, memoirs, academic 
articles, and books. Over the decades, the government has been able to define and contain 
conversation about the nuclear weapons complex by guarding the complex’s secrets. 
Even when those secrets have been revealed and thus opened to new interpretations, 
traces of the government’s narrative have lingered.  
Indeed, the government’s account of Hanford has influenced even scholars who 
have revealed the extent of the Site’s contamination. A crucial example of this is Michele 
Gerber’s On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site, the first 
book written about Hanford’s pollution and scientific culture for a popular audience. 
Writing in the late 1980s, Gerber tackled Hanford’s thorny history only a few years after 
 38 
the DOE had, in 1986, released roughly 19,000 pages of previously classified documents 
about Hanford’s early days, including detailed information about contaminants that had 
been discharged into the soil, air, and water. Gerber wrote On the Home Front in 
response to these “newly available primary sources” about Hanford, thereby creating “a 
narrative for understanding Hanford that had no real counterpart for other major plants 
devoted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons” (Findlay v).  
Because most accounts of the nuclear weapons complex written prior to Gerber’s 
were celebratory, had not dealt with the Cold War period (from which the U.S. emerged 
less triumphant than it did after WWII), and did not include much technical information 
(because it was still classified), John Findlay argues that the publication of On the Home 
Front represented a new era of writing about the U.S. weapons program and its 
environmental legacy (v). Gerber was the first to interpret and synthesize thousands of 
pages of “environmental monitoring surveys, engineering reports, office memoranda and 
correspondence, and other miscellaneous pieces of the historical record” for the public 
(Gerber 2-3). Using these recently declassified documents and Freedom of Information 
Act requests, she made surprising discoveries about Hanford’s reckless disposal of 
contaminants. Thus, her narrative became foundational, and it remains one of only a 
couple of scholarly books on Hanford’s pollution.7 
 And yet, despite the book’s extended focus on the staggering amounts of 
radioactive and chemical wastes left behind by weapons production, as well as the 
difficulty of removing that waste, Gerber describes the work of Hanford scientists, 
engineers, and military personnel in apologetic terms. Immediately after describing the 
content of the declassified documents, Gerber appears to defend the government’s 
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rationale for creating so much pollution: “In his memoirs, General Leslie Groves, the 
MED [Manhattan Engineering District] chief, pointed to a partial explanation [for the 
wastes at Hanford]: ‘Not until later would it be recognized that chances would have to be 
taken that in more normal times would be considered reckless in the extreme [. . .]. While 
normally haste makes waste, in this case haste was essential’” (3). In passages like these, 
Gerber offers a justification for irresponsible waste handling at Hanford without 
interrogating that justification, which makes this semi-official history read as an 
“authorized exposé” (Gray 46).8  
Though she aims to be impartial, Gerber’s account is heavily influenced by the 
U.S. government’s narrative about the nuclear weapons complex. This is especially 
evident when she frames the construction of the bomb as a spectacular achievement. 
When recounting Hanford’s role in building the bombs that were dropped at Trinity and 
Nagasaki, Gerber insists that these events “represented pioneering technological 
achievements and the largest scale-up in the history of the engineering craft. They 
instigated whole new fields of scientific inquiry. They also changed national defense 
strategy and altered the course of global politics and world history for the last two 
generations” (2).9 Gerber’s ostensibly neutral descriptions of nuclear weapons production 
are similar to those offered by the DOE, and yet they create more dissonance for the 
reader, since Gerber prizes the magnitude of the Manhattan Project even as she paints a 
damning portrait of Hanford’s waste practices. She remains curiously impressed with 
Hanford science even as she details the life-threatening substances it produced. 
Throughout On the Home Front, Gerber marvels at Hanford’s “pioneering” 
efforts, despite their devastating consequences, both local and global. Because of this, 
 40 
one reviewer notes that “the book’s most serious weakness is the spin it puts on the 
Hanford story—mostly by glossing over the systematic official deception that began at 
Hanford 50 years ago and continues to this day” (Gray 46). Indeed, Gerber implicitly 
argues that the “systematic official deception” was justified not only by the need for 
national security but also by the degree to which Hanford’s operations advanced nuclear 
physics, chemical engineering, and environmental sciences. 
 Gerber also portrays Hanford’s study of the local environment as visionary, which 
is ironic given the Site’s deplorable environmental legacy. (In this way, Gerber’s 
narrative anticipates the rhetoric of today’s DOE, which consistently congratulates itself 
for environmental remediation well done.) Rather than questioning the government’s 
decision to pour toxins directly into the environment, Gerber praises Hanford for what 
she sees as its groundbreaking system of record keeping: “In addition to brilliant 
breakthroughs in reactor physics and chemical technologies, the Hanford Site pioneered 
the science of environmental monitoring” (2). She writes this without noting that the 
sciences of weapons production and the environmental monitoring done at Hanford are 
both predicated on large-scale destruction; reactor physics and chemical technologies 
generate a massive waste stream while monitoring merely records data about that stream.  
Indeed, Gerber emphasizes the “pioneering” efforts made to measure and analyze 
pollution at Hanford, as if quantifying radioactive and chemical contamination somehow 
counteracts its destructive effects. Indeed, Gerber portrays Hanford as an environmental 
steward: “The Hanford Site was unique for measuring contamination levels in stack 
gases, vegetation, river water, fish and ducks, and groundwater. Hanford’s environmental 
records were among the most complete ones in the world” (2). In praising what she 
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frames as the environmental prescience of Hanford workers, Gerber neglects the fact that 
the science of monitoring would not be necessary without the existence of large-scale, 
persistent pollution. In these passages, Gerber hints at, but fails to analyze, the 
contradiction that has always been at the core of Hanford operations: the curious manner 
in which environmental devastation and environmental concern—seemingly 
incompatible pursuits—align in the name of scientific discovery. Accounts of Hanford 
like Gerber’s have worked to normalize this contradiction. Both Gerber and the DOE are 
invested in maintaining a narrative in which Hanford’s “dazzling scientific 
accomplishments” justify or at least overshadow its damage to people and the 
environment (218).   
On the Home Front was first published in 1992, a year before the DOE launched 
an official Openness Initiative that increased transparency about the very issues Gerber 
was reporting on, including waste releases and threats to public health. Several years 
before, in the mid-1980s, the DOE moved rapidly from “secrecy to sincerity” in its 
communication with the public (Kinsella 178). During that time, a series of Secretaries of 
Energy responded to public concern about the nuclear weapons complex by releasing a 
large volume of previously classified materials. The DOE itself noted that this “backlog 
of secret documents” was “monumental, roughly equivalent to a column of paper 3 miles 
high” (U.S. DOE EM, Closing 82).10 Because of the revelations that came from this 
large-scale declassification, by the early 1990s, there was a clear mandate from the public 
for the DOE to be more transparent about its operations. In 1993, then-Secretary of 
Energy Hazel O’Leary announced the Openness Initiative, which she described as 
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“coming clean with our past and opening many of our files to the public” (U.S. DOE EM, 
Closing 82).  
Two years later, as part of this initiative, the DOE Office of Environmental 
Management (EM) published a document called Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the 
Atom: The Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production in the United States 
and What the Department of Energy is Doing About It.11 The report described, in 
accessible language, how the nuclear weapons program had harmed the environment at 
each stage of production and at dozens of sites across the U.S.12 The hundred or so 
photographs included in the report were especially striking since they offered detailed 
portraits of a previously off-limits nuclear weapons complex and depicted examples of 
the careless dumping that occurred during the war years. To describe why it published 
this information under the title Closing the Circle, EM claimed that “The task of 
Environmental Management is to begin to close the circle on the splitting of the atom for 
weapons production through sustained efforts to understand the whole problem as well as 
its parts” (9). EM meant to communicate that the weapons complex’s problems require 
holistic thinking. However, the metaphor of “closing the circle” suggests not a remedy of 
closure through disclosure and cleanup (which the report as a whole advocates) but rather 
an eternal cycle in which waste escapes its containment and the DOE responds with 
further remediation. Indeed, nearly two decades later and despite its promises, the DOE is 
still caught in a vicious circle of leakage and cleanup that operates in both the material 
and discursive realms. 
The majority of Closing the Circle described the types and extent of waste left 
over from weapons production, but the report also announced the DOE’s intention 
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radically to transform how it handled information. The report acknowledged that this 
would mean pushing for a change of culture within the agency: “To fulfill its new 
missions successfully, the Department must itself undergo a major institutional 
transformation. It must institute fundamentally different operating practices from those 
historically used to produce nuclear weapons” (80). This is one of the few places where 
the DOE has admitted the need to alter its way of thinking in order to move forward with 
cleanup. The report further claimed that the agency needed to improve “operating 
practices” by encouraging public participation, which could “be meaningful only with 
significant openness” on the part of the DOE (81). And yet despite focusing on the 
agency’s hopes of encouraging “informed and constructive citizen involvement,” the 
report still contradictorily insisted that “secrecy remains essential to maintaining the 
nuclear weapons stockpile” (81). 
While the report was vague on the topic of citizen involvement (perhaps because 
it was such a novel concept in 1995), it did outline a new policy intended to give 
employees of the DOE and its contractors a voice in cleanup operations. The report 
claimed that a key aspect of the openness initiative involved “encouraging 
‘whistleblowers’ to report lack of compliance with regulations, mismanagement, 
inefficiencies, fraud, and other problems” (82). This commitment to supporting 
whistleblowers could have represented a major shift for the nuclear weapons complex, 
where employees labored along mostly uninformed in a “need-to-know” context and had 
little say in how operations should be conducted. However, the DOE’s support of socially 
responsible employees did not last long, and the agency would go on to mistreat scores of 
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whistleblowers in the decades following Closing the Circle’s publication (Payne and 
Ring). 
Though the DOE declared that it needed to begin a new chapter in its history by 
instituting new management practices, Closing the Circle’s opening “Letter from the 
Secretary” (again, O’Leary) relied on the narrative of patriotism and unyielding faith in 
scientific progress that was foundational to its former practices: 
The United States built the world’s first atomic bomb to help win World 
War II and developed a nuclear arsenal to fight the Cold War. How we 
unleashed the fundamental power of the universe is one of the great stories 
of our era. It is a story of extraordinary challenges brilliantly met, a story of 
genius, teamwork, industry and courage. (v)   
By claiming the splitting of the atom as an American achievement and identifying it as 
“one of the great stories of our era,” O’Leary glorified weapons production and justified 
the waste it left behind. Because she could not afford to admit wrongdoing or alienate 
political allies who worked within the complex, O’Leary took pains to acknowledge the 
successes of the nuclear weapons program. Her loyalty to the status quo did not square 
with her professed belief in the necessity of change:  
We are now embarked on another great challenge and a new national 
priority: refocusing the commitment that built the most powerful weapons 
on Earth towards the widespread environmental and safety problems at 
thousands of contaminated sites across the land. We have a moral 
obligation to do no less, and we are committed to producing meaningful 
results. (v) 
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O’Leary’s doublespeak is subtle but powerful. She claims that changing environmental 
and safety practices in the nuclear weapons complex will require only “refocusing the 
commitment” that built thousands of weapons and poisoned people in the U.S. and 
abroad. Indeed, many of the same devoted workers who created and produced the bomb 
at factories across the country have had to turn their knowledge to a new mission: 
environmental remediation. O’Leary suggests—in talking about transparency and 
environmental practices—that the DOE has a “moral obligation” to change, but her 
admiration of the science that built the bomb undermines her obligation to the morality of 
environmental cleanup. Thus, the report initiated less material change than promised; 
nevertheless, Closing the Circle signaled a revision in the stated mission of the nuclear 
weapons complex from that era forward.13 
Though transparency continued to be elusive (since the government and its 
contractors still conducted much of their business in secret), O’Leary’s openness 
initiative helped to revolutionize public access to information about the nuclear weapons 
complex. Some files remained (and still remain) classified, but the openness initiative 
gave the public new points of entry into the nuclear weapons complex: 
Under this new approach public access to information on past and current 
problems has increased substantially. Previously, access to such 
information typically required prolonged legal efforts and the surmounting 
of multiple bureaucratic hurdles, when possible at all. Now, the Department 
releases information routinely via newsletters, reports, and other documents 
distributed to extensive mailing lists; in voluminous environmental impact 
studies; at public involvement meetings that accompany the annual budget 
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development cycle; and at frequent meetings of citizen advisory boards that 
provide formal advice on management and cleanup issues. (Kinsella 178-
79) 
Before this period, U.S. citizens had little access to information about—let alone a say 
in—the practices of the nuclear weapons complex. Today, people can raise issues with 
DOE’s waste management plans by participating in the legal processes that govern 
environmental cleanup or apply for a seat on one of the DOE’s citizen advisory boards, 
which provide significant judgment and guidance to the DOE at eight sites within the 
nuclear weapons complex.14 
And yet, ironically, given the long list of ways the DOE communicates with the 
public, there is now almost too much information for the public to digest. Just keeping up 
with new phases in long-term cleanup plans and interpreting the different alternatives the 
DOE presents to the public (about how and to what extent sites should be cleaned up, 
how contamination should be monitored, and how remediated lands should be used in the 
future) can overwhelm environmental, public health, and labor advocacy organizations 
working to protect the public interest. People can only make sound decisions if they have 
all the available information, but the technical complexity and sheer volume of data 
coming from the DOE can make it difficult for outsiders to decipher and synthesize the 
agency’s disclosures.  
 Despite these challenges, the DOE claims to be providing more and better 
information, and each new Presidential administration and Secretary of Energy influences 
how the agency pursues accountability. In recent years, the Obama administration has 
affirmed its commitment to open government by using new and social media to advance 
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its transparency goals. Thus, the DOE’s website—like that of many other federal 
agencies—has been expanded under Obama. Though Energy.gov emphasizes the DOE’s 
less controversial work (in renewable energy and energy efficiency, for example), it also 
links to web pages hosted by individual sites within the nuclear weapons complex. Thus, 
Energy.gov links to Hanford.gov, a website managed by the Hanford DOE. Hanford.gov 
links, in turn, to the Site’s Facebook and Twitter pages as well as its YouTube channel. 
The DOE uses each of these outlets to communicate information about what is currently 
happening at Hanford and, in some cases, what it is planning for the future. 
 While the Internet offers unparalleled access to the nuclear weapons complex, it 
also conceals inconsistencies and gaps in the information the DOE offers to the public. 
Early in 2012, Dawn Stover, a contributing editor of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
brought this to light in a critique of recent changes to the DOE’s website. Stover refers to 
Energy.gov as a place “where information goes to die,” arguing that the DOE’s recent 
redesign of its website altered or blocked access to a large (and ultimately unknown) 
number of documents that were previously accessible via the web. The DOE touts the 
efficiency of the redesign, but the changes actually retract information that was once easy 
to find:  
Last August, the U.S. Energy Department proudly announced a 
“comprehensive website reform, making Energy.gov a cutting-edge, 
interactive information platform and saving taxpayers more than $10 
million annually.” In short, the government eliminated 12 separate 
department program sites and merged them into one (with plans to add 
many more), upgraded the content-management system, and streamlined 
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information into the cloud. In theory, Energy.gov is now the “cutting-
edge” go-to site for information on everything from home weatherization 
to nuclear research. In practice, however, it’s more often a black hole. 
(Stover) 
Offering one example of how information disappears into this “black hole,” Stover 
describes her frustrated search for previously accessible documents on Yucca Mountain, 
the government’s now-defunct deep geological repository in Nevada.15 She finds that 
searching Energy.gov is an inefficient process that fails to yield the documents she was 
previously able to access through the Office of Civilian Management’s Yucca Mountain 
website (which was removed when the federal government shut down the Yucca project).  
I had a similar experience while teaching a class on the Hanford Site and the 
Atomic West. When I initially taught the course in 2009, my students could explore a 
website devoted specifically to Yucca Mountain. By the time I taught the class again in 
summer of 2011—after the Obama administration had tabled Yucca Mountain—the 
website had disappeared, and I was unable to locate any of the documents or maps about 
Yucca that I had used two years earlier. Documents about Yucca Mountain are not the 
only ones that have become difficult or impossible to locate through Energy.gov:  
Documents of all sorts have simply disappeared from public view as a 
result of website consolidation and reorganization, and this has 
repercussions not just for the general public and independent researchers 
but also for federal employees and contractors who use the Energy 
Department website and are no longer able to refer to historic 
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documents—such as loan guarantees for nuclear power plants or 
Environmental Impact statements for energy projects. (Stover) 
It may seem like these documents would be available elsewhere after disappearing from 
the web, but some are only available through Freedom of Information Act requests, 
which require writing letters that may never receive responses (Stover).  
 One problem is that the federal government does not set specific standards for 
web-based transparency. As Stover notes, every government agency interprets “open 
government” in a different way: “For some departments, ‘open government’ means a 
serious effort to make information easier to find. For others, it simply means summer 
interns scanning documents into PDFs with poorly worded tags, posting newsy articles 
with attractive photos, and opening Twitter and Facebook accounts.” Without guiding 
principles or regulations, agencies can share information until it no longer suits them to 
do so. Documents can easily be altered, moved, or deleted without penalty. Though these 
practices square with neither the DOE’s Openness Initiative nor the Obama 
administration’s rhetoric about open government, they generally go unnoticed and create 
little controversy. 
Still, many of the Obama administration’s new media officials pride themselves 
on making information widely available to the public, and so five days after Stover’s 
piece appeared online at the Bulletin, the DOE answered with a blog post at Energy.gov. 
Cammie Croft—who was named the DOE’s Senior Advisor and Director of New Media 
and Citizen Engagement in May 2010—responded to Stover’s critiques (without linking 
to Stover’s article, thereby avoiding further circulation of the Bulletin piece) and 
defended the DOE’s informational practices: “One of the biggest challenges for federal 
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websites—including Energy.gov—is managing the millions of PDFs the government has 
online. That challenge existed before our redesign and still exists today.” The 
government’s effort to organize and tag millions of documents is undoubtedly 
cumbersome work, but Croft insists that Energy.gov’s redesign made it possible “quickly 
[to] elevate additional Yucca Mountain documents, update their metadata and make them 
more findable,” all “within a couple days of the concern being raised.”16 Throughout her 
blog post, Croft maintains that changes to the DOE website have made the government 
more—not less—responsive to the public. She closes her post with an optimistic 
assessment of the Department’s online work: “At the Energy Department, we’re striving 
each day to make Energy.gov better and achieve the principles of Open Government: 
transparency, participation, and collaboration.” 
 What Croft’s answer misses is that every change in the location or overall 
availability of crucial information about the weapons complex amounts to a new form of 
redaction. Once activists brought an end to the era of weapons production in the U.S. and 
the federal government released thousands of documents about what had gone on there, 
some of those documents were still partially redacted. In other words, key elements were 
literally blacked out. In an era when U.S. citizens still have much to learn about the 
history of the nuclear weapons complex and much to decide about its fate, any change in 
the availability of information—regardless of whether the intention is to contain scandals 
(like the $10 billion spent on construction of a waste repository that may never be used) 
or simply to reorganize information—may be a step backwards. Government secrecy and 
deliberate attempts to erase institutional memory of what has happened within the nuclear 
weapons complex have obstructed prolonged conversation about its waste problems. The 
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Internet makes it possible for information to last practically forever, but it also allows 
information effectively to disappear into that vast “forever” without a trace and without 
an explanation. If the DOE genuinely wants to cultivate openness and transparency via 
the web, it will have to take care not to bury, alter, or remove documents.  
While Croft insists—somewhat vaguely—that the “Energy.gov of today [. . .] is 
much better than what was offered before,” the DOE’s recent moves to present and 
reorganize information on the web represent a new phase in the agency’s attempts to 
control discourse about Hanford more thoroughly. William J. Kinsella explains that the 
principle of containment that operated during the Cold War has affected numerous areas 
of American life and has “served to constrain, contain, and discipline public policy 
discourse,” including discourse generated by the DOE (163). Kinsella uses Hanford as a 
case study since it is a setting “in which containment operates visibly in both the material 
and discursive domains” (164). In other words, there are obvious efforts at Hanford both 
physically to contain radioactive waste and discursively to contain knowledge about the 
Site. He describes two periods in Hanford’s history of containment. During the first 
period, which lasted from 1943 through the mid-1980s, the DOE instituted a “regime of 
secrecy” that cloaked the weapons complex from public view. Since the mid-1980s, the 
DOE has implemented 
a more complex strategy in which information about Hanford is far less 
restricted, but the meanings of that information and the authority to make 
those meanings is rhetorically contained (by the Department of Energy) 
and contested (by other federal and state agencies, activists, 
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environmentalists, local and regional communities, and Native American 
tribes). (164-65) 
The remainder of this chapter will show how the DOE has made formerly secret 
information more readily available but simultaneously intensified its efforts to control the 
public’s interpretation of that information. This has become increasingly necessary for 
the agency, given that public interest organizations can now make information available 
to the public in a matter of minutes via their own web pages and social media sites. 
Organizations like Hanford Challenge—which “exists to transform Hanford’s nuclear 
legacy into a model of safe and effective cleanup”—consistently dispute the narrative 
provided by the DOE. Thus, the Department has tried “to manage its discursive 
environment” in more complex ways, through the use of new and social media. 
 
 “Word [about Hanford] is getting out… to more people than ever before”—or so 
says the title of a January 2013 post on the Hanford Blog. The post describes how 
“Hanford’s story—history, present cleanup mission, and plans for the future—are being 
communicated to a larger, younger, and more diverse audience through the use of new 
and innovative methods” (“Word”). Indeed, the Hanford DOE now communicates with 
the public through its blog, a frequently updated website, Facebook posts, a Twitter feed, 
and videos posted on YouTube. While this may seem like an unremarkable phenomenon, 
the blog post mentioned above suggests that there is something at stake for the DOE not 
only in how many people they are actually contacting but also in being able to claim that 
they are reaching a large and diverse audience. The more people the agency reaches, the 
more it is able to shape public understanding of Hanford. The more it publicizes its 
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attempts to involve the public, the more it can build trust with stakeholders, appear as 
though it has earned public consent, and move forward with controversial cleanup 
plans.17  
This strategy is especially evident at Hanford.gov (accessible at 
www.hanford.gov), which functions as a clearinghouse for information that the Hanford 
DOE makes available to the public. Through this website, the DOE crafts a reassuring 
virtual image of Hanford that belies internal problems with project delays, worker safety, 
unsafe technologies, and the agency’s inability to prevent waste from spreading across 
the Site and into the local environment. These problems have long plagued Hanford, but 
they have received more attention in recent months and years for two related reasons: 
first, advocacy groups have intensified their efforts to ensure safe cleanup at Hanford, 
and, second, those same advocacy groups—often in partnership with Native American 
tribes and Hanford whistleblowers—have brought troubling revelations about the DOE’s 
waste management practices and reporting to light. In other words, Hanford is now 
subject to public dialogue (in a way that it was not during the era of secrecy), and if the 
DOE wants to maintain its credibility, it must try to frame the terms of that dialogue, a 
point Kinsella makes: “information about the practices of nuclear institutions is now 
widely available [, so] the key discursive problem today is the meaning of that 
information. Through claims of expertise, nuclear institutions now seek to define and 
contain these meanings within a single, technocratic narrative which would restore the 
stability of the earlier discursive regime” (189). Today, the DOE cannot completely limit 
the public’s access to information about Hanford, but it can try to shape the public’s 
understanding of the Site’s history and cleanup. Hanford.gov—which the DOE has 
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expanded in recent years—accomplishes this by weaving new knowledge about Hanford 
into the larger technocratic narrative about nuclear safety and filtering news about the 
Site. 
As stories of Hanford’s mismanagement have received more attention from the 
media, the public’s trust in the DOE has diminished.18 In response, the DOE has 
attempted to cultivate an image of openness and transparency via the Internet. The DOE 
revamped Hanford.gov in early 2010, shortly after the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) injected billions in federal funding into Hanford 
cleanup. The new website allowed the agency to report on cleanup progress made as a 
result of ARRA. Before the overhaul, Hanford.gov offered only basic information about 
Hanford and did little to emphasize the Site’s relationship to the DOE and the wider 
nuclear weapons complex. Up until early 2010, the homepage differentiated between the 
Richland Operations Office and the Office of River Protection, the two offices that 
oversee remediation efforts at Hanford. The website represented these offices with large 
photographs of workers—often in layers of protective clothing—interacting directly with 
plutonium gloveboxes, waste tanks, and other extremely hot (i.e., radioactive) objects. 
Other photos on the homepage captured the beauty of Hanford Reach (the stretch of the 
Columbia River that runs through the Site), sparkling and blue in the sun. Together, these 
photos ensured that visitors to Hanford.gov would see the dangerous labor that goes on at 
Hanford as well as the motivation (a clean, beautiful environment) for that work. Both 
served to justify the billions of dollars in federal money that are spent at the Site every 





Figure 2. Image of www.hanford.gov captured on July 19, 2002 and posted on the 




Figure 3. Image of www.hanford.gov captured on August 15, 2005 and posted on the 




On a superficial level, the Hanford.gov of today presents a sleeker and more 
bureaucratic face to the public than it did in the early 2000s. The new website emphasizes 
its own status as a routinely updated text that gives the public direct access to Hanford 
operations. While the old version of the website gave prominence to photos of workers 
interacting with radioactive waste, the current version of Hanford.gov features text-heavy 
links and flashing notices about the availability of new legal documents that the DOE is 
required to make available to the public. A large panel on the website’s main page 
revolves between recent news items and notices about ways the public can get involved 
in cleanup (such as Site tours and participation in surveys). This version of Hanford.gov 
is easier to navigate, has linked pages with detailed descriptions of projects and initiatives 
happening across the Site, is updated more frequently than the former versions of the 
website, and is, generally, directed at the public (as evidenced by its emphasis on public 
involvement). (See Figure 4.) 
 
Figure 4. Image of www.hanford.gov captured (by the author) on June 26, 2013. 
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Nevertheless, Hanford.gov does not exist to make the public aware of major 
events at the Site; quite the contrary, its primary purpose is to divert attention from the 
many scandals unfolding there. While the Hanford website gives anyone with an Internet 
connection access to an unprecedented amount of information about the Site’s history and 
operations, that information is manipulated to reassure readers that the DOE is a fiscally 
and environmentally responsible agency that holds itself accountable to the public. Two 
changes to the appearance of the Hanford.gov homepage facilitate this redirection. First, 
the DOE no longer features photos of hazmat-suited workers on the website’s front page. 
This may signal the agency’s reluctance to represent itself with images of employees who 
are visibly endangered by their close contact with radioactive waste (though the DOE 
certainly posts many photos of workers handling waste on its Facebook page, where it 
uses such images as evidence of progress on specific cleanup projects). Another change 
to the appearance of the Hanford.gov homepage appears to invite the public to learn 
about Hanford, but it leads to a dead end. Though online registration for “Hanford Public 
Site Tours” (four-hour bus tours of former production areas and remediation projects) 
generally closes within hours of being offered to the public, the announcement for tours 
continues to rotate on the Hanford.gov home page for the entire year. 
 Other pages of Hanford.gov appear to present neutral background on the Site but 
actually work to normalize Hanford’s decades of plutonium production, its ongoing 
cleanup (which has no definitive end date), and its continued colonization of a massive 
area of land. In the “About Us” section of the website under “Hanford Cleanup,” the 
DOE portrays Hanford as a factory like any other and casts doubt on those who would 
contradict that view: “For more than forty years, reactors located at Hanford produced 
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plutonium for America’s defense program. The process of making plutonium is 
extremely ‘inefficient’ in that a massive amount of liquid and solid waste is generated 
while only a small amount of plutonium is produced” (“Hanford Cleanup”). By observing 
that Hanford made plutonium for over four decades, the agency suggests that everything 
operated normally during that period. It then effectively undermines critics’ claims that 
Hanford was an especially dirty enterprise. The agency concedes that “the process of 
making plutonium is extremely ‘inefficient’” but also questions that claim by placing the 
word “inefficient” in quotation marks. By simultaneously addressing and disputing facts 
about Hanford’s waste, the DOE leaves readers feeling uncertain about what to believe. 
The agency pursues a similar strategy when discussing groundwater contamination: 
The liquid waste that had been poured onto the ground or held in ponds or 
trenches has long since evaporated or soaked into the soil on the Site. In 
doing so, the waste did contaminate some of the soil and is thought to 
have also created underground “plumes” of contaminants. A “plume” is 
kind of like an underground river where the contaminants join with the 
water that exists beneath the surface of the Earth. Many of these plumes 
move in varying speeds and move toward the Columbia River. (“Hanford 
Cleanup”) 
This passage illustrates the delicate dance of admission and denial that is characteristic of 
the DOE’s rhetoric about Hanford. When the agency says “the waste did contaminate 
some of the soil,” the word “did” suggests that this passage is responding to an oblique 
conversation in which the agency must begrudgingly admit that Hanford polluted “some” 
of the soil. The DOE makes a similarly reluctant admission when describing underground 
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contamination at Hanford. While the existence of contaminant plumes at Hanford is well 
established, the DOE creates doubt around the science by saying that waste “is thought to 
have created” underground plumes. Even the word “plume” is placed in scare quotes, as 
if the DOE wants to question whether these underground rivers of contaminants are real. 
Emphasizing the word “plume” is a strategy for questioning the accuracy of claims that 
outside groups have made about the mobility of Hanford’s pollution. Even when the 
agency confesses that Hanford has a waste problem, it immediately insists that all of the 
contamination at the Site has been contained and that “precautions have been taken” to 
prevent pollution from spreading (“Hanford Cleanup”). 
 Despite underemphasizing the danger of Hanford’s ever-moving contaminants, 
Hanford.gov presents a long list of cleanup operations that will proceed without 
definitive end dates. The DOE has legal agreements to meet certain deadlines for 
cleanup, but those deadlines are regularly broken.19 Furthermore, the DOE claims that it 
must maintain a presence at Hanford even after cleanup actions are complete, given that 
many portions of the Site will never be fit for other uses. At least ten associated but 
separate pages of Hanford.gov are devoted to explaining what the DOE calls “long-term 
stewardship” (LTS), a program that includes “all activities necessary to ensure protection 
of human health and the environment following completion of cleanup, disposal, or 
stabilization of a site” (“LTS Fact Sheets”). All of these pages highlight the “protection” 
of health and environment; none of them is specific about how long Hanford’s 
contaminants will persist (plutonium has a half-life of 24,000 years, but this is not 
mentioned). Indeed, LTS distorts the traditional meaning of “stewardship,” given that the 
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program protects natural resources not by conserving them but by guarding them from 
deadly wastes.  
The story told by the pages of Hanford.gov fits into a larger technocratic narrative 
that encourages the public to trust the recommendations of nuclear scientists and 
engineers. This is the same narrative that led to the other slow-motion catastrophes 
happening across the nuclear weapons complex as well as the large-scale disasters at 
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. In the U.S., the government labors to 
convince the public that scientists can both ensure national security through weapons 
production and deliver us from the toxic byproducts of those weapons. To do this, the 
government employs a way of talking about environmental problems that John Dryzek 
calls “administrative rationalism,” a “problem-solving discourse which emphasizes the 
role of the expert rather than the citizen or producer-consumer in social problem solving, 
and which stresses social relationships of hierarchy” (75). It insists that experts have 
everything under control, but “combines a mixture of concern and reassurance” to 
assuage the public (88).  
When Hanford Challenge revealed evidence of a double-shell waste tank leak at 
Hanford in August 2012, the DOE addressed it in the neutral tone of administrative 
rationalism. A leak in a double-shell tank is dangerous in itself, but it also raises concerns 
about the DOE’s approach to waste storage, given that the agency is relying on double-
shell tanks as the best technology available for containing 56 million gallons of liquid 
waste until it can one day be stabilized in glass logs at the Waste Treatment Plant. The 
discovery of the leak has generated much concern from public interest organizations and 
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politicians, but the DOE’s initial response to the event was neutral and distanced. In a 
press release available at Energy.gov, the DOE said, 
The Department of Energy’s Office of River Protection (ORP), working 
with its Hanford tank operations contractor Washington River Protection 
Solutions, has determined that there is a slow leak of chemical and 
radioactive waste into the annulus space in Tank AY-102, the 
approximately 30-inch area between the inner primary tank and the outer 
tank that serves as the secondary containment for these types of tanks. 
This is the first time a double-shell tank (DST) leak from the primary tank 
into the annulus has been identified. There is no indication of waste in the 
leak detection pit outside the DST, which means that no waste has leaked 
out of the annulus and into the environment. (“Office of River Protection”) 
The claim that no waste had leaked out of the annulus was later proven false and would 
also come to seem disingenuous given revelations that the DOE knew about the leak for 
more than a year before it disclosed information about it. The press release illustrates 
administrative rationalism’s mix of restrained concern and science-based reassurance. 
Like other Hanford DOE press releases, it attempts to communicate that the agency has 
total control over its most dangerous waste, and it works to convince readers that cleanup 
is proceeding on schedule and according to an established legal process. This impression 
of control is the basis for Hanford’s expert culture, which dictates that only Hanford 
insiders can understand problems at the Site (and therefore only insiders should make 
decisions about how cleanup proceeds). It is, in fact, challenging for outsiders to 
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understand the complex problems at Hanford, partially because the DOE frequently 
withholds crucial information. 
 Though there are lingering questions about the future of the Waste Treatment 
Plant and about how the DOE will store liquid waste if more tanks leak, Hanford.gov 
continues to avoid controversy and to focus on remediation activities the agency 
characterizes as successful. For example, the “Hanford News” on the front page of 
Hanford.gov (as of late August 2013) announces two recent milestones: “Hanford Site 
Treating Record Amount of Groundwater” and “Hanford Landfill Reaches 15 Million 
Tons Disposed.” These are, of course, dubious accomplishments: they celebrate the 
achievements of treating billions of gallons of groundwater and moving millions of tons 
of soil, two feats that signal the reduction and relocation—but not elimination—of risk. 
Still, the DOE links to lengthy descriptions of these two milestones, whereas it offers 
only a paragraph about the leaking double-shell tank (and nothing about a possible tank 
leak detected the night of August 21, 2013 that caused workers to evacuate the C Tank 
Farm).20 Hanford.gov appears to be a definitive source on Hanford, but it diverts attention 
from accidents, leakages, and scandals, and attempts to minimize the most serious threats 
to human and environmental health, dismissing the concerns expressed by outside 
groups. However, and regardless of how much Hanford.gov distorts information, the 
website is far more restrained than the Hanford Site Facebook page, which takes 
distraction to a new level by using Hanford’s natural beauty, photographic evidence of 
cleanup progress, and support for Hanford workers to build community spirit and trust in 
the DOE. And while Hanford.gov has largely ignored the Site’s recent waste tank leaks, 
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the Hanford Site Facebook page has reluctantly responded to them, though quite 
awkwardly, as I will explain. 
 
On February 8, 2013, the DOE changed the cover photo of the Hanford Site 
Facebook (FB) page to a striking aerial photograph of the Columbia River.21 In the photo, 
the river weaves from the background to the foreground, turning from white-blue to sky 
blue. A road runs along one side of the river, and tiny buildings are visible in the 
distance, but the land is otherwise unmarred by human activity. The terrain, a mix of 
flatlands and white, shadowy bluffs, looks like a relief map painted in shades of brown. 
The earthy colors and the time of day make the entire photo look hazy, and the haziness 
makes the Scablands beautiful.22 On that same day, as always, Hanford Site’s profile 
picture sat in the lower left-hand corner of the cover photo. The picture is a cartoonish 
version of the DOE’s seal, which consists of a shield decorated with tiny depictions of the 
sun, an atom, an oil well, a windmill, and a turbine—symbols that represent the agency’s 
many energy-related initiatives—and a bald eagle, in profile.23 (See Figure 5.)  
This juxtaposition of images—river side by side with government insignia—
exemplifies the strange mixture of informally expressed pride (in Hanford’s 
accomplishments and its natural beauty) and official discourse that appears on the 
Hanford Site FB page. While the DOE’s seal marks the page as a legitimate source of 
information about Hanford, the cover photo—which spans most of the page—
demonstrates the DOE’s attention to matters beyond its official mission at Hanford. 
Instead of depicting an environmental remediation project (as other photos on the 
Hanford Site FB page do), this photo takes the Columbia as its subject, giving viewers a 
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glimpse of a place that is generally unseen because the federal government owns and 
manages both sides of the river. But the DOE lays claim to this area in more than a 
physical sense. By using this stretch of the river to represent itself on FB, the DOE 
paradoxically claims the authority to inscribe its own meanings on the land and argues 
that the land itself defines the Site. Despite the fact that Hanford has irrevocably polluted 
the area, the DOE represents the river as beautiful and uses that beauty to publicize its 
remediation efforts.24  
 
Figure 5. Image of Hanford Site Facebook page, captured on February 21, 2013. 
 
 Indeed, when one takes a step back, the Hanford Site FB page looks more like 
publicity for the DOE than a reliable source of information for citizens. The page allows 
the DOE to cultivate an image of transparency even as it works to shape viewers’ 
perceptions of the Site’s meaning. By offering a wealth of knowledge about the Hanford 
Site and its community (that would otherwise go undisclosed), the DOE creates the 
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appearance of openness and establishes itself as the primary authority on the Site. 
However, the FB page fails to report on the events and projects that seem most pressing 
to outsiders. Visitors to the FB page learn little about the Site’s history of radioactive 
colonialism, its prolonged and expensive cleanup, and the government’s inability to 
contain threats to people and the environment. Instead, the DOE uses the FB page to 
engage in what Kinsella calls “rhetorical boundary management”:  
[The DOE’s] strategies of discursive containment [have] evolved from the 
inelegant principle of secrecy to a more subtle principle of rhetorical 
boundary management. With this shift, concern [has] moved from the 
questions of “who knows” or “what is known” about Hanford and its 
organizational and technical practices, to what that knowledge means and 
to the related question of who participates in the making of those 
meanings. Informational boundaries have been replaced by boundaries on 
meaning, and on the interpretive authority to establish legitimate 
meanings. (167) 
Because the DOE can no longer maintain strict informational boundaries (following 
disclosures about its current and former recklessness), it has shifted its discursive strategy 
to one of tightly controlled self-revelation. By posting text and photos every few days on 
a social network that reaches over a billion subscribers, the DOE makes it appear as 
though it has nothing to hide.  
However, the page’s interpretation of Hanford’s meaning is completely at odds 
with the interpretations of public interest groups, local Native American tribes, and the 
vast majority of journalists reporting on Hanford. The DOE uses the FB page to establish 
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its credibility, likeability, and openness (primarily through the visual rhetoric of photos) 
and then uses its “interpretive authority” to minimize concerns about Site management. A 
troubling example of this is the Hanford Site FB page’s handling of the recent waste tank 
leaks at Hanford. For the most part, the FB page has remained silent about the leaks. 
When it has posted about them, the information has been sandwiched between other posts 
that engage in the FB page’s usual celebration of Hanford history and cleanup. 
Hanford.gov and the Hanford Site FB page are alike in their attempts to direct the 
public’s attention away from controversy and scandals and in their lack of meaningful 
engagement with the public. FB provides the opportunity for users to comment on the 
DOE’s activity—and one might think that some of the DOE’s posts would generate 
confused or outraged replies—but very few people comment on the DOE’s status 
updates, and the DOE does not request feedback. Indeed, the Hanford Site FB page does 
almost nothing to promote discussion or analysis of Hanford’s problems and few 
questioning or dissenting voices are represented there—with one exception that I will 
discuss at the end of this section. 
In order to establish its credibility and cultivate the impression that the DOE is an 
open, effective, and community-minded organization, the Hanford Site FB page posts 
photos of what it considers newsworthy events. Indeed, the DOE has posted thousands of 
photos there over the last few years, some of which capture buildings and areas that could 
not be spoken about publicly (let alone photographed) during the era of secrecy. This 
gives visitors the impression that they are being given insider access to a place that is 
otherwise off-limits (to both the public and the news media).25 Besides that, many of the 
photos feel intimate: they create a sense of familiarity with the broken landscape of the 
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Site as well as with its workers, who are portrayed doing cleanup work, giving tours, and 
engaging in community service. (See Appendix A for examples of Hanford Site FB 
photos.) 
Most of the photos posted on the FB page fit neatly into one of five categories: 
progress, safety, nature, visitors, and public relations. Presented together, these photos 
subtly argue that Hanford cleanup is occurring safely, transparently, and as planned, 
against a spectacularly scenic backdrop. A large collection of photos that emphasize 
progress show building demolition and construction, remediation of specific areas, and 
photos of sites like the F area (home to a decommissioned reactor) whose cleanup has 
been declared complete. Images that portray safety at the Site show DOE officials 
receiving safety awards, workers in protective clothing finishing dangerous jobs safely, 
and activities at the Site’s Volpentest Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency 
Response (HAMMER) Training Facility. Photos of nature depict serene or dramatic 
scenes like the Columbia River at sunset, Rattlesnake Mountain covered in snow, deer 
tracks in a remediation area, and a coyote running through the brush. Visitors pictured in 
photos include Site archaeologists touring with Cold War-era Hanford employees, the 
Washington State governor and U.S. Secretary of Energy, and engineers from the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (who hope to use Hanford as a model of nuclear cleanup after 
the Fukushima disaster). There are also dozens of photos that show DOE officials 
engaging directly with the public: opening the Hanford Story kiosk at the Richland Public 
Library, speaking at local schools as part of the Hanford Speakers Bureau, and visiting 
local Native American tribes’ museums and field stations. Together, these five categories 
of photos create the impression that the DOE is a benevolent, forthright agency that 
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serves the public interest; that Hanford is home to a community of conscientious and 
devoted employees; and that nature is thriving at the Site. Despite the dangers portrayed 
in some images, the overall tone of the photos is celebratory. More than anything, the 
Hanford Site FB page builds excitement about progress on cleanup projects, the hard 
work of employees, and the DOE’s efforts to reach out to the public. This is what enables 
the DOE’s discursive containment of the scandals at Hanford; without positive images of 
Hanford, the agency could not convincingly argue that everything is under control at the 
Site.  
And yet there are vast and obvious gaps in what knowledge the DOE makes 
available to the public, as evidenced by the agency’s response to new evidence of leaking 
waste tanks. Glossy photos and informal informational posts that express pride in the 
DOE’s work at Hanford (like the one discussed at the beginning of this chapter) 
communicate that cleanup is proceeding safely and efficiently, but reports from advocacy 
groups and the media tell another story. Even though the Hanford Site FB page covers 
news that ranges from the momentous to the mundane, including visits from government 
officials, recent snowfall at the Site, and cleanup landmarks reached, the page gives very 
few details about the most controversial and alarming events that occur at Hanford. The 
page’s silence about recent revelations of leaking waste tanks is the most recent example 
of this. As noted above, Hanford Challenge—a public interest group that advocates for 
“safe and effective cleanup”—released the news that a double-shell tank (called AY-102) 
at Hanford is leaking in mid-August 2012 (Hanford Challenge, “About”). The DOE did 
not admit to the “tank failure” until October 2012 (Hanford Challenge, “Leaking”). The 
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tank leak saga is still unfolding now—in August of 2014—and the DOE remains 
reluctant to admit to failure.  
 The AY-102 leak presents a serious challenge to the DOE’s professed 
understanding of the waste tanks and to its central plans for remediation, though the 
agency does not admit that at Hanford.gov or on its FB page. There are 177 underground 
waste tanks at Hanford, and each one contains a unique brew of radioactive and chemical 
wastes. Of the 177 waste tanks, 149 are single-shelled—made from one layer of carbon 
steel encased in reinforced concrete. Hanford engineers built these temporary, single-
shell tanks between 1943 and 1964, once they realized that they could not continue to 
dump large volumes of waste from plutonium processing directly into the environment.26 
Between 1968 and 1986, Hanford workers built another 28 waste tanks using a double-
shell design. Since then, the DOE has counted on these double-shell tanks to contain 
waste until it can be stabilized at the Waste Treatment Plant (which has been plagued by 
design flaws, contractor malfeasance, skyrocketing costs, and long-term delays that make 
its opening date highly unpredictable).27 As recently as April 5, 2013, a page of 
Hanford.gov dedicated to describing Hanford’s tank farms referred to the supposed 
durability of the double-shell tanks: “These [newer] tanks [are] sturdier, made with a 
second shell to surround the carbon steel and the reinforced concrete. Called ‘double shell 
tanks,’ these tanks have not leaked any of their waste since being put into service” (“Tank 
Farms,” April 5). Now that the agency has admitted to the failure of AY-102 (which 
holds approximately 857,000 gallons of radioactive and chemical waste), it has deleted 
the line about none of the tanks leaking. Such deletions happen quietly, even in 
circumstances that are particularly alarming, like this one. 
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 Indeed, the DOE has provided little background about the tanks in its posts to 
Hanford.gov and the Hanford Site FB page despite the fact that context is important to 
understanding the situation. Hanford’s waste tanks were only meant to last 20-40 years, 
and they were “never designed to permanently store high-level radioactive waste,” yet the 
majority of them are still in service (Hanford Challenge “Tank Waste”). The single-shell 
tanks are considered less durable, so the DOE has actually been transferring liquid wastes 
from leak-prone single-shell tanks into some of the double-shell tanks.28 Anna King, a 
longtime Hanford journalist who currently reports for Oregon Public Broadcasting, 
summarized the anxieties created by the AY-102 leak: 
The only problem is now we have found out that one of those double-shell 
tanks that was supposedly one of the newer, stronger-hulled tanks they 
were emptying the single-shell tanks into is now leaking internally. 
Although it’s a slow leak, it is concerning because if one tank is leaking 
there could be others. That’s what they’re [the DOE is] looking into now.  
It’s like a game of cups where you keep removing one cup and 
transferring the liquid into the remaining cups. But you have so much 
liquid and only so many cups to keep it in. If you keep eliminating cups, 
eventually you’re going to run out of places to store the liquid. (King) 
King pinpoints the impossibility of the situation: the DOE has been at a loss for where to 
store millions of gallons of liquid waste for decades, and Hanford has become a de facto 
waste storage site. The Tri-Party Agreement—the 1989 agreement between the DOE, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and Washington State Department of Ecology 
that governs Hanford cleanup—dictates that the DOE “must remove 99% of the material 
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in every tank on the Site, or at least as much waste that can be removed based on 
available technology,” so there is a legal imperative for the DOE to find a solution to the 
game of cups King describes (US DOE, “Tank Farms”). 
 Despite the low-level panic induced by the AY-102 leak (“low-level” because 
Hanford is such an unspectacular, perpetually unfolding disaster that none of the worst 
news to come out of the Site inspires the terror that it might), the Hanford Site FB page 
made no mention of it. When Hanford Challenge disclosed news of the tank leak in 
August 2012, the advocacy group quickly followed up the revelation with links to media 
coverage on its FB page, newsletters with analysis about what steps the DOE should take 
next, and continued inquiries into the tank situation. In comparison to Hanford Challenge 
(and despite the fact that the DOE has the most information about the tanks), the Hanford 
Site FB page was silent. In the days after Hanford Challenge released news of the leak, 
the Hanford Site FB page—rather than posting news on the leak—posted a photo album 
called, “Feds Feed Families,” in which Hanford workers are pictured transporting the 
thousands of pounds of food they collected to feed people in the local community. 
Whether this was purposeful distraction or a sign of the Hanford community’s 
desensitization to crisis, the result was the same: the DOE did not communicate news 
about a major threat to the Site’s groundwater, cleanup plans, and tank workers (who 
monitor the tanks everyday). Instead, by celebrating daily life at the Site, the DOE 
distracts from matters that require the public’s awareness and input and lulls people into 
accepting the status quo of inadequate monitoring, inattention to problems, and worker 
endangerment. 
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 Hanford’s management structure allows the Site’s public affairs staff to avoid 
releasing information about tank leaks via the Hanford Site FB page. Though “Hanford 
Site” is the Site’s main FB page, it is maintained by the Richland Operations Office, 
which does not work directly on tank issues. The management entity that does oversee 
the tank farms, the Office of River Protection (ORP), maintains its own FB page, which 
is called “River Protection Project.” Since the title of this page does not even include the 
word “Hanford,” people searching for information about Hanford on FB are unlikely to 
stumble upon its updates about waste tank treatment. Secrecy continues to be an 
operating principle at Hanford, though the rhetorical tools the DOE now employs are less 
obvious than the agency’s former approach of simply designating as classified all 
controversial information (Kinsella 165). Even when the River Protection Project posts 
about the tank leaks, it remains evasive, as in this post that describes the ORP’s 
inspection of the area between the two shells (known as the annulus) of AY-102: 
A second riser was visually inspected last week and additional material 
was identified in the annulus near this second riser. At this time, it is 
unknown if the material is radioactive. This area of the tank annulus was 
previously viewed in 2006, providing historical benchmarking data [. . .]. 
We are continuing our investigation, including gathering additional 
information from other tank risers. (River Protection Project, 
“OVERVIEW”) 
The DOE is cautious about whether the unknown material in the space between the shells 
is radioactive, likely because the tank leak has already created public relations 
difficulties. The DOE has not taken the precautions necessary to prevent waste leaks (in 
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that it has not replaced or emptied aging tanks), but it avoids blame by employing 
noncommittal language and insisting that it needs more time to analyze the problem.29   
 The DOE has discovered several new tank leaks since the AY-102 crisis, but 
regardless of how dire the situation gets, the DOE’s FB response remains the same: the 
agency continues to focus on cleanup progress, community service, and visits from 
government officials—in other words, anything but the tank leaks. On February 22, 2013, 
Washington Governor Jay Inslee announced that a whole new level of disaster had been 
reached at Hanford: after the leaks in tanks AY-102 and T-111 (a single-shell tank that 
was reported to have been leaking a week earlier), six other underground radioactive 
waste tanks were found to be leaking in the center of the Site (Inslee). This mass of 
leaking tanks poses a threat not only to human and environmental health but also to the 
public’s faith in the management and contractors at Hanford.30 State and federal officials 
are now looking into whether Hanford’s monitoring and maintenance program is 
sufficient, and the government will have to decide how to store waste until the Waste 
Treatment Plant, which is being built to stabilize liquid waste in glass logs, is constructed 
and operational. This could take a decade or longer. News outlets in Oregon and 
Washington are generally the only ones to cover events at Hanford, but the report of the 
six leaking tanks made national and international news. While news agencies in France 
were translating Hanford commentators’ quotations on the tank leaks and advocacy 
organizations like Hanford Challenge were furiously posting updated stories about the 
leak to their FB pages, the Hanford Site FB page said nothing about the leaks. Three days 
later, on February 25, Hanford Site posted a new status update, but it had nothing to do 
with the tank leaks: “Registration for Hanford Site public tours is on March 4 at 6 p.m. 
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So ‘march forth’ and get your spot. Details,” and a link to more information appeared 
below. Thus, two familiar strategies are at work in Hanford Site’s handling of the tank 
leaks: avoidance and distraction. Public affairs staff have avoided any mention of the 
leaks and have instead distracted readers with what might be mistaken for accountability: 
an invitation for citizens to see Hanford themselves. 
 Though the Hanford Site FB page ignored the mass leak event, the River 
Protection Project acknowledged it on the day it was announced by posting a link to a 
Tri-City Herald article about it. The River Protection Project is, in some ways, more 
forthcoming than the Hanford Site FB page, likely because ORP manages the tank waste 
and can more persuasively hide behind technical accounts and measurements. On 
February 25, three days after Governor Inslee announced the new leaks, the River 
Protection Project posted this status update, which was meant to quell anxieties about 
contaminants spilling into the groundwater:  
Lindsey Geisler, DOE spokesperson, on the six leaking Hanford tanks: 
“The Department of Energy is committed to the safe cleanup of the 
Hanford site. The cumulative rates of seepage from the 6 tanks is currently 
estimated to be less than three gallons a day. To put that amount in 
perspective, roughly 1 million gallons of material previously leaked into 
the soil from the single-shell tanks at Hanford over a period of decades. To 
address those tanks that were leaking, by 2005, the Department removed 
all the drainable liquid possible out of the single-shell tanks, into double-
shell tanks. We have not observed any discernible change in the 
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contamination levels in the monitoring wells, but continue to monitor it 
very closely.”  
Here, the DOE tries to reassure the public through careful language that avoids detailing 
what happened to the contamination. When Geisler offers “to put that amount [of 
contamination] in perspective,” she does so by suggesting that the current levels of 
leakage are much smaller than levels measured in the past—as if the public should be 
reassured that Hanford tanks are leaking less than ever, with the implication that those 
past amounts never harmed anything. She also gives what has become a typical report on 
Hanford’s leaking tanks when she says that they are leaking three gallons a day, but the 
DOE has not found contamination in their monitoring wells. None of the DOE’s reports 
provides a possible reason for this discrepancy between what they know about leaks and 
what contamination they have actually measured in the local area. 
 The Hanford Site FB page has made very little mention of the tank leaks, but 
when it did mention the leak of single-shell tank T-111, it used similarly evasive, 
distancing language. Many Hanford Site status updates include an informal description of 
the event being described, clever wordplay, or an invitation to “check out” the 
information that is being provided. For example, the two status updates before Hanford 
Site mentioned the T-111 leak were playful: “Down to the core. Tri-City Herald covers 
preparations to cocoon Hanford’s K East Reactor” and “Vote for your favorite flashback 
story on KGW-TV Portland on Monday, Kennedy at Hanford or Nixon in Portland.” By 
contrast, the Hanford Site FB page announced the T-111 leak by linking to the DOE’s 
press release: “Office of River Protection Confirms a Decrease of Liquid Level in 
Hanford Single-Shell Tank.” Here, the FB page uses the title of the press release and says 
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nothing more. The title’s equivocal language—in which the world “leak” is replaced by 
“decrease of liquid level,” as if the tank’s contents just evaporated—is characteristic of 
DOE press releases about controversial topics. The press release itself goes on to say, 
“Monitoring wells in the T Tank Farm, where Tank T-111 is located, have not identified 
significant changes in concentrations of chemicals or radionuclides in the soil.” While the 
DOE cannot detect that anything has leaked from the tank, the press release notes that 
“this tank was classified as an assumed leaker in 1979,” and though “pumpable liquids 
were removed” in the mid-1990s, “data indicate the current rate of loss of liquids from 
the tank could be in the range of 150 to 300 gallons over the course of a year” (Hanford 
Site “Office”). This string of assertions—which claims that the tank contains less liquid 
than it did before, but no waste has been found beneath it, though it may actually be 
leaking hundreds of gallons a year—is so careful to avoid conclusions that it confuses 
more than it clarifies. Like other Hanford press releases, it avoids putting this tank leak 
into a larger context and fails to interpret what this might mean for the local environment, 
human health, and future work at Hanford. 
 Though the DOE has worked to contain this scandal by limiting the information it 
provides to the public and couching its revelations with reassurances about safety, a DOE 
FB post about the recent tank leak inspired one FB user to criticize the agency’s waste 
management practices. On the same day the DOE posted the news release on the tank 
leak, a FB user (whose name I have blacked out) posted this comment: “The DOE along 
with WRPS says the union workers have [too] good of benefits yet [we’re] the ones that 
have to clean that crap up. And they wonder why we get sick.” Here, a Hanford worker 
protests that the DOE and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), the contractor 
 77 
that manages Hanford’s tank farms, try to reduce employee benefits during union 
negotiations, and yet tank workers face risks to their lives and health each day when they 
are monitoring and maintaining Hanford’s tanks. Though there is much public concern 
about Hanford’s poisoning of the environment and expensive, ineffective cleanup, this is 
one of the only dissenting comments to appear on the Hanford Site FB page. Whether this 
is because the DOE deletes such comments or because many of those who would voice 
dissent (such as Hanford employees) fear retribution, the dearth of protest confirms that 
the Hanford Site FB page is not a forum for meaningful exchange on Hanford issues. 
(The DOE did not respond to the worker’s remarks.) Regardless, the very structure of 
Facebook creates the potential for debate. While very little discussion has happened there 
thus far, this comment proves that the DOE cannot always control the story when it is 
posting in a public forum. (See Figure 6.)  
                   
Figure 6. Hanford Site Facebook (FB) status update, posted on February 15, 2013, 
including response from FB user. 
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 The DOE can, however, easily manage its discursive environment when it is the 
only voice allowed to speak. This is the situation in my third subject of analysis, The 
Hanford Story, a video series the DOE began to release starting in April 2011.31 Unlike 
the Hanford Site FB page, which creates opportunities for public comment (however 
limited they are and however infrequently they are used), The Hanford Story represents 
what the DOE says about Hanford when it is not directly accountable to the public. 
Indeed, The Hanford Story transpires in time outside of time and in a world where dissent 
and scandal do not exist.  
The DOE’s current goal is to complete significant cleanup along the Columbia 
River Corridor in order to shrink its cleanup “footprint” to a 75-square-mile area at the 
center of the Site.32 In order to sell its plans for new types of land management and help 
the regional community adjust to a new phase in long-term environmental cleanup, the 
DOE has intensified its public relations efforts. Those efforts culminated in the release of 
The Hanford Story, a video series produced by Lockheed Martin Creative and Strategic 
Services.33 Together, the seven parts of the series, titled Overview, Groundwater, 
Recovery Act, Tank Waste Cleanup, The Future, Plutonium Finishing Plant, and River 
Corridor, argue that Hanford cleanup efforts are under control and that the Site and 
region have entered “a new era” in which Hanford will represent opportunity, innovation, 
and a clean environment.  
The Hanford Story would like to give the impression that it tells the one, 
definitive narrative about the Site, but a closer look reveals that it presents a biased 
version of the Site’s past, an unreasonably optimistic view of its present condition, and a 
disturbingly utopian version of its future. The videos so conspicuously avoid controversy 
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and undermine the claims of those who have exposed the harm Hanford has done to 
people and the environment that one would think they could only engender public distrust 
of the DOE. However, The Hanford Story effectively masquerades as an educational 
film; indeed, the Overview won a Northwest Emmy for best historical program.34 The 
tone and content of The Hanford Story make one thing very clear: the DOE banks on the 
assumption that the American public will have forgotten (or never learned) about what 
happened at Hanford during several wars and what is still going on there today: 
unchecked releases of life-threatening pollutants and efforts to limit the public’s 
knowledge of those releases. Whether most viewers realize it or not, The Hanford Story 
deliberately writes over other versions of Hanford’s history and does rhetorical violence 
to the Site’s victims.  
 Before The Hanford Story can advance its own version of history, it works to 
position the DOE as the definitive authority on the Site and to foreclose discussion of the 
waste management, financial, and ethical controversies that tend to define it in the public 
imagination. The first video, Overview, opens with a tellingly dismissive statement from 
a DOE spokesperson: “A lot of the people come here with a lot of questions; a lot of 
people come here with some concerns.” In this vague pronouncement, the spokesman 
implies that the government has privileged knowledge about Hanford and that “people” 
(members of the public) come to the Site with a lack of knowledge (represented by their 
“questions” and “concerns”). This statement does not take into account that the public’s 
concerns about Hanford—which are consistently validated by news reports—stem from 
the government’s imposed secrecy, willful deception, and gross mismanagement of life-
 80 
threatening waste. This opening scene perpetuates the lay versus expert divide and sets a 
tone of condescension for the rest of the video series. 
 Instead of addressing the public’s concerns, the videos engage in several means of 
distraction, including constant attention to areas of Hanford where the non-human world 
seems to dwarf human influence. The DOE spokesperson at the beginning of the video 
disappears, and nature scenes flash on the screen, carrying the viewer over the Columbia 
River and across Hanford’s less-altered landscapes, away from the deadly waste that 
requires human intervention. Then, the scene abruptly shifts back to the human world and 
what appears to be a representation of public opinion about the Site. The video interviews 
a series of people and, one by one, they muse over what they would say if they had to 
describe Hanford in a single word. Twenty-four people offer their responses (though their 
opinions are obviously scripted), and the scene shifts among them as they give this series 
of answers: “The one word I would use to describe Hanford would be change.” 
“Massive.” “Enormous.” “Employment.” “I suppose it’s cleanup.” “Controversial.” 
“Toxic.” “Taxes.” “Technology.” “Bureaucracy.” “Nuclear weapons production.” “I 
think of testing.” “Energy.” “Science.” “Jobs.” “Unsustainable.” “Money pit.” “Historic.” 
“Chaotic.” “Radioactivity.” “Impossible.” “Unbelievable.” “Unsafe.” “Complicated.” 
While most of these words are positive or relatively neutral, words like “radioactivity,” 
“impossible,” and “unsafe” reflect the well-documented sense of dread that the public 
experiences in response to nuclear technologies (Slovic, Flynn, and Layman 1606). 
Though this is what many people feel about Hanford, the videos do not linger on negative 
images; instead, the program’s host (a male actor with an authoritative tone) appears and 
neutralizes any controversy that may have been represented in that scene. With a 
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knowing smile, he offers a condescending summary of people’s impressions: “Maybe the 
best word is ‘complex.’ Welcome to Hanford.” This pronouncement sets the tone for the 
rest of the series. Descriptions like “chaotic” (which suggest that Hanford’s pollution and 
management are out of control) never surface again. Instead, the sense that Hanford’s 
problems are “complex”—challenging, but not troubling—pervades the entire series. 
This scripted simulation of dialogue between citizens and the DOE fails to 
represent conflicting views; instead, it suppresses dissent and forecloses discussion, both 
of which are necessary to democratic decision making at Hanford. Rather than 
acknowledging that the public has valid reasons to believe that Hanford is “unsafe” and 
“toxic,” the video series uses actors, graphics, interviews with supporters, and carefully 
selected elements of Hanford’s story to insist that viewers should associate Hanford with 
the positive images elicited by some of the words in the list above, including “jobs,” 
“cleanup,” “technology,” “science,” and “energy.” The video’s storytelling is an instance 
of the DOE’s “decide, announce, defend” strategy, which sees public participation as an 
end in itself rather than a means to better decision-making.35 Instead of acknowledging 
the legitimacy of the public’s fears and then working to address them, the video series 
tells viewers what to believe about Hanford’s past and present and then announces how 
the government will use the land there in the future.  
 Once the Overview contains dissenting views, it rewrites Hanford’s destructive 
past in order to justify the DOE’s current and future plans for remediation. Though the 
entire series is dedicated to describing the expensive and frustrating cleanup of one of the 
most contaminated sites in the world, it never finds fault with Hanford’s operations or 
acknowledges the suffering the Site has caused for an untold number of people. Indeed, it 
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consistently characterizes Hanford’s mission as patriotic and even describes the Site’s 
history as “one of our nation’s most compelling stories” (Overview). Instead of 
acknowledging that Hanford was made into a national sacrifice area without the consent 
of the American public or people living in the area, the Overview frames the Site’s 
origins by defending its establishment: “the Hanford most people are familiar with was 
born out of an intense race to produce the world’s first atomic bomb during the Second 
World War.” Again and again, the DOE uses the threat posed by despots during WWII as 
a justification for everything that came after at Hanford despite the fact that most of 
Hanford’s production and pollution happened after the U.S. dropped bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan surrendered. Indeed, the Overview glosses over the 
feverish weapons production of the Cold War era in a single sentence: “Ushering in the 
atomic age, Hanford continued to support America’s peace through strength policies 
throughout the Cold War, producing enough plutonium to maintain a continual and 
formidable deterrent to any potentially hostile nation, namely, the Soviet Union.” Thus, 
the video argues that Hanford accomplished three missions, all three of which can be 
used to justify the existence of such intractable pollution problems: the Site paved the 
way for the “atomic age,” supported the country’s pursuit of “peace,” and defended the 
country from the Soviet threat. And yet making weapons is an undeniably hostile act, and 
the “continual” production of plutonium to pursue “peace through strength” meant 
making war on people and the environment at home. 
The video’s denial of that central fact makes it inevitable that The Hanford Story 
also denies the history of conquest, colonization, and nuclear colonialism that began 
before Hanford and continues to this day. In a particularly tone-deaf portion of the 
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Overview’s voiceover, the host describes Hanford’s repeated colonizations (first by white 
settlers and then by the government) in a manner that can only be called light-hearted: 
before there was a Hanford, these windblown plains served Native 
American tribes such as the Wanapum, Yakama, Umatilla, and Nez Perce, 
who hunted, fished, and gathered traditional foods and medicines along 
the banks of the Columbia River. With the Gold Rush and westward 
expansion, early settlers began arriving to the area in the mid-1800s, 
establishing the farming communities of White Bluffs and the Hanford 
township. Life was hard in those days, but the communities flourished, 
growing to a population of some 1300 residents. Everything was hunky-
dory, that is, until 1943. 
The final words of this voiceover are followed by black-and-white footage of WWII 
explosions and the sound of artillery fire. While the narrator seems mildly troubled by 
war, he is not disturbed by his script’s peculiar transition from Native American use of 
the Hanford area to the marginalization of those same people. Though the Wanapum, 
Yakama, Umatilla, and Nez Perce were violently displaced by white settlers, the host 
simply says that “early settlers” arrived “with the Gold Rush and Westward expansion”—
as if frenzied resource extraction and brutal colonization were part of a natural 
progression of events. His preposterous and clumsy claim that “everything was hunky-
dory” intensifies the video’s already outrageous interpretation of history, and in trying to 
sound folksy and casual, the host insults his audience. 
And yet The Hanford Story does not perceive its own awkwardness. Instead, it 
acts as if everything has always been hunky-dory at Hanford. The videos provide no 
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critical interpretation of the past—no acknowledgement of nuclear colonialism, the 
massive releases of pollutants to the air, soil, and water that have made countless people 
ill, or the ways government secrecy and deceit made those problems even worse (since 
people living in the area were never encouraged to take basic precautions like avoiding 
food covered in radioiodine or staying out of the Columbia River near Hanford). Over 
and over, The Hanford Story insists that a “new era” has begun at Hanford, and yet there 
is never any direct acknowledgment of wrongdoing in the previous era. The DOE tries to 
have it both ways: it maintains that cleanup and new business ventures at Hanford are 
part of one, continuing story of environmental protection and economic development, and 
yet simultaneously it claims that the government will revive the landscape and provide 
new economic opportunities, suggesting that a shift is occurring. The very suggestion that 
“a new era” is desirable implies that something went wrong in the former era, and yet the 
Hanford DOE never admits that. 
The DOE is also expert at finessing explanations of how and why waste ended up 
permeating the environment at Hanford. Usually, national security is the justification, as 
in the Overview when the hosts says, “during these critical wartime and national security 
missions, the thought of what to do with the resulting waste and what its impact on the 
environment might be was secondary to the need for immediate production and use of the 
vital plutonium.” In the DOE’s logic, national security with respect to international 
enemies trumps domestic communities’ need for security from exposure to radioactive 
and chemical waste. Plutonium is also considered “vital” to “national security missions,” 
though the word seems out of place here, given that “vital” describes something that is 
indispensable to life—not destructive to it.  
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The DOE has several rhetorical ways around admitting that waste was 
irresponsibly and carelessly dumped in the ground at Hanford. At one point, the host 
says, “nearly 200 million gallons of this waste was held in underground storage tanks or 
worse, returned directly to the ground.” The word “return” suggests that disposal is 
natural—a way to restore what has been extracted and destroyed—but this indirection 
hides the fact that nuclear waste has gone through countless human-directed 
transformations that make it too dangerous for apt comparison with rotting organic 
matter. Deposition of Hanford’s waste could only create deadly land mines for current 
and future Hanford workers as well as those living downwind and downstream.  
The Hanford Story offers other euphemisms to describe how waste was dumped at 
Hanford. In the Overview, a former B reactor worker (whose nostalgia about Hanford 
suggests that it was a safe and pleasant place to work) is interviewed, and he 
euphemistically admits that waste was “distributed” and “discharged” to the middle of the 
Columbia River. Such distancing language masks the revelation that workers were 
poisoning the Columbia River, though the B reactor worker, who also describes waste 
being placed in unlined trenches, insists that “that was how [waste] was disposed of in 
those days.” The worker grins as he describes these irresponsible waste disposal 
practices, but the video redirects viewers’ attention by jumping to a description of 
Hanford’s cleanup project. As in this example, the tone of the series is consistently ill-
suited to its material.   
Much of The Hanford Story comes across as boastful, and the DOE’s pride in 
Hanford’s massive scale and mission is especially evident in the series’ use of 
illustrations. Graphics interpreting Hanford’s size, impact, and waste problems are 
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interspersed throughout The Hanford Story, and their impact is likely why the series was 
nominated for a Northwest Emmy for “best use of graphics.” Hanford’s physical 
presence on the landscape has been secret for so long and the things that have happened 
there are so difficult for outsiders to comprehend that graphics provide necessary visual 
aids. But the videos’ graphics are used for more than interpretation; they also argue that, 
despite its problems, Hanford is worth bragging about. The DOE’s tendency to show off 
is especially evident in the Overview’s first use of graphics, which fly across the screen as 
the host reads these words:  
Hundreds of facilities and buildings along with their supporting 
infrastructure were constructed across the 586-square mile site, an area 
that would easily fit the city of Los Angeles today, with plenty of room to 
spare. In fact, Hanford is a city in its own right, with more than 500 miles 
of road, 1.2 million square feet of facility space, 12,000 phone lines and 
40 meteorological monitoring stations. At its peak, Hanford employed 
some 50,000 people, ranging from laborers and security personnel to 
scientists and engineers. 
During the voiceover, a visual representation of the city of L.A. falls from the top of the 
screen and is superimposed on a map of Hanford. Then, the city swirls and transforms 
into representations of Hanford’s roads, facilities, phone lines, weather stations, and 
employees. At no point is it mentioned that this city was built to produce weapons of 
mass destruction. And it is clear that the DOE is doing more than just reporting the 
numbers; the Hanford Story videos consistently maintain a sense of awe in the face of 
Hanford. For example, right after this description of the site’s infrastructure, the host 
 87 
proudly introduces “one of the world’s greatest construction projects of that era, 
Hanford’s B reactor,” and claims that it “is perhaps the site’s most iconic image.” Though 
the B reactor heralded a dangerous arms race, decades of nuclear proliferation, profound 
suffering, and an untold number of deaths (especially when you include deaths from 
exposure to all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle), the DOE maintains its pride in the 
reactor’s construction and capabilities. The agency exaggerates when it refers to the B 
reactor as iconic, though—the Site has been too secret to produce an iconic image. In 
fact, The Hanford Story can only make such unfounded claims because the public knows 
so little about the Site. The videos take advantage of the public’s lack of knowledge about 
Hanford and attempt to cultivate a misplaced sense of admiration for it. They accomplish 
this by using graphics both to entertain the audience and stand in place of the Site’s 
unsightly realities. 
 Indeed, The Hanford Story’s animations make Hanford’s waste problems appear 
palatable, even benign. The DOE uses more fast-moving, cartoonish illustrations to help 
viewers visualize the shocking waste statistics read in the following voiceover: 
the sheer magnitude of the impact on the environment, resulting in nearly 
incomprehensible numbers, numbers like 270 billion gallons of 
contaminated groundwater, 25 million cubic feet of buried or stored solid 
waste, 23 hundred tons of spent nuclear fuel, 20 tons of plutonium-bearing 
materials and 53 million gallons of waste in 177 underground storage 
tanks. 
Instead of interpreting the incomprehensibility of these numbers with videos of workers 
handling the actual waste, the DOE illustrates groundwater flowing, barrels of solid waste 
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lining up in rows, spent nuclear fuel tipping a scale, plutonium-bearing materials falling 
into a truck, and then a black wave washing away the truck and transforming into 
underground storage tanks. A written description immediately reveals the absurdity of 
this cartoon sequence, but it fits seamlessly into the Hanford Story’s larger intent to 
ensure that people do not learn the truth about Hanford, even as it poses as an educational 
video. The graphics in the video series are meant both to hide Hanford’s realities and 
render them more impressive, but the unthinkable numbers reported in the passages 
above can be tolerated only if viewers have forgotten the meaning of them. And since the 
DOE sums up Hanford’s early years by insisting that “ultimately, the Manhattan Project 
was a success,” it is clear that the agency is not interested in framing the massive waste 
problems as a mistake: for the DOE, these wastes are the accidental legacy of a 
successful military project (Overview). 
 The ultimate evidence that Hanford has been a success comes in the apparent 
health of its ecosystems, and the DOE uses natural scenes throughout The Hanford Story 
to prove the paradox that the Hanford area is simultaneously safe and worth saving. The 
pervasiveness of nature scenes in a seven-part series on a nuclear wasteland is certainly 
remarkable, but it is typical for the DOE. A scene in the middle of the Overview 
illustrates one way the DOE persistently uses nature to assure people that the Hanford 
Site is safe. Once the host has finished describing the immensity of the Site’s waste 
problem (discussed in the passage above that lists the types of waste at Hanford), he 
immediately assures viewers that none of that waste has harmed people: “Significantly, 
Hanford cleanup activities have resulted in exposures to the public that are exceedingly 
low, less than 1 millirem per year, well below regulatory limits.” The host makes this 
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claim as a kayaker on the Columbia River flashes on the screen. The implication is that 
the kayaker would not be allowed on the river if it were unsafe to be there. But several 
things are made unclear by the host’s statement: when and how this “1 millirem” 
measurement was made, through which pathway (air, groundwater, river, or food chain) 
exposure was measured, and which agency’s regulatory limits are not being exceeded. In 
this, the only statement the Overview makes about potential threats to public health, the 
DOE dismisses the public’s concerns with a single, unexplained number and a single 
powerful image; it uses the apparent safety of a person recreating in the river as evidence 
for its claims about safety. 
 Indeed, the DOE consistently invokes nature to dispute its statements about 
Hanford’s waste. Just as the agency uses images of the local landscape to introduce the 
public to Hanford at the beginning of the Overview, it closes the video with similar 
scenes even as it delivers some of the most devastating news about Hanford cleanup. 
Again, the stirring violin music that opened the video rises slowly over the final words 
spoken by the video’s host: “Because cleanup will never result in the complete 
elimination of all contamination, the government will continue to play an active role in 
Hanford’s long-term stewardship, to help protect its magnificent cultural, natural, and 
historic heritage.” Even as the host admits that Hanford will never be completely 
remediated, stunning shots of the sky over the Columbia River, cloud shadows over 
Rattlesnake Mountain, the moon rising over the shores of the Columbia, and salmon 
swimming underwater dispute his pronouncements with their apparent vitality.  
 Preservation, conservation, and recreation are only part of a bewildering array of 
future land uses the DOE unveils in The Hanford Story’s fifth chapter, The Future. The 
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video features testimonials from political leaders and descriptions of land use plans, all 
described with the tone of an extended commercial for the DOE’s utopian hopes. The 
Future opens with testimony from a stiff Tri-City Development Council spokesman who 
assures viewers that “The Tri-Cities has been supportive of national missions since 
1943,” which suggests that people in the region embrace all the economic development 
plans described thereafter. The video quickly moves from economic concerns to a 
powerful statement from local indigenous leader Rex Buck, who is identified as “Leader 
of the Wanapum”: “This place is so sacred that we’re part of this land and this land is part 
of us. I think that’s what we work hard towards, to stay here because this is who we are 
and this is where we belong.” Buck’s testimony provides a powerful reason for the DOE 
to pursue complete cleanup of the Site, but—in the midst of The Hanford Story’s larger 
narrative, which supports nuclear colonialism—the inclusion of that testimony serves 
only to conflate Native Americans’ and whites’ ties to the land. The Wanapum’s 
traditional and sacred relationship to the land becomes an argument for the white 
economic boosters’ development of that same land. Indigenous peoples’ connection with 
the land, which includes specific principles of land management, comes to represent 
everyone’s attachment to the land, regardless of their intentions for it.  
Such conflation becomes even more obvious in the next scene, where child actors 
are brought in to advance a maniacally optimistic view of Hanford’s future. In a portrait 
of innocence, a group of white children play in slow motion on an unnaturally green 
lawn, on a playground, and with a golden retriever. The lilting voices of the children and 
a soundtrack of steady drumming and birdsong give the scene an oddly soothing rhythm. 
One by one, with scripted words in their mouths, the children imagine their futures: 
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“When I grow up, my Hanford will be different.” “It will be a place to explore.” “A place 
to learn.” “My Hanford will be a place” “where people come to visit.” “Work.” “And 
even play here.” “That’s what my Hanford will be.” “Mine too!” “Mine too.” “Mine too.” 
Through these children, the DOE tries to sell its reinvention of Hanford, a reinvention 
that will erase the Site’s history of violence and distract the public from the corruption 
and endless cleanup going on there today. One way to erase history is to equate Rex Buck 
and his people—who have a relationship to the land that requires them to stay in the 
Hanford area, regardless of the contamination—with these children, who repeatedly refer 
to the Hanford area possessively with the words “my” and “mine.” The DOE’s emphasis 
on the children denies the Site’s long history of Native American inhabitation as well as 
the violence done by white settlers and the U.S. government. That the DOE uses children 
points to the importance of taking care of Hanford for future generations, but in the 
agency’s imagined future, Hanford is valued only for tourism, employment, and 
recreation. And in the cleanup era, all groups—regardless of their relationships to the 
area—are depicted as equally invested in the future of the land. Everyone is reduced to a 
“stakeholder” with equal claims in a DOE-controlled political process that will decide the 
future of the landscape at Hanford. 
 The government has, to a large degree, determined the fate of the region in which 
Hanford was built and The Future suggests that the government will continue to make 
decisions for local people in the coming decades. Beginning with a confusing statement 
of faith in the Hanford community’s ability to transition away from weapons production 
and cleanup, the hosts asks viewers to  
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Fast forward to Hanford a few years from now where a community 
founded on harnessing the power of energy over 60 years ago has now 
reinvented itself through energy’s potential. Where a 586-square-mile site 
once home to a nation’s plutonium production efforts and its legacy of 
waste and ensuing cleanup has been reduced to a final waste management 
area less than 10 square miles in size. Transforming the site’s remaining 
land into a vast canvas of preservation, possibility, and opportunity. 
Here, the DOE paints a hopeful vision in which it can “fast forward” past the Site’s 
intractable cleanup and into a future of economic prosperity. “Harnessing the power of 
energy” is a euphemism for making nuclear weapons, but the meaning of a community 
reinventing itself “through energy’s potential” is less clear. If anything, it suggests that 
weapons production (and “its legacy of waste and ensuing cleanup”) will continue to fuel 
the local economy far into the future. The DOE claims that the community is reinventing 
itself, but many of the projects woven into the “vast canvas of preservation, possibility, 
and opportunity” are being driven by federal agencies and private investors. As the host 
notes, “the basic foundation of the future of the Hanford Site is taking shape in 
documents” such as the DOE’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan and the Comprehensive 
Conservation Plan for the Hanford Reach National Monument. In optimistic descriptions 
of those plans, The Future lays out a cacophonous mixture of land uses, suggesting that 
people will go to Hanford to hike, fish, kayak, and camp, visit the Manhattan Project 
Historical Park (which has not been approved by Congress), conduct academic research, 
and work in a thriving industrial center. Repeatedly and throughout the eight-minute 
video, The Future vows that, decades from now, Hanford will have entered “a new era”; 
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that “Tomorrow is a Hanford imagined, a Hanford of possibility”; and that “This is the 
Hanford of tomorrow, a picture of a bright future.” The unfounded assurances that things 
will be different in the future do as much to indict the past as today’s headlines about 
contamination and corruption.  
Unlike other videos in the series, many of which focus on how environmental 
remediation is being conducted, The Future looks past the cleanup era to a time when 
Hanford will be turned over to other uses. In this vision, the Site’s most intractable 
problems have been solved, and the DOE is proud to announce—but not explain—its 
vague plans for “how these lands and associated waste will be managed and monitored 
going forward.” Interspersed between descriptions of the agency’s grand plans for 
Hanford, the host of The Future reassures the public that “All of [these new land uses 
will occur] as the DOE continues to test, measure, and monitor the environment and 
human health to ensure ongoing protection for decades to come.” The agency will 
certainly monitor contaminants in the soil, groundwater, and river at the Site for many 
decades, but the DOE never gives specific details about what it will do to monitor human 
health. Announcing such plans would trigger too much public concern.  
There is substantial evidence to suggest that even if the DOE discovered impacts 
to human health, it would deny the problem or otherwise fail to take action. The agency’s 
precursor, the Atomic Energy Commission, tested employees and local citizens for 
exposure to radiation, but it often did so without their knowledge and without the 
intention to correct radiation exposure problems. Hanford Downwinders’ cases against 
the government and its contractors are still in litigation, two decades after those suits 
were brought forth. Hanford cleanup workers, who experience some of the most 
 94 
significant exposures to the Site’s radioactive and chemical wastes, may be monitored, 
but they are often not given the proper equipment to prevent exposure and they often find 
that their exposure-related symptoms are dismissed by Hanford’s on-site medical clinic.36 
The government has done little to compensate workers and civilians who have been 
damaged by Hanford’s contaminants. 
And yet the video perceives no issues with human health in Hanford’s future, just 
as it foresees no problems with the progress of the Site’s remediation. However, Hanford 
today faces serious, life-threatening challenges, including waste tanks that are leaking 
and potentially explosive and a vitrification plant that may never operate safely. As of 
right now, the DOE is pushing low-level waste toward the center of the Site and juggling 
high-level waste as the agency waits for the Waste Treatment Plant and a national 
geological repository for nuclear waste to be built. The DOE does not have a viable plan 
for dealing with the leaking waste tanks, and there is currently no money from Congress 
to build new tanks.37 And yet, in the utopia laid out in The Future, those problems have 
vanished, and we are left with, “A Hanford that is new, based in potential, powered by 
imagination and made possible by you.” Thus, The Hanford Story makes one last plea for 
the public to make the DOE’s plans possible even as it shifts responsibility for imagining 
a new future onto the viewer. 
 
 Through claims to transparency and the three forms of web communication 
discussed in this chapter, the Department of Energy is attempting to redefine Hanford in 
the public imagination. The DOE’s use of new, web-based communication forms like 
Facebook demonstrates that these tools can be used to disseminate not only useful 
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knowledge but also propaganda. To a large degree, Hanford.gov, the Hanford Site FB 
page, and The Hanford Story merely neutralize citizen concern, close down conversation 
about Hanford’s future, and make a mockery of government transparency. The waste tank 
leakages happening right now are a keen reminder of the fact that Hanford’s violence is 
continually unfolding, and they provide an especially disturbing counterpoint to the 
DOE’s optimistic projections about Hanford. Advocacy groups, local Native American 
tribes, and scholars continue to challenge the DOE’s narrative and to insist that 
“cleanup”—a word I have used throughout this chapter—is a euphemism (since nuclear 
waste can only be contained or relocated—never removed), but even as they labor to 
keep institutional memory alive, the DOE works to dismantle it. Indeed, the agency 
encourages the public to forget (or never learn) about the slow violence occurring in the 




1 To protect the privacy of FB users who have commented on Hanford Site status 
updates, I have blacked out their names. 
2 The news release linked to the status update provides more information about the 
movement of radioactive material described in the FB post: “Today’s transfer [of waste 
from the Columbia River] is the first of six shipments this summer to remove the most 
radioactive material. At the same time, a separate system is being built to remove the rest 
of the sludge from the basin by 2015” (U.S. DOE “First of Hanford’s”). In other words, 




news release explains why: Hanford engineers have had to develop new technologies and 
tools to deal with the sludge. In its description of the shipment, the news release 
repeatedly congratulates workers for performing the task safely, which suggests that it 
was dangerous work. The status update and the news release both downplay the dangers 
and delays. 
3 Hanford Site’s Facebook page frequently engages in wordplay that diverts 
attention from the seriousness of Site operations. For example, on August 9, 2012, 
Hanford Site linked to a video of a celebration and announced: “It’s our ‘treat’ to share 
our b-roll from today’s 200 West Pump and Treat Operations Celebration with you: 
http://ow.ly/cRJVu.” Here, Public Affairs Officers use two meanings of “treat” but 
foreground the pleasure they take in sharing their celebration and suppress the word’s 
usual Hanford meaning: massive groundwater treatment operations. 
4 Not everyone has the opportunity to tour Hanford. The DOE only takes a few 
thousand people on tour each year, and those interested must register beginning at 
midnight on a particular day of the year. Tour tickets are free, but they often “sell out” 
within a few hours.  
5 Several laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), State 
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA; also known as “Superfund”), and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), require the DOE to solicit comments 




6 Hanford.gov can be accessed at www.hanford.gov. A quick search for “Hanford 
Site” on Facebook should bring a user to the DOE’s Hanford FB page. Later in the 
chapter, I will also discuss another Facebook page called “River Protection Project” that 
is maintained by Hanford employees. The Hanford Story videos can be accessed via 
Hanford.gov or from the “HanfordSite” YouTube Channel. Though I will not discuss it 
here (since the account is not very active, and it replicates—with much less substance—
what is posted on Facebook), the Hanford DOE also maintains a Twitter account that 
goes by the username @HanfordSite. 
7 Another scholarly work on Hanford is Findlay and Hevly’s Atomic Frontier 
Days: Hanford and the American West, which focuses not only on production and 
pollution at Hanford (as On the Home Front did) but also on the growth of the Tri-Cities, 
the politics of building the bomb, and the impacts of economic interests and 
environmentalism on the area.  
8 Though some reviewers claim that Gerber was working for the DOE when she 
wrote On the Home Front, she was, in fact, an independent historian when she researched 
and wrote the book. It was only later—once she had demonstrated her knowledge of 
Hanford by doing exhaustive research about the Site and publishing her book—that 
Gerber was hired as a Public Information Officer at Fluor Hanford, Inc., a DOE 
contractor. Despite its praise for Hanford’s engineering achievements, On the Home 
Front presented a revolutionary view of Hanford; it was not only the first book-length 
work on Hanford but also one of the first texts to expose abuses at a specific site in the 




9 The bombs dropped on the Alamogordo Desert (Trinity) and Nagasaki, Japan in 
1945 were made with plutonium processed at Hanford. The uranium for the bomb that 
destroyed Hiroshima, Japan was enriched at the Manhattan Project’s Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee site. 
10 When describing the large number of declassified documents as a “column of 
paper 3 miles high,” the DOE inadvertently echoed the name of the what is regularly 
cited as the only nuclear disaster to happen in the U.S., the 1979 nuclear meltdown at 
Three-Mile Island in Pennsylvania.  
11 The Office of Environmental Management is the DOE office responsible for 
conducting cleanup of the nation’s nuclear weapons complex.  
12 The nuclear weapons production process begins with uranium mining and 
milling, refining, and enrichment. Plutonium is produced in production reactors and 
chemically separated at production reactors and reprocessing facilities like those at 
Hanford. Nuclear weapons must also be designed, assembled, and tested and then used, 
stored, or dismantled. Sites all over the U.S. have hosted these activities, all of which are 
toxic to local people and the environment. 
13 The DOE claims that its primary mission is cleanup at all of the sites within the 
nuclear weapons complex. Advisory boards, advocacy groups, and—in some cases—
regulatory agencies like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Washington Department of Ecology work to ensure that DOE remains committed to that 
mission, but the DOE frequently proposes to engage in activities outside of its cleanup 




(under a program called Global Nuclear Energy Partnerships) considered reprocessing 
spent fuel at an undetermined location within the nuclear weapons complex. Hanford 
would have been an obvious choice because it is already so contaminated, and some 
people in the Tri-Cities supported the initiative because it would spur economic 
development in the region. However, activists (like Tom Carpenter of Hanford 
Challenge) pointed out the irony in reprocessing at Hanford: a very similar process had 
created the Site’s 56 million gallons of high-level waste, which the government has been 
unable to clean up (Cary, “Reusing”). 
14 These advisory boards can be quite influential, as evidenced by the fact that the 
DOE continually tries to gut them. As recently as 2012, DOE officials considered 
imposing term limits on members of the Hanford Advisory Board. Some board members 
viewed this as “an attempt to exert more control over the board or even rid it of members 
with opinions [the DOE] dislike[s]” (Cary, “DOE”). Many argue that board seats should 
not have term limits because experienced members provide much-need institutional 
memory. For more information on site-specific advisory boards, see the U.S. DOE Office 
of Environmental Management’s “EM Site-Specific Advisory Board (EM SSAB)” 
website. 
15 The Obama Administration and the DOE withdrew the Yucca Mountain’s 
license application in 2010 despite the fact that the government had no plans for building 
another repository. The U.S. has already spent over $10 billion researching and building 




the whims of changing administrations, the U.S. Court of Appeals recently ruled that the 
federal government must continue the process of licensing Yucca (Cary, “Court”). 
16 Croft’s solution of making documents “more findable” does not address the 
entirety of the problem. For example, a large number of documents on Yucca Mountain 
used to be available through a single website devoted to that project. If a researcher wants 
to find those documents today, he or she will have to guess at what the correct search 
terms would be. And if that researcher never saw the original website, he or she would be 
especially at a loss. 
17 This blog post disappeared for some undetermined amount of time but is now 
(as of August 2013) available through a Google search. It is not, however, listed on the 
Hanford Blog when one clicks a link for January 2013 entries. The DOE may argue that 
it removes and relocates information in order to streamline its websites, but these 
practices may frustrate readers. Furthermore, moving and erasing information alters the 
online record of what the DOE has published to Hanford.gov. 
18 The public’s distrust for the DOE is a well-documented phenomenon. In a study 
conducted in 1991, Slovic, Flynn, and Layman showed that the public’s negative 
perceptions of the U.S. nuclear waste program are based not only on “deeply rooted 
images of fear and dread” associated with radioactivity, but also on “decades of 
mishandling of wastes at the nation’s military weapons facilities” (1603, 1606). The 





19 For example, the Hanford DOE recently announced that it would likely miss 
major court-enforced deadlines, including one that requires the DOE to empty leaking 
waste tanks (Cary, “Update”).  
20 Hanford declared an alert the evening of August 21, 2013 when C farm 
workers’ radiation monitors detected a leak from equipment being used to transfer waste 
from the farm’s single shell tanks (Cary, “Emergency”). 
21 Hanford Site’s Facebook page functions as the main source of DOE-generated 
information about Hanford available on FB. The “About” section of the page claims that 
the account “is maintained by Public Affairs Officers for the Department of Energy at the 
Hanford Site.” FB users who “like” the page receive Hanford Site’s “status updates” in 
their “News Feeds” whenever Hanford Site posts them, which is generally every few 
days. Like all other FB pages, Hanford Site uses FB’s relatively new “Timeline” format, 
which presents a user’s history in a series of reverse chronological posts that are designed 
to emphasize visual information. Viewers of the page can scroll down to revisit past 
events, but the point of origin is always the top of a user’s page, which includes a small 
“Profile Picture” and a larger “Cover” photo. Hanford Site’s Timeline should list all the 
status updates Public Affairs officers have posted since the page was created, but I have 
regularly encountered problems with accessing information that was posted in the past. 
This is one serious problem with the DOE pursuing accountability via FB.  
22 The Missoula Floods carved out eastern Washington’s unique geology. The 
vast areas of barren, relatively soil-less topography are known as Channeled Scablands. 




considered photogenic. The DOE goes to some trouble to make them appear spectacular 
in the photos it posts to the Hanford Site FB page. 
23 Though cleaning up nuclear waste is one of the DOE’s most significant and 
costly jobs, that mission is not represented on the DOE seal. 
24 The DOE posted the photo of the Columbia without any textual interpretation, a 
move that makes it easy to forget the history of the landscape there. Only someone 
intimately familiar with Hanford would know that this single bend in the Columbia flows 
by a decommissioned reactor, the crumbling buildings of a former town, and a portion of 
the Hanford Reach National Monument dedicated to scientific research. These marks on 
the landscape represent a fraught history of early settlement, weapons production, and 
enclosure justified by science, but that history is rendered invisible by the dazzling image 
of the river. Though the DOE uses the beauty of the Columbia to publicize its cleanup 
work and even refers to itself as a “steward” of the river, recent revelations about waste 
tank leaks support what many have known about Hanford for decades—that the DOE is 
not protecting the river from Site contaminants. 
25 Since outsiders are rarely given access to Hanford and are even more rarely 
given permission to take photos there, the Hanford Site FB page is one of the best sources 
of images of the Site. When Hanford appears on the evening news, the footage is often 
taken through fences at the Site or drawn from previous stories when journalists were 
allowed at the Site. While the Hanford Site Facebook page offers thousands of photos 
(many of which are close-ups of equipment and workers), they are, of course, hand-




26 Despite the fact that Hanford engineers knew that wastes from plutonium 
processing should be contained, they dumped waste straight into the soil. The “Tank 
Farms” page of Hanford.gov reluctantly admits to this practice: “However, even with 149 
tanks available, the volume of chemical wastes generated through the plutonium 
production mission far exceeded the capacity of the tanks. Some of the liquid waste did 
end up being put into holding facilities and some was poured into open trenches. Some of 
the wastes that were put into the tanks didn’t stay there, as the heat generated by the 
waste and the composition of the waste caused an estimated 67 of these tanks to leak 
some of their contents into the ground. Some of this liquid waste migrated through the 
ground and has reached the groundwater.” The DOE uses passive voice and phrases like 
“the liquid waste did end up being” that seem to be reluctantly answering accusations of 
misconduct. 
27 The DOE does not currently have an estimated date of completion or total cost 
for the Waste Treatment Plant, which has serious design flaws (according to the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and others). Earlier plans had optimistically predicted 
that the WTP could open by 2019, but that goal now seems unrealistic (Bernton, Wald). 
28 This process of relocating waste from single- to double-shell tanks is neither 
simple nor safe; workers involved in waste transfer routinely fall ill from inhaling toxic 
vapors. Though Hanford workers are consistently endangered, “the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) does not have jurisdiction at the Hanford Site or any 




chooses not to exercise effective contractor oversight to ensure a quicker, ‘cheaper’ 
cleanup” (Carpenter and Gilbert 3). 
29 The DOE has thus far prioritized construction of the Waste Treatment Plant—
which would stabilize the tank waste—over the construction of new tanks. Building new 
tanks would take several years and would require millions—if not billions—in additional 
federal funding. Still, many critics would argue that the DOE should have foreseen the 
mass leakage of Hanford’s tanks that is happening now. 
30 The DOE is not certain how many tanks are leaking. At a public forum held in 
Seattle, representatives of the Washington State Department of Ecology reported that 7 of 
the 177 underground storage tanks are leaking, and 66 more are under investigation for 
declining levels or possible rainwater intrusion (Holmes and Lyon). 
31 The DOE’s description of The Hanford Story is curiously patronizing: “Many 
in the Pacific Northwest region are aware the site exists; but what really happens in this 
‘secret’ place known as Hanford? In response to these questions and concerns, the 
Department of Energy created The Hanford Story, a multi-media presentation of several 
chapters. This documentary takes a look at a complex, historical location and makes it 
understandable for the general public by providing an outline and basic information on 
the Hanford site” (“The Hanford Story”). It released the videos in the series one by one, 
beginning in April 2011 and ending in June 2012.  
32 The “2015 Vision” is “a road map for finishing the cleanup activities on the 
220-square-mile River Corridor portion of the Site by the year 2015” (US DOE, “2015 




Challenge and other groups are “concerned that the 2015 vision inaccurately conveys that 
the river corridor will be completely cleaned up by 2015, which could threaten future 
funding for the remaining work” (Hanford Challenge, “Letter”).   
33 Lockheed Martin is one of the world’s largest defense contractors, and its 
primary customers are U.S. government agencies. 
34 The first chapter of The Hanford Story (Hanford Overview) won a Northwest 
Emmy Award for best historical/cultural program or special. According to the DOE, it 
was nominated for “best use of graphics” (“The Hanford Story”).  
35 Endres cites several authors who have explored the implications of the “decide, 
announce, defend” strategy. Many commentators on environmental decision-making 
processes “have examined how technocratic models of public participation often dismiss 
the input of citizens because they advance social, political, or value-based arguments that 
do not fit into the traditional positivist notions of science or expertise and are thus 
perceived as non-scientific” (Endres, “Science” 51).  
36 Investigators have found that workers are sometimes denied supplied-air 
respirators even if they request them after they believe they have been exposed 
(Carpenter and Gilbert 29). Outside examiners have also discovered that, “in the 
overwhelming majority of exposure incidents, workers were wearing no respiratory 
protection at all” (29). Furthermore, workers treated by doctors at the on-site 
occupational services contractor, Hanford Environmental Health Foundation (HEHF), are 
routinely told that their exposure symptoms are either psychosomatic or the result of 




37 On June 14, 2013 the DOE announced that it will take six years to pump out 
leaking double-shell tank AY-102 (despite federal regulations that say a leaking tank 
must be pumped within 24 hours) (Frame, “Feds”). A week after this announcement—
which was based on the assumption that only the inner shell of AY-102 was leaking—
news broke that AY-102 is actually leaking through both of its shells and into the soil 
below (Frame, “Worst”). 
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CHAPTER III 
NATURE-INDUCED AMNESIA: THE HANFORD REACH NATIONAL 
MONUMENT 
On July 3, 2013, the Washington Department of Ecology’s Hanford Education 
and Outreach Network Facebook (FB) page breathed a sigh of relief: “Refreshing to get 
some good news about Hanford once in a while!”1 The good news appeared in a linked 
article from the Tri-City Herald (Herald): “[T]wo bald eagles have hatched in a nest on 
the Hanford nuclear reservation, for possibly the first time in more than 50 years” (Cary, 
“Baby Eagles”). Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)—which is 
always on the lookout for signs that life persists at Hanford—posted a photo of the eagle 
nest on its Hanford Site FB page and announced that “These approximately 10-week-old 
bald eagle chicks will spend their 4th of July at Hanford.” Any newly discovered bald 
eagle nest might be cause for celebration, given that eagle populations were decimated by 
widespread insecticide use in the 1960s and 1970s, but the DOE has special cause to 
publicize the health of sensitive species at its most contaminated nuclear site.2 To 
demonstrate that wildlife is flourishing at Hanford is to suggest—however subtly—that 
the Site is safe and in the final stages of recovery from decades of plutonium production 
and waste disposal.  
The public affairs specialists who manage the Hanford Site FB page must have 
found it fortuitous that eagles, of all species, were spotted on site in advance of July 4th. 
Emblematic of the U.S., eagles elicit patriotism—a sentiment the DOE counts on when it 
argues that the U.S. government destroyed the landscape at Hanford to protect national 
security. Not coincidentally, the U.S. government has publicized eagles thriving at other 
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highly contaminated, militarized sites, including Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado, 
which became an attractive habitat for eagles even after the government had 
manufactured chemical weapons there for four decades.3 In a broader sense, the recovery 
of bald eagle populations represents a triumph for environmentalists and conservationists; 
a combination of banning insecticides, protecting habitat, and restricting hunting brought 
the species back from the brink of extinction. And yet here, eagles are found roosting at 
the most contaminated site in the Western Hemisphere, which also hosts one of the 
largest environmental remediation projects in the world—characteristics that would seem 
to make Hanford just as threatening to eagles as DDT. But observers at Ecology, the 
Herald, and the DOE (via the Hanford Site FB page) all took solace in the eagles’ 
presence. They were happy to forget Hanford for a moment. (See Figure 7.)  
 
Figure 7. Washington State Department of Ecology status update about Hanford’s eagle 
nest, posted July 3, 2013. 
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 Though plants and animals living in the aftermath of nuclear disaster are 
endangered by their exposure to extreme pollution, some individuals appear to persist or 
even thrive in these contaminated environments, and this seeming resilience fascinates 
observers.4 Consider the case of the world’s most spectacular nuclear accident, the 1986 
nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl (rivaled only by the Fukushima disaster, which is still 
actively contaminating large volumes of groundwater, soil, and ocean, nearly three years 
after the initial meltdown) (Tabuchi). Once Chernobyl was contained in a concrete 
sarcophagus, officials drew a 30-km “zone of exclusion” around the site to prevent 
people from encountering radiation that lingered in the soil, water, and vegetation. Years 
later, in the 1990s, a bull was discovered grazing in the exclusion zone. Instead of 
provoking horror, the bull offered inspiration to human survivors of the accident: “The 
apparent health of the animal became a source of commentary and pleasure for workers 
and neighboring communities who were dealing with the daily effects of radiation 
exposures and uncertainty in their lives” (Masco, “Mutant” 526). The event made it easy 
momentarily to forget that Chernobyl generated a huge area of permanently uninhabitable 
land. The bull’s ability to survive in the wasteland seemed to suggest that humans might 
recover from the incident, too.  
 While individual animals should not be taken as indicators of ecosystem health at 
post-disaster Chernobyl, many journalists, politicians, and scientists have done just that 
and even reinterpreted the exclusion zone as a nature reserve. In an essay written in 
response to the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl explosion, journalist Steve 
Featherstone argues that such reports have sensationalized the resilience of the natural 
areas surrounding Chernobyl.5 In these accounts, 
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the nightmare has changed to a comeback story. The Zone is no longer a 
wasteland, the story goes, but rather a lush wildlife refuge renewed by the 
irrepressible forces of nature. Eager to rebrand the Zone as Europe’s 
largest nature preserve, the Ukrainian government has introduced a small 
herd of endangered Przewalski’s horses to the Zone and has dabbled in 
niche tourism. Endtimes enthusiasts can now take day trips to the 
forbidden city of Pripyat, a postapocalyptic Disney World complete with a 
creepy amusement park and authentic Soviet-themed sets. (42) 
Featherstone explains the degree to which the Ukrainian government and private interests 
have used—and perhaps, as in the case of the endangered horses, even exploited—non-
human species in order to reinvent Chernobyl in the public imagination. Several 
Chernobyl tour companies have popped up in recent years, and many of them argue that 
wildlife has triumphed in the zone. On its website, a tour company called 
CHERNOBYLwel.come invites potential visitors to “See how nature has taken over and 
overruled the exclusion zone and see this amazing place for yourself.” The term 
“overruled” is purposely vague, but it suggests that nature has asserted dominance over 
the conditions of nuclear disaster and is now flourishing at Chernobyl.  
The DOE and its partner agency at Hanford, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(alternately “Fish and Wildlife” or “the FWS”), have made similarly broad claims about 
nature’s ability to overcome nuclear disaster at Hanford. Just a month after posting a 
photo of Hanford’s breeding eagles to FB, the DOE (via the Hanford Site FB page) 
shared photos of a snowy owl perched on railroad tracks and power lines with the 
caption: “Some more photos of Hanford’s thriving wildlife.” (See Figure 8.) 
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Figure 8. Status update posted by Hanford public affairs officers on Hanford Site’s 
Facebook page August 13, 2013. 
 
Notably, the DOE does not elaborate on what it means by “thriving.” The agency seems 
to take the very existence of animals at Hanford as a sign that wildlife is healthy. While 
nuclear sites like Hanford provide refuge for animals that have been pushed out of 
surrounding areas by development, accounts like the one about the snowy owl may 
obscure the ways animals are damaged by radiated environments. Scientists studying 
birds at Chernobyl, for example, have found birth defects and abnormalities like albinism 
in barn swallows exposed to radioactive contaminants (Møller et al.).6 One of those 
scientists, Tim Mousseau, explained to Featherstone that Chernobyl cannot be taken at 
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face value: “‘[it’s] not a lunar landscape. [. . .] It’s much more insidious than that. 
Because everything’s still there, it’s just being modified at some low level’” 
(Featherstone 42). In other words, Chernobyl did not simply wipe out everything in its 
vicinity; instead, it exterminated some organisms and altered others. The disaster also left 
behind a massive volume of contaminated soil and water punctuated by particularly 
deadly radiation hotspots. Exposure to that environment has induced low-level genetic 
modifications that are often difficult to detect.  
Scientists working for the U.S. government have not volunteered evidence of 
genetic mutation in animals living near Hanford, but there is no doubt that both plants 
and animals encounter and spread radioactive contamination at the Site. Hanford’s 
tumbleweeds provide the most frequently cited example of this phenomenon. These 
tumbleweeds send roots deep into the ground, extract radioactive isotopes from the soil 
and then break off at the surface and roll across the landscape. Hanford pest control 
workers search for the tumbleweeds that are radioactive, gather them up, and ensure that 
they are disposed of properly. Without human intervention, these tumbleweeds could roll 
off site or even create airborne contamination by landing in the path of a wildfire 
(Marshall 1616).  
In other cases, animals disperse radiation in areas of the Site that workers 
ordinarily consider safe. In 1998, contractors discovered that fruit flies and gnats were 
spreading contamination in a worker lunchroom and in trash that was ultimately dumped 
at a municipal landfill (Ashton). As recently as June 2013 (a month before the roosting 
eagles were spotted at Hanford), workers discovered contamination someplace they least 
expected to find it—at a new on-site construction project. They ultimately traced it to the 
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work of barn swallows that were building their nests with contaminated mud (Cary, 
“DOE Tracks Source”).  
Events like these have made headlines and provoked the concern of Hanford 
officials not because plants and animals may be irrevocably damaged by their contact 
with radioactive and chemical waste but because uncontained radionuclides pose a threat 
to Hanford workers and, potentially, the public. To neutralize that threat, animals that 
spread contamination are hunted, killed, and then handled as waste. In November of 
2010, for instance, Hanford workers discovered rabbit droppings contaminated with 
radioactive cesium on site, just north of the city of Richland. Washington Closure 
Hanford, a Hanford contractor, tracked the droppings to a single contaminated rabbit, 
which it killed and “disposed [of] as radioactive waste” (“Radioactive”). Since the DOE’s 
fundamental strategy for dealing with Hanford’s waste is containment, it runs a “robust 
animal control program” to manage the threat posed by radioactive wildlife (US DOE, 
“Information”).  
The agency also maintains a discursive containment program to manage the 
public’s perceptions about these incidents. It releases as little information as possible 
about animals that have been damaged by exposure to Hanford waste and simultaneously 
publicizes its commitment to protecting animals that have not proven to be contaminated. 
For instance, when Hanford officials discovered the eagles nesting on site, they 
announced that workers would maintain a “buffer zone around the nest until the birds 
have fledged” (Cary, “Baby eagles”). Though Hanford’s eagles are subject to the ultimate 
human intrusion (exposure to anthropogenic chemicals and radionuclides that may alter 
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their physiology and even their genetic code), the DOE claims that it can protect them 
from disturbance.  
The U.S. government makes even grander claims about its relationship to the 
natural world at the Hanford Reach National Monument (also known as “Hanford Reach” 
or “the HRNM”), an enormous refuge that exists to protect threatened species living on 
Hanford’s outer edges. This 195,000-acre Monument, which is managed by the FWS as 
part of the National Wildlife Refuge System, surrounds the Hanford Site and was carved 
from the security buffer zone created around Hanford’s production facilities when the 
area was seized by eminent domain in 1943.7 Since this buffer zone has been controlled 
by the military and federal agencies for seventy years, it has inadvertently shielded non-
human species from the erosive impacts of agriculture, ranching, and development. 
Pieces of what has become the HRNM held federal designations like “National Wildlife 
Refuge” and “National Environmental Research Park” prior to 2000, but it was not until 
that year that President Clinton declared the entire area a National Monument. Since then, 
the government has maintained an official boundary between the nuclear site and the 
Monument, and it has claimed to sequester contaminants on one side and protect non-
human species on the other.8 
The FWS describes Hanford Reach as a “thoroughly unique refuge,” but Joseph 
Masco, an anthropologist who studies the nuclear weapons complex, calls the 
phenomenon of transforming nuclear sites into a wildlife refuges “a uniquely modern 
contradiction” (US FWS Homepage; Masco, “Mutant” 532). The contradiction rests in 
the fact that the government has both rendered these lands uninhabitable and preserved 
them for future generations. The HRNM is not the only nuclear site to undergo such a 
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transition; dozens of former military and nuclear sites across the U.S. have been 
redesignated as wildlife refuges. David Havlick shows how discourses about these 
“military-to-wildlife” or “M2W” conversions (at sites formerly owned or managed by the 
DOE or the Department of Defense [DOD]) contribute to a “broader discourse of 
ecological militarization,” which “frames military practices as compatible with and 
contributing to environmental protection” (“Logics” 151). Though these conversions 
have occurred across the U.S., they have gone largely unnoticed by the American public.  
 This chapter will investigate how government agencies have used nature to shape 
perceptions of Hanford’s nuclear activities, its safety, and, especially, the U.S. 
government’s actions there. At Hanford, the FWS has been charged with protecting 
nature, and in that role, the agency has served as both manager and interpreter of the 
landscape. Nature has provided a convenient screen for government control and 
mismanagement at Hanford; rare plants and charismatic wildlife have come to symbolize 
health and purity in a landscape that would otherwise be considered a wasteland. Such 
symbols have become especially useful to the government in recent years, as Hanford 
cleanup has proven far more complex and expensive than the DOE originally anticipated.  
While the DOE has maintained its controlling narratives about Hanford through 
discursive containment, the FWS has furthered those narratives through discursive 
proliferation. Fish and Wildlife has done little to mark the physical place of the HRNM as 
a National Monument established for the visiting public, but it has built an extensive 
portrait of the Monument on the Internet. Though it seems outside the purview of an 
agency that focuses on the preservation and restoration of habitat, the FWS uses the 
HRNM website to draw explicit connections between war and preservation and to justify 
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the continued enclosure of lands that were once inhabitable and are now compromised by 
their proximity to Hanford. A closer look at the evolution of the HRNM website reveals 
that FWS has, in recent years, expanded its discursive construction of the HRNM, 
thereby aiding the DOE in that agency’s efforts to assure the public that Hanford is not a 
threat to local people or the environment. Because Fish and Wildlife manages Hanford 
Reach at the DOE’s behest, the FWS’s work must be seen as an extension of the DOE’s 
mission at Hanford, which is not only to remediate the Site but also to rehabilitate its 
image in the public imagination. The FWS extends and perpetuates DOE-generated 
propaganda by using the HRNM website to minimize the threats posed by Hanford and 
also by promoting the health of Hanford’s ecosystems. Before examining how Fish and 
Wildlife constructs the HRNM, this chapter will investigate the circumstances that 
converged to create the HRNM: the interaction of local and national interests, the public 
relations needs of federal agencies like the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and DOE, 
and the relatively recent phenomenon of ecological militarization, which has made it 
seem rational to create wildlife refuges at militarized sites. 
 
When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. War Department 
established the Hanford Engineer Works in 1943, they established a huge security buffer 
zone around the operational core of the 375,000-acre Site. This buffer zone made the Site 
visually inaccessible, prevented people from living or farming in areas directly downwind 
of Hanford, and allowed the government to maintain ownership of land that it might need 
for future operations. Though the War Department had promised to return the land to its 
previous inhabitants after WWII ended, the federal government instead expanded 
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Hanford’s plutonium production operations, and it justified continued occupation of the 
land by invoking the Communist threat. The Hanford Site and its buffer zone underwent 
a number of transformations during the Cold War. By the 1990s, the DOE—compelled 
by Hanford’s waste problems, public pressure, and pervasive concern about pollution—
began environmental remediation of the Site. After decades of conflict between the U.S. 
government, Native American tribes, and other local stakeholders about what would 
happen to lands released after cleanup, in 2000, President Clinton declared the former 
buffer zone Hanford Reach National Monument.9 This new designation was enabled by 
the Antiquities Act, which “authorizes the President to establish as national monuments 
‘historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or 
scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government 
of the United States’” (US FWS, HRNM CCP B-7).10 Thus, the federal government has—
through the Antiquities Act—explicitly objectified the human history and ecology of the 
Hanford area. The “objects of historic or scientific interest” identified at Hanford Reach 
include traces left by former inhabitants (including Native Americans, homesteaders, and 
nuclear workers) and aspects of the local ecosystem, including sagebrush-steppe 
vegetation and wildlife species like elk. The HRNM also protects Hanford Reach, the 51 
mile-long stretch of the Columbia River that bisects the Hanford Site. Many refer to 
Hanford Reach as the “last free-flowing, non-tidal stretch of the Upper Columbia River” 
because it is one of the only areas of the Columbia that has not been dammed. The Reach 
is also an important spawning ground for large numbers of fall Chinook salmon.  
The U.S. government has drawn one boundary after another on Hanford’s 
landscape, beginning with the establishment of the nuclear site and buffer zone in 1943. 
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Since then, Hanford Reach and the surrounding area have gone through a remarkable 
number of transformations as federal and state agencies have claimed portions of the 
landscape. While FWS publications about the HRNM make it look like any other refuge, 
the fine print of the Monument’s Comprehensive Conservation Plan (CCP) reveals that 
the Monument’s management is incredibly complicated.11 The HRNM itself is 
superimposed over approximately 196,000 acres of the 586-square mile DOE-managed 
Hanford Site, and those 196,000 acres are further divided by other management 
boundaries: “The DOE currently administers approximately 29,000 acres of land within 
the Monument and retains land surface ownership or control on all acreage. 
Approximately 165,000 acres [of the 196,000-acre Monument] are currently managed by 
the FWS through its authorities under the National Wildlife Refuge System Management 
Act” (US FWS HRNM CCP 1-6-7). (The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife 
also manages a smaller, 8,000-acre portion of the Monument through a permit with the 
DOE.) Thus, the HRNM is managed as an “overlay” refuge, which means that the FWS 
“manages for the benefit of fish and wildlife resources,” but the DOE retains the title to 
the land (1-7). FWS-managed land is further divided into four units—the Rattlesnake, 
Wahluke, Saddle Mountain, and Ringold Units—which are dedicated to different 
purposes, including recreation, hunting and fishing, conservation, and scientific research. 
(See Figure 9.) 
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Figure 9. Map showing the boundary (marked in red) between the Hanford Site (at the 
center of the map, in lighter green) and the Hanford Reach National Monument (ringing 
the Site, in darker green) (US FWS “General Map”). 
 
Thus, the Hanford Site—a chaotic collection of former production areas, waste 
tanks, waste burial grounds, and new construction projects (with a commercial nuclear 
reactor operating nearby)—is ringed by the HRNM, which is itself an assortment of areas 
designated for hunting, fishing, recreation, preservation, and scientific research. Hanford 
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and the Monument are surrounded, in turn, by an assortment of land uses, including other 
industrial zones, irrigated agricultural fields, dams, residential areas, wildlife refuges, 
game preserves, and parks. According to John M. Findlay and Bruce Hevly, the 
boundaries drawn within and around Hanford “epitomize the emergence of a 
hypercompartmentalized West” characterized by “a patchwork of mutually exclusive, or 
contradictory, uses” (203). In part because the federal government has exercised such 
power to influence the landscape of the Hanford area, it has become a “patchwork of 
sacrifice zones and natural and cultural reserves [. . .] managed by a tangle of government 
agencies” (208). Thus, in the Hanford area, heavily industrialized, militarized zones 
permeated with pervasive, long-lived pollution exist adjacent to the urban areas of the 
Tri-Cities, dams that restrict river flows, large-scale agricultural monocultures, 
recreational areas, and preserves. Aerial photos of the Hanford area exhibit these unusual 
land-use patterns. In the photos, one immediately sees the Site’s alarming proximity to 
the Columbia River as well as the stark contrast between Hanford’s relatively intact 
sagebrush steppe vegetation and neighboring agriculture.  
 The Hanford area’s hypercompartmentalization is the result of competing 
interests acting on the landscape, but it is also the consequence of government rhetoric 
working to reassure the public of Hanford’s safety. In order to accept the idea that a city 
or a recreational area might exist side-by-side with one of the world’s largest and most 
intractable environmental disasters, one has to believe that the bodies on one side of the 
boundary will not encounter the contaminants on the other. Locals in the Hanford area 
have certainly embraced their share of endangerment in exchange for jobs and 
investment, but people’s acceptance of the risks posed by Hanford have been influenced 
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at every step by the federal government’s insistence that Hanford is not a threat to public 
health.  
Though the FWS only arrived on the scene at Hanford in 2000, it has played no 
small part in the government discourse that creates this hypercompartmentalized mindset. 
The agency describes the HRNM in evasive and misleading terms that work to make the 
public forget Hanford’s past and the threat it poses to the region today. For example, in 
the background of the HRNM’s CCP, the FWS offers an ambiguous description of the 
Monument’s history: “The land comprising the Monument has an unusual and colorful 
provenance” (1-1). So as to avoid making judgments about the Monument’s origins, the 
FWS calls them “unusual and colorful,” as if to suggest that Hanford is merely a 
curiosity—not a threat. Indeed, the FWS attempts to depict Hanford as harmless 
throughout its publications. For instance, the description of the Monument in the CCP 
also states that “The entry of the United States into World War II and the race to develop 
an atomic bomb led to a search for a suitable place to locate plutonium production and 
purification facilities” (1-1). Federal agencies often refer to the arms race to lend a sense 
of urgency to Hanford’s work. Here, the FWS also uses the word “purification” 
discursively to sanitize Site operations. While it may be accurate to state that plutonium 
was purified—in other words, separated from impurities—at Hanford, this choice of 
words belies the larger context of plutonium production. The chemical process that 
separated plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel rods created a far greater volume of 
toxic byproducts than usable plutonium. “Purification” sounds like a process of 
decontamination; in reality, it creates toxic, long-lived chemical and radioactive waste. 
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Just as the FWS eschews descriptions of Hanford’s waste that might alarm the 
public, it also avoids less flattering descriptions of Hanford Reach. In the Monument’s 
CCP, the agency does this by sidestepping details of the Reach’s relationship to Hanford 
and then burying precise descriptions in the footnotes. The text of the document at one 
point claims that “By the late 1980s, the primary DOE mission had changed from defense 
materials production to environmental restoration, waste management, and science and 
technology research, further decreasing the need for a large land base” (1-1-2). This 
suggests that the DOE of the 1980s was demilitarizing and no longer needed such a vast 
area to carry out its missions or protect the public. However, the passage ends with a 
footnote in which the FWS admits that the Monument is, even today, a buffer zone that 
stands between Hanford and the public: 
The Monument was created primarily from parts of the Hanford Site that 
were considered safety and security buffers during the weapons 
production period of the site’s history. As such, the Monument forms a 
large horseshoe-shaped area around what is generally known as Central 
Hanford and, because use has been restricted in the area, the Monument 
provides a buffer for the smaller areas currently used for storage of nuclear 
materials, waste storage, waste disposal, and the Energy Northwest Power 
Plant. (1-2) 
Nowhere on the Monument’s websites or in its brochures does the FWS describe Hanford 
Reach as a buffer for pollutants and possible accidents occurring at the nuclear site. Nor 
does it acknowledge that the DOE actively monitors safety buffers (around known areas 
of contamination) that extend into the Monument. The FWS instead hides this 
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information in its CCP, a nearly 400-page document with over 100 footnotes. And even 
in slightly more candid statements like the one above, the agency attempts to downplay 
the fact that the Monument and its wildlife, workers, and visitors provide a barrier 
between the nuclear site and the outside world.  
One might wonder how a sacrifice area like Hanford received official recognition 
as a safe haven for wildlife and a recreational area for people. Though many factors 
contributed to the transformation of Hanford’s buffer zone, the land within the 
boundaries of what is now the HRNM was preserved—in piecemeal fashion—in part 
because the government had a public relations problem at Hanford. Beginning in the 
years after WWII, people were both curious and concerned about the effect the plant 
might have on the surrounding area. Instead of changing its practices, the government 
embraced any scheme that would keep the public in the dark about Hanford’s activities. 
During its conversion, the Monument was divided into separate areas that FWS now 
manages for different values and uses. I will describe two areas of the Monument, the 
Wahluke Slope and the Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, which represent two critical 
moments in the history of Hanford’s buffer zone. The fates of these two areas illustrate 
the HRNM’s complicated road to preservation as well as the discourses of conservation, 
security, and science that have shaped the landscape there. 
First, I will discuss the Wahluke Slope, which exemplifies how the federal 
government’s need for public approval made preservation the most attractive option for 
Hanford’s buffer zone. During the Cold War, people living near Hanford were both 
fearful of pollution emitted from the Site and resentful that the government controlled 
such a large area of land around Hanford. The nuclear reservation was already massive 
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and encompassed areas north of the Columbia River in Grant and Franklin counties when 
it was established in 1943. Then, the Atomic Energy Commission (the agency in charge 
of Hanford from 1947 to 1974), responding to concerns about safety, extended the buffer 
zone. This move prevented the settlement and development of 280,000 acres on the 
Wahluke Slope (north of the Site). In those early years, Hanford scientists believed that if 
a catastrophic accident occurred, airborne releases from the plutonium production 
reactors would blow to the north and northeast, with the prevailing winds (Findlay and 
Hevly 218-19).  
Despite the AEC’s warnings about safety, a core group of local farmers, ranchers, 
and business owners who were keen to develop and diversify the local economy pushed 
the agency to release buffer zone land to the public. They twice convinced the AEC to 
reduce the size of its land holdings on the Wahluke Slope (Findlay and Hevly 221). In 
retrospect, it is difficult to understand why local people would protest the government’s 
attempts to protect the public, but Hanford historians John M. Findlay and Bruce Hevly 
illuminate why: 
While local residents lacked the expertise to challenge AEC opinion about 
the hazards of Hanford reactors, they objected to being told that they could 
not decide for themselves whether to live with those hazards, if they 
wished [. . .]. In rationalizing their right to expose themselves (not to 
mention their agricultural products and the consumers of those products) 
to the environmental hazards of plutonium production, Hanford’s 
neighbors adopted a kind of nuclear fatalism. (222-23) 
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Over the decades, residents of the Hanford area have embraced a variety of plans—
including proposals to build commercial nuclear power reactors and to turn the Site into a 
national repository for nuclear waste—that would turn their home into a national sacrifice 
area. According to Findlay and Hevly, this eagerness to embrace dangerous new schemes 
came not only from fatalistic acceptance of hazard, but from beliefs in sacrifice and 
leadership that the community had embraced since the time of Hanford’s original 
establishment in 1943 (233). In their desire to develop the Wahluke Slope, residents were 
also looking for ways to expand the local economy, the success of which was limited by 
the area’s remoteness and undesirability to outsiders. The AEC fought locals on opening 
the buffer zone to development but then decided that maintaining good public relations 
was more important than withholding lands for safety reasons. Besides, the AEC learned 
in the late 1950s that well-populated agricultural and urban areas to the southeast were 
just as vulnerable to Hanford’s emissions as the Wahluke Slope. The agency could not 
afford to admit these dangers or evacuate the Tri-Cities, so it released more lands within 
the Wahluke Slope to the public in 1958. The government rarely disclosed Hanford’s 
dangers, and, when it did, powerful local voices balked at its concerns. Perhaps this was 
because “the AEC, wanting to portray Hanford as a good neighbor, emphasized the safety 
of the plant much more persistently than the risks it presented to surroundings areas” 
(224). Indeed, the government systematically ignored or minimized concerns about the 
safety of Hanford’s buffer zone, which allowed powerful local interests to dismiss 
potential risks, too. 
 Within the AEC, officials still believed that the agency needed to maintain control 
of buffer zone lands, and that belief laid the foundation for preservation and, eventually, 
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the Hanford Reach National Monument. The AEC embraced preservation as an 
alternative to development at Hanford for three reasons. First, the agency was concerned 
that development within Hanford’s buffer zone could expose people to toxic emissions or 
stir up wastes that had already been deposited in the soil and water. Second, the 
government wanted to maintain government ownership of Hanford lands in case it 
needed to expand plutonium production. Third, the AEC was concerned about its public 
image, and it felt that transferring areas of Hanford to wildlife agencies and scientific 
researchers would ultimately instill public confidence. Many locals resisted preservation, 
claiming that it would reduce opportunities for resource development, so the AEC led the 
charge when it came to environmental pursuits at Hanford. Findlay and Hevly frame this 
as a contradiction: “Paradoxically, then, while the AEC was largely responsible for the 
pollution at Hanford, it also became a source of preservation programs and ecological 
awareness in the Columbia Basin” (248). And yet, the federal government has done 
everything possible to prevent the public from perceiving this as a paradox. Preservation 
at Hanford has always been a consequence of the government’s desire to control land and 
conceal contamination, but those ulterior motives have gone largely unnoticed. This has 
been perhaps especially true at the second area of the HRNM that I will discuss, the 
Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (ALE), which has been promoted not 
only by bureaucrats but also by ecologists.  
 Indeed, the ALE has been shaped not only by government action but also by the 
priorities and discourses of the ecological sciences. The ALE today forms the southwest 
portion of the HRNM (located within the Rattlesnake Unit), but it was created in 1967, 
before any other areas of Hanford’s buffer zone were dedicated to preservation. 
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According to a history of the ALE written by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL, a DOE-managed national science lab based in Richland, Washington), the “U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission set aside 33,500 hectares of nearly pristine shrub-steppe on 
the Hanford Site to preserve portions of vegetation types that once covered a great 
expanse of the West” (“Shrub-steppe”). The AEC may have identified those 33,500 
hectares as “pristine” because it did not want to release them to the public (either because 
the agency was worried about contamination or because it needed to reserve the area for 
the government’s future use). Early ecologists contributed to that justification by framing 
these areas as valuable historical remnants that were representative of the Western U.S. 
PNNL ecologists continue to emphasize the value of this ecosystem today: “The concept 
of a large, outdoor laboratory in which to conduct studies of native plants and animals 
without human intrusion was conceived in the early 1960s. Botanists and managers of the 
Hanford Laboratories (operated by General Electric [GE] Company) and AEC managers 
all recognized the value of Hanford lands as an ecological oasis” (O’Connor and 
Rickard). Thus, ecologists helped to justify the continued enclosure of Hanford’s buffer 
zone not by claiming that Hanford was a threat to human health, but by arguing that its 
ecosystems ought to be preserved from “human intrusion.”  
 Prior to being recognized as an “ecological oasis,” the area encompassed by the 
ALE had first been sacred to local Native American tribes, including the Yakama and 
Wanapum. In 1995, the Yakama Nation submitted a proposal to re-acquire ALE lands in 
which they described the tribe’s historical connection to the area: “Since time 
immemorial, this area has provided the indigenous peoples of the region with lithic 
materials, wild game, seasonal roots and berries, grazing land, and burial grounds” (qtd. 
 128 
in O’Connor and Rickard 18). The Yakama continue to request access to the area, and 
they maintain their sacred ties to the most prominent geological feature of the ALE, 
Rattlesnake Mountain. According to the Yakama, their people have gone to the mountain 
regularly to “seek visions.” Indeed, one of the tribe’s most important spiritual leaders, 
Smohalla, formed the foundation of his teachings after receiving a vision at Rattlesnake 
Ridge. The Yakama ceded the area that is now known as the ALE to the U.S. government 
through the Treaty of 1855, but the tribe retains treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather in 
all “usual and accustomed places.” In the decades after the Yakama ceded tribal lands, 
homesteaders inhabited the land that would become the ALE, and in the early 20th 
century, companies drilled natural gas wells there. The area was then taken over by the 
Army Corps when the Hanford Site was established in 1943, and the Army built Nike 
Ajax missile defense systems there in the 1950s.  
 The ALE was “‘permanently’ set aside for desert ecology research and education” 
in 1967, and this opened the area to a number of other, scientifically based land 
management designations (O’Connor and Rickard 19). In 1971, the ALE was designated 
as “the Rattlesnake Hills RNA [Research Natural Area] as part of a five-agency federal 
cooperative agreement under the Natural Area Preserves Act” (19). Agencies have 
established RNAs throughout the Pacific Northwest to preserve terrestrial and aquatic 
ecosystems that have been identified as having biological value. One of the major 
purposes of RNAs is to “preserve examples of all significant natural ecosystems for 
comparison with those influenced by man” (19). Despite being on the Hanford Site (in 
close proximity to massive quantities of chemical and radioactive pollution), the ALE 
was seen as an untouched area that could serve as a baseline against which other, 
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impacted ecosystems could be measured. The agencies involved in designating the RNA 
also valued the ALE for its enormous size and Hanford’s ability to shield scientific 
research projects from public scrutiny and intrusion: “Its large size is of importance… It 
is quite unusual to have an area available for long-term environmental monitoring and 
research that permits addressing factors that operate at a landscape scale” (20). Hanford 
was especially attractive to scientists because other large, “pristine” areas were not as 
easy for them to acquire. The RNA title made way for yet another classification, and in 
1977, portions of the ALE and other areas of the Hanford Site were declared a National 
Environmental Research Park (NERP). According to PNNL, research parks like the one 
at Hanford contribute to the government’s ecosystem-based land management program: 
“The Hanford NERP was one of seven DOE established across the nation in six major 
ecoregions covering more than half of the United States” (20). Since the NERPs were 
established on land already owned by the DOE, there has been less public review of the 
government’s work on them than there might be if the DOE were to acquire such vast 
acreage today. After 1971, the ALE received one final designation when it was renamed 
the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve by Congress in 1993. The reserve 
makes the “pristine” landscape off-limits to the public but allows government scientists to 
conduct research there. Hanford has thus been used to serve a number of needs for the 
U.S. government, though this use goes largely unquestioned because it contributes to the 
advancement of the ecological sciences.  
 However, federal management of the ALE was jeopardized in the early 1990s, 
when the DOE began cleanup work at Hanford and outside groups began to push for the 
release of remediated areas. Both the Bureau of Land Management and the Yakama 
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Nation put in proposals to take ownership of the ALE in 1995, but in 1996, then-
Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary announced that the DOE would retain the ALE, 
admitting that “[a] change in ownership would result in unacceptable cost to the 
Department in meeting standards imposed as a result of a change in the site boundary” 
(24). The DOE was unwilling to meet the cleanup standards necessary to release the ALE 
into the public domain, so it opted to transfer management of the land to the FWS. Thus, 
the HRNM, which appears to preserve “pristine” ecosystems, also serves as a way for the 
government to retain ownership of an area that will continue to present a hazard hundreds 
of years from now. 
 Many other sites within the nuclear weapons complex have been subject to similar 
scrutiny and acquisition by scientists working not only in weapons production and 
environmental remediation but also in the ecological sciences. Nuclear activities have 
cordoned off massive areas of land in the U.S., and within the DOE’s constellation of 
National Environmental Research Parks, the former buffer zones of sites like Hanford, 
Oak Ridge, the Nevada Test Site, and Los Alamos have proven to be productive real-life 
laboratories for scientists developing an understanding of natural systems. Scott Kirsch 
describes how the Savannah River Site, a nuclear site in South Carolina that produced 
plutonium and tritium for the U.S. nuclear arsenal beginning in the 1950s, has been 
transformed into an “experimental landscape” by ecologists. The Savannah River 
Ecology Laboratory (SREL) was established in 1960, and beginning in those early years, 
it hosted the work of early ecologists like Eugene Odum. Since the beginning, SREL has 
provided “an extraordinary resource for long-term ecological observation and for the 
controlled manipulation of environments” (487). Scientists at SREL put high value on the 
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spaces in which they work, claiming that those spaces are “biologically significant” not 
just because of the species present but also because of the size of the reserve (491). In 
other words, the SREL scientists value the landscape for the special protections and the 
level of exclusion afforded by the DOE’s control of the land. Science at SREL is subject 
to almost no human intrusion, little public scrutiny of research projects, and in some 
cases, exemption from environmental laws (491-92). Thus, ecology—because of its need 
for access to “untouched” natural systems—has depended on the continued colonization 
of landscapes by government agencies that have prioritized defense over environmental 
and public health. Though the DOE and FWS often argue that weapons production has 
been good for the natural environment (resulting in preserves like the ALE and SREL), it 
is more accurate to say that government officials and scientists are the ones who benefit 
when an area is militarized. 
As the parallels between the HRNM and SREL suggest, Hanford Reach is neither 
the only former military site to provide habitat for a range of plants and animals nor the 
only one to receive official designation as a wildlife refuge. In 2007, David Havlick 
brought to light the startling number of U.S. military sites that had recently been 
transformed into wildlife refuges: “Since 1988, the United States Department of Defense 
(DOD) has closed or reclassified approximately 400 military sites, including more than 
125 major installations. Of these, nearly two dozen bases on more than one million acres 
have been redesignated as new national wildlife refuges” (Havlick, “Logics” 151). These 
“military-to-wildlife (M2W) conversions” (Havlick’s term) may not drastically alter the 
physical landscape (since they are predicated on protecting preexisting wildlife and 
habitat), but they represent a change in how the government justifies its occupation of 
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large tracts of land. Since the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is the recipient of M2W 
lands, and its work is less controversial than that of the U.S. military, the FWS is often 
the agency that provides an explanation for these conversions.  
In many cases, the FWS describes M2W conversions in evasive terms, without 
explaining how or why they have come about. For example, on its website for the 
Aroostook National Wildlife Refuge (in northern Maine), the FWS mentions—but does 
not discuss at length—the fact that Aroostook was carved from Loring Air Force Base, 
the largest base of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command during the Cold War: “What 
was once a strategic military base for half of a century has now been restored to an 
ecologically diverse assemblage of federally protected lands in northern Maine” (US 
FWS, “About” Aroostook). The FWS provides no information about how Loring affected 
the landscape or how the land was redesignated; instead, it directs the public’s focus to 
the site’s restoration. For the FWS, there is nothing remarkable about the fact that where 
the government formerly stationed “long-range bombers capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons,” it now protects numerous species and habitats, including moose, upland 
sandpipers, neotropical migratory birds, wetlands, and grasslands. By emphasizing nature 
and recreational opportunities at Aroostook, the government sidesteps the contradiction 
between military activity—which is necessarily destructive of land and life—and 
protection of nature. 
 Regardless of this obvious inconsistency, the government-generated discourse 
about M2W refuges exhibits a characteristic comfort with the salvage ecology being 
practiced on military lands. Though many M2W refuge managers have to deal with 
enduring traces of military impacts, and though these conversions have the potential to 
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erase military history, the federal government consistently argues that a M2W conversion 
is a “win-win-win” for the DOD, the natural world, and the public (Havlick, “Logics” 
152). Indeed, the government narrates these conversions within a discourse of “ecological 
militarization,” which “frames military practices as compatible with and contributing to 
environmental protection” (151). This discourse is especially advantageous for the DOD, 
which has actively cultivated a “green” image in order to stem criticism of its usual 
environmental practices, which put the pursuit of “national security” before the well-
being of people and environment. Other parties support this discourse as well; 
conservationists, for example, often push the hardest for the remediation, preservation, 
and release of former military lands. They believe there is value in restoring even the 
most ecologically devastated landscapes. While such restoration may be a noble pursuit 
and M2W refuges may present “a prospective opening of restricted military spaces into 
public places dedicated to environmental conservation,” militarization and preservation 
are not as compatible as the U.S. government would like the public to believe (151). 
Even as M2W conversions provide habitat for rare species and allow public 
access to formerly sequestered sites, they are often plagued by military legacies that the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is unequipped to handle. Many M2W refuges are polluted 
with chemical waste, littered with unexploded ordnance (UXO), or otherwise scarred by 
their military pasts. In some cases, the DOD has done little or nothing to remove 
contamination before transferring lands to the FWS. For example, at the Big Oaks 
National Wildlife Refuge in Indiana (formerly known as Jefferson Proving Ground), the 
Army has not cleaned up UXO from decades of ammunitions testing. Visitors to the 
refuge “must register at the refuge office upon arrival and departure, watch a 30-minute 
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safety video, sign a hold-harmless agreement that limits government liability for the 
munitions hazards remaining on-site, and even then are free only to visit approximately 
10 percent of the refuge lands; the rest remains gated and off limits” (Havlick, 
“Disarming” 192). While Jefferson Proving Ground’s transformation into Big Oaks looks 
like a rededication of land to public use and environmental protection, the refuge’s 
inability to guarantee visitor safety reveals the degree to which the U.S. military’s 
decades of bombing destroyed the landscape and limited the range of uses to which the 
land could be put in the future. 
Even when the DOD spends billions to remediate such sites before transferring 
them to the FWS, some threats may linger. Take the case of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
(RMA) in Colorado, for example. For forty years, this chemical weapons manufacturing 
site produced napalm, nerve agents, grenades, rocket fuels, biological weapons, 
explosives, and a variety of persistent chemicals, some manufactured for commercial use. 
The area was designated a Superfund Site in the late 1980s, at which point the Army and 
Shell (one of the on-site commercial manufacturers) were forced to pay more than two 
billion dollars for remediation. Twelve years later, in 1992, the RMA was designated as a 
wildlife refuge. Today, visitors to the refuge can explore the “interactive exhibit hall” in 
the recently built Visitor Center, fish in one of the refuge’s two lakes, or take a “self-
guided Wildlife Drive auto tour” of the refuge (US FWS, “Visitor” RMA). The drive 
affords views of the FWS’s shortgrass prairie restoration projects and its herd of 
reintroduced bison. While this might read as a success story, the RMA “perseveres as a 
militarized site with its Army-owned chemical land-fills, subterranean barriers to contain 
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toxic groundwater, and ongoing soil, odor, and water treatment efforts” (Havlick, 
“Logics” 162). The Arsenal’s impacts may be felt (if not seen) far into the future.  
Rather than publicizing those impacts (and fulfilling its mission of environmental 
education by discussing the nearly irreversible effects of chemical pollution), the FWS 
argues that the Arsenal has undergone “a natural transition” (Visitor Center sign). While 
this phrase may be taken to mean that the refuge is “transitioning” to a state that reflects 
increased concern for the natural world, it also makes the conversion itself seem natural, 
as if it came about without human influence. In fact, the current state of the RMA is the 
result of decades of environmental devastation, which was followed by public outrage 
and a highly political process that led to the site’s designation as a refuge. This rhetoric—
which shows up at the RMA Visitor Center, on its website, and in other publications 
released by the FWS—has a powerful influence on the public’s perceptions of the site, 
given that most physical traces of the RMA’s weapons production years have been 
removed and replaced by Fish and Wildlife infrastructure. Furthermore, FWS signage 
implicitly and explicitly argues that the RMA is both protective of natural systems and 
safe for the public to visit. 
The federal government has directed several similar redesignations within the 
nuclear weapons complex, including the one that created the Hanford Reach National 
Monument. Though no scholarship has catalogued all of these “nuclear-to-wildlife” 
(N2W) conversions (as Havlick has done with the M2W sites), several authors have 
described preservation schemes at a variety of nuclear sites, including Savannah River, 
Rocky Flats, the Nevada Test Site, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, and Hanford, among others. Just as the 
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public came to understand these areas—this “archipelago of contaminated sites”—as a 
threat to human and environmental health, the U.S. government rebranded them as 
wildlife preserves (Masco, “Mutant” 530). These N2W refuges come with their own 
unique problems and circumstances, many of which are different from those generated by 
M2W conversions. Refuges at former nuclear sites operate on land formerly or currently 
managed by the DOE (rather than the DOD) and are therefore influenced by the DOE’s 
guiding narratives about nuclear weapons production. Like the DOE, the FWS avoids 
volunteering information that would undermine the U.S. government or generate concern 
about public health. This loyalty to the DOE’s narratives, which are informed by long-
standing policies of deceit and secrecy, is especially alarming given that another unique 
feature of these N2W conversions is their proximity to massive amounts of radioactive 
contamination, some of which will be dangerous for the next 240,000 years (as in the 
case of left over plutonium). At Hanford, significant remediation was performed on 
Monument lands before they were transferred to the FWS and opened to the public. 
Hanford workers and managers generally accept it as true that the HRNM is safe to visit. 
And yet the DOE retains the title to the Monument, at least partially because there are 
still some hazards there. Like Big Oaks NWR, Hanford Reach is operated as an “overlay 
refuge,” which means that the FWS manages wildlife, habitat, and visitors, but another 
agency holds the deed to the land (US FWS, HRNM CCP 1-7).  
This connection between Big Oaks and Hanford Reach points to the fact that there 
are also significant similarities between M2W and N2W conversions. Indeed, the nuclear 
weapons complex should be seen as a special subset of lands within the much larger 
picture of militarized land in the U.S. Both the DOD and DOE create the sense that they 
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are performing a public service when they remediate devastated lands and then open 
those lands to the public. In reality, areas zoned as residential or commercial would have 
to meet a higher standard of environmental cleanup than sites zoned as wildlife refuges, 
so transferring land to the FWS provides federal agencies and their contractors with a 
relatively cheap and convenient solution to the problem of what to do with heavily 
impacted land. In the case of both M2W and N2W refuges, “the discourse of 
‘preservation’” is enabled only by a policy of “ignoring the long standing practices of 
environmental ruin” that characterized the former military sites (Masco, “Mutant” 531). 
While M2W and N2W conversions may offer support for wildlife species and habitats 
valued by the U.S. government, they may erase evidence of military impacts and 
mistakenly give credit to the DOD and DOE for the apparent health of ecosystems that 
have endured military occupation. 
M2W refuges gain legitimacy through the stories that are told about them. In 
general, these stories are narrated by federal agencies, but they also gain support from 
conservationists, elected officials, and members of the public. Havlick explains how three 
different “logics of change”—Biodiversity, Brownfields, and Serendipity—work to 
justify M2W refuges in public discourse. The first justification, Biodiversity, is given 
when scientists and conservationists discover that a plot of former military land hosts a 
diversity of species that are considered biologically valuable. Thus, at Hanford Reach, the 
variety of rare, endangered, and charismatic species justifies the Monument’s existence. 
Often, this recognition of ecological attributes happens at the cost of other values. Those 
who advocate for refuges often assume “that risks can be geographically bounded and 
public access effectively managed. The privileged positioning of ecological sciences and 
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biodiversity protection looms large here, as concerns about public health or 
socioeconomic disruptions are largely left out of comments contributed by environmental 
advocates of M2W conversion” (“Logics” 155). Potential impacts to refuge staff and the 
visiting public do not enter into this calculation.  
Other M2W conversions are narrated using the Brownfields explanation, the title 
of which refers to areas of land whose potential for future use is compromised by real or 
perceived contamination. This explanation argues that former military sites might as well 
be transformed into wildlife refuges since it would impossible or far too expensive to 
remediate them enough for people to inhabit them. This logic is nothing if not practical, 
saying that  
nothing else redeeming will likely come of military lands so their highest, 
most practical “use” will be to dedicate these places to conservation 
priorities. Put somewhat less charitably, military managers recognize that 
certain DOD lands are too contaminated to ever bear more economically 
productive commercial or residential activities, so a wildlife refuge 
designation can present a positive public face to an otherwise blighted site. 
(156) 
Once a M2W refuge is established, the FWS rarely admits to economically motivated 
practicality as a reason for the redesignation; instead, the agency helps the DOD or DOE 
to “present a positive public face to an otherwise blighted site” by emphasizing the 
ecological attributes worth saving (156). While it may, in fact, be inexpensive and 
beneficial for the federal government to convert militarized sites into refuges, admission 
of that fact is rarely incorporated into the government’s story about a given site. Thus, the 
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HRNM resulted at least partially from the recognition that lands so close to the Hanford 
Site could not be developed for residential or commercial use (because of the Site’s 
contamination), but the government never acknowledges that fact in its publications 
about Hanford Reach.  
 The final—and perhaps most deceptive—justification for a M2W conversion is 
Serendipity, which says that wildlife—and not human actors—are responsible for a site’s 
transformation. To illustrate this justification, Havlick provides the example of the 
FWS’s reaction to the discovery of bald eagles nesting at the RMA: “‘In a way, it was the 
eagles that made it happen.’” This statement “implies that scientists, politicians, the 
DOD, economists, community leaders, FWS officials, conservation advocates, court 
rulings, and the many other elements that actually contributed to this reclassification are 
merely bit players in the larger stage of what is fundamentally a natural occurrence” 
(157). This justification insists that nature has directed the conversion of a given site. At 
Hanford Reach, the Serendipity argument emerges in the FWS’s descriptions of the 
shrub-steppe ecosystem. Historically, this ecosystem has been devalued and destroyed by 
farmers, ranchers, and developers, who have seen little aesthetic or economic use for it. 
As the weapons production era at Hanford began to wind down, the government suddenly 
discovered the ecological value of the shrub-steppe, which hosts a diversity of plant and 
animal communities. This discovery came at a convenient time—just when the DOE 
needed to identify some positive outcome of decades of bomb building. Thus, the FWS 
may say that it was the persistence of the shrub steppe and its diversity of flora and fauna 
that made the Monument, but others might ask: was this ecosystem uniquely valuable, or 
was it made accessible to scientists in order to distract from other events at Hanford? 
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Many would say that both are true; there is very little shrub-steppe left in the western 
U.S., and the fact that some of it sits on the Hanford Site proved advantageous for 
ecologists and the federal government. 
 Today, the HRNM’s status as a National Monument and Wildlife Refuge allows 
the government to characterize parts of Hanford  as worth preserving. Indeed, the 
FWS depicts the HRNM as not just ecologically valuable (and equivalent to other 
valuable sites) but particularly intact and safe for native plants and wildlife. This is, of 
course, exactly the opposite of what one might expect from a nuclear site. Visitors to 
Hanford Reach might reasonably feel unsettled about visiting a former nuclear weapons 
production site that is still in active cleanup. They might worry about their own safety, 
the safety of Monument workers, and the health of plants and animals that can easily 
migrate between the relatively uncompromised landscape of the Monument and the 
highly contaminated spaces of the nuclear site. And yet the HRNM website—which 
exists as a means of interpreting the Monument for the public—registers no concern for 
those potential threats. In fact, it strategically avoids the nuclear issue by redirecting 
visitors’ attention to the local ecology and even relocating the threats to that ecology, as 
in this declaration: “Without a doubt, the biggest threat to the Monument are invasive 
plant species—weeds” (“Wildlife and Habitat”). Such an assertion communicates that the 
proliferation of cheatgrass is a more serious hazard to the ecological integrity of the 
Monument than the presence of long-lived radionuclides right next door. Fish and 
Wildlife’s preoccupation with weeds—a symptom of an already suspect concern for so-
called native species—becomes even more suspicious in the context of Hanford. Indeed, 
the FWS consistently ignores the big, nuclear elephant in the room when it represents 
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Hanford Reach to the public. While not every aspect of the agency’s work at Hanford 
need be related to the impact of nuclear activities on the local ecosystem, the FWS also 
should not aim to distract the public from past, present, and future dangers. And yet, in its 
online rhetoric, the FWS depicts the Monument as a paradise brimming with charismatic 
wildlife, rare and native plants, unique geology, and fascinating “cultural resources.” 
According to the agency’s calculation of risk, only weeds and wildfire—not nuclear 
contamination or ongoing government occupation of the land—threaten these valuable 
“resources.” Thus, the HRNM website provides insight into how the FWS (and by 
extension, Hanford Reach’s co-owner, the DOE) frames the relationship between 
Hanford’s nuclear activities and its preservation. It also offers interpretations of Hanford 
that are difficult to come by if you actually visit HRNM, given that the Monument offers 
little in the way of signage, facilities, or tours. (See Figure 10.) 
Figure 10. Screenshot from the HRNM website’s “Wildlife and Habitat” page. 
 
Most of the HRNM website makes the Monument seem more like a park 
dedicated to picturesque scenery than the outer edges of a nuclear site, and yet—unlike a 
park—the Monument does not offer interpretive centers, well-marked trails, or restrooms. 
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Visitors are left to their own devices, and it appears as if the FWS is indifferent to—or 
perhaps wary of—people’s presence on the Monument. A trip to the northern units of the 
HRNM demonstrates just how isolated and uninviting the landscape is. As you drive 
northwest from Richland on State Route 240—which serves as the boundary between the 
nuclear site and the Monument—you travel for roughly thirty miles with Hanford Site on 
your right and the Rattlesnake Unit of the HRNM on your left. Neither is well marked, 
but you know Hanford by the barbed wire fences with warnings not to trespass, and you 
can recognize the HRNM by the stunning views of Rattlesnake Mountain, which has long 
been sacred to Columbia Basin tribes. Shortly after you arrive at the Columbia River, you 
pass a viewpoint from which you can see the B Reactor, which sits in the distance, across 
the river. (This is the only way to see the B Reactor without a Hanford Site badge or a 
seat on a DOE tour bus.) State Route 240 eventually becomes State Route 24, which 
forms the border between the Wahluke and Saddle Mountain Units of the Monument. 
The HRNM signage near the road is sun-faded, worn, and in some cases, riddled with 
bullet holes.  
For example, a sign on a dirt road located off the highway offers an ambiguous 
“Welcome to the Wahluke Unit” (See Appendix B for a photo of the sign.). The pictures 
on the sign highlight the landscapes and birds that can be viewed at the HRNM, but the 
text reveals the degree to which the Wahluke Unit itself—and not just the core of the 
Hanford Site—was once militarized: “The 5th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group operated 
1200mm gun batteries along these slopes from 1950 to 1957. To further protect Hanford 
during the Cold War, NIKE missile silos and radar control sites were maintained here. 
All were deactivated and removed after 1958.” When the sign claims that these 
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operations protected Hanford during the Cold War, it literally means that the government 
defended Hanford’s plutonium production facilities using artillery, NIKE missiles, and 
radar, but it also suggests that the landscape itself was protected. The assertion that all 
weaponry was “deactivated and removed after 1958” implies that military occupation 
ended mid-century, and Hanford Reach is no worse for the wear. The text of the sign 
communicates that instead of damaging the landscape, federal protection (via the military 
and land use designations) purified it, as demonstrated by illustrations of the Saddle 
Mountains, a meadowlark, and a long-billed curlew. And yet the HRNM’s purified 
landscape is not as welcoming as the sign indicates; the drawing of the meadowlark is 
shot through with bullets, ironically echoing the military presence that once existed there. 
If anything, the sign makes one feel the artificiality of the HRNM’s designation as a 
Monument; the government has erected signs to claim the landscape, but they seem 
neglected and the entire area is eerily empty.  
Other signage at the Monument is even less inviting and sends mixed messages 
about whether the Monument is open to visitors. The northern side of the HRNM feels 
like the middle of nowhere, but the occasional sign with the Monument logo indicates 
that you are in a regulated space. For example, a “DEAD END” sign at a turnoff on the 
Columbia River side of State Route 24 suggests that visitors should turn around, but it is 
not clear whether the sign is meant to help confused drivers (who may be lost in this 
landscape without restaurants, gas stations, or restrooms) or to keep people out. (See 
Appendix B for a photo of the sign.) Regardless, the sign’s message is startling, and it 
seems peculiar given that the area beyond the sign is less a dead end than a scenic 
overlook. The end of the road provides an extraordinary view of both the Columbia River 
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and, in the distance, the Hanford Site. This view connects the Monument and the river to 
the nuclear site, which is the opposite of what the FWS wants to emphasize about the 
area. Thus, the road is a kind of dead end for the government’s narratives, which attempt 
discursively to separate the Monument and river from Hanford’s deadly waste.  
The visitor’s sense that the Monument is undeveloped and even a little 
unwelcoming is corroborated by the HRNM website, which—on its “About the 
Monument” page—extends an ambiguous invitation to visit the Reach:   
So, whether you’re interested in history, sightseeing, wildlife, hunting, 
fishing, or just enjoying a bit of time away from the bustle of everyday 
life, the Hanford Reach National Monument has something to offer you. 
But don’t come expecting a lot of visitor facilities—they don’t exist. 
You’ll be experiencing the Monument on its own terms. 
Here, the FWS depicts the HRNM as both a pastoral escape and threatening wilderness. 
People are invited to visit but not linger. Nature sets the “terms” at the HRNM, and those 
terms are difficult, if not dangerous, to humans. Furthermore, there are no visitor 
facilities to make the landscape more hospitable to visitors. In this way, the FWS paints a 
paradoxical portrait of an enchanting yet ominous landscape seemingly devoid of human 
influence.  
 This depiction of the HRNM accomplishes two things. First, it makes a landscape 
that has been irrevocably altered by humans appear as if it were ruled by non-human 
nature. (Native American habitation, white settlement, fire suppression, agriculture, and 
careless dispersal of long-lived contaminants have made their mark on the HRNM, but 
the FWS does not mention this.) Second, it excuses the agency for opening the 
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Monument to the public without providing visitor facilities. The HRNM’s CCP backs the 
agency up on this point; the document spins the lack of facilities at the Monument as 
something that contributes to the naturalness of the landscape.12 In reality, the FWS has 
neither the will nor the funding to erect buildings and staff them. So why was the HRNM 
turned into a Monument, and why has the FWS created an extensive website that depicts 
the HRNM as a friendly place to visit and view wildlife? Why does the FWS build more 
and more discursive infrastructure online while the Monument itself remains 
undeveloped?  
 Given the government’s history of seizing the Hanford area by eminent domain, 
laying waste to it, and then spending billions of dollars inefficiently to address the 
pollution that will threaten human and environmental health far into the future, there is a 
great deal at stake in Fish and Wildlife’s interpretation of Hanford Reach. The FWS has 
repeatedly revamped the HRNM website, increasing the amount of interpretive text 
available to the public, fleshing out its own framing of Hanford’s M2W transition. The 
website has become more sophisticated in its representations of that transition, but each 
version has made this central claim: that nuclear weapons production paved the way for 
preservation of native plants and wildlife. It is no coincidence that just as the DOE is 
talking about the end of environmental cleanup and new opportunities for economic 
development, recreation, and tourism at Hanford, the FWS has increased its planning for 
the HRNM and used its website to justify Hanford’s status as a Monument. The changes 
the FWS has made to Hanford Reach’s website suggest that the agency is paying closer 
attention to the language and images it uses to depict the Monument lands than it did in 
years past. Here, I will trace the evolution of the FWS’s online rhetoric through three 
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different versions of the website—one that was live through March 2009, another that 
was up from March 2009 to May 2013, and another that has been available since May 
2013. While these three successive interpretations emphasize different aspects of Hanford 
Reach, all three present the Monument as if it were a national park rather than a nuclear 
site, and each version argues that Hanford’s nuclear activities fortuitously protected vast 
tracts of shrub-steppe habitat. Though the HRNM directly borders the Hanford Site, none 
of the versions of the HRNM website discusses how contamination and cleanup affect 
plants, wildlife, “cultural resources,” or public access. As an agency tasked with 
preservation and habitat protection, the FWS is more justified in focusing on the 
“natural” features of the landscape than the DOE. While the FWS places emphasis on 
sagebrush, elk, and other local species, the agency must also interpret how Hanford 
Reach came to be a wildlife refuge, and that forces the FWS out of its usual 
administrative and science-based discourse. Today, the proliferation of pages on the 
HRNM website works to justify and celebrate the continued government colonization of 
Hanford’s outer edges and to argue that military activities are compatible with 
environmental protection.  
 
At its inception, the HRNM website provided very little information about what 
one would find at the Monument, but still managed—with a scant amount of text—to 
equate preparing for war with preserving a natural area. At that point, the website was 
less flashy than it is today; the FWS had yet to publicize the Monument with crisp, 
professional photographs of elk herds and coyote. Instead, the front page featured a 
banner with the FWS logo, a generic drawing of a fish, and the Monument’s tagline, 
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“protecting the last of the free-flowing Columbia River.” Beneath the banner, the FWS 
summarized the Monument’s characteristics, history, and management. The most striking 
passage was the second paragraph of this description, which made an awkward and 
ambiguous argument about how government action had transformed the Monument’s 
lands over the decades: “Originally preserved to help win the second world war, the lands 
that now comprise the Hanford Reach National Monument have been part of a 
progression from World War II to the Cold War to preservation as a testament to both the 
natural world and the history of the 20th century.” In this tangled statement, the FWS 
insinuated that when the government converted 640 square miles of land adjacent to the 
Columbia River into a nuclear complex in the 1940s, it was actually preserving the 
landscape’s natural qualities. In a contemporary environmental context, “preserve” means 
“protect,” but what the government has actually done at Hanford more closely matches 
another meaning of “preserve”—to “reserve” for personal use. Over and over, the 
government has ensured its legal claim to Hanford—first by seizing the land in 1943, 
then by claiming that national security required decades of plutonium production, and 
now by arguing that the Site’s environment must be protected. Though the passage 
argued for the compatibility of militarization and preservation, it tried to appear neutral 
by referring to the series of government takeovers as a “progression.” Indeed, the passage 
insisted on having it both ways: it appealed to readers’ patriotism by emphasizing that 
Hanford helped to “win” World War II, and it appealed to environmental concern by 
underscoring the importance of preservation. But the passage made these appeals in a 
strategically vague and bewildering way; it did not clarify what serves as a “testament to 
both the natural world and the history of the 20th century.” The word “testament,” which 
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has a sacred valence, suggests that the HRNM is a sign of the righteousness of two 
things: the U.S. nuclear mission and its protection of nature. (See Figure 11.) 
 
Figure 11. Image of the HRNM website, captured on February 18, 2007 and available 
through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine under http://www.fws.gov/hanfordreach/ 
index-expanded.html. 
 
In 2009, the FWS revised its description of the Monument to emphasize the 
notion that preservation has purified the landscape at Hanford. In that version of the 
website, large photographs of an elk herd, river otters, and a fisherman holding a salmon 
dominated the homepage. While the earlier version merely mentioned the Monument’s 
“spectacular shrub-steppe habitat,” the revised version elaborated on the diversity of 
species that dwells in that habitat:  
Welcome to the Hanford Reach National Monument—the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service’s first national monument and the only one within the 
interior United States. Protected by Presidential Proclamation in 2000 
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under the American Antiquities Act, the Monument is a place of sweeping 
vistas and stark beauty, of towering bluffs and delicate flowers. Wildlife 
abounds in this harsh landscape—rare is a trip along the river that doesn’t 
produce mule deer, coyotes, bald eagles, great blue herons, or white 
pelicans. A large elk herd hides in the canyons, and incredibly, porcupines 
are a common sight. Rare plants defy the desert, wind and heat. Beautiful 
spring wildflower displays delight the visitor who ventures into the field.  
In this account, the Monument is a place for people to get back to nature. The landscape 
is at once sublime in its “sweeping vistas,” “stark beauty,” and “harsh landscape” and 
pastoral in its benign and inviting “wildflower displays.” The natural world at Hanford is 
resilient even in the face of punishing conditions: “wildlife abounds” and “rare plants 
defy the desert.” This Eden would seem to exist outside history—and outside the nuclear 
weapons complex—but for the next paragraph:  
The Monument is also a reminder of our history. Plutonium reactors stand 
along the river, remnants of WWII and the Cold War. Plutonium from B 
Reactor fueled “Fat Man,” the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, 
on August 9, 1945. No longer in production, these reactors are now being 
dismantled, and the lands and waters cleaned. 
This version of the website acknowledges Hanford’s nuclear past, but avoids making 
judgments about it. “Plutonium reactors” passively “stand along the river” like ancient 
ruins from a time when plutonium “fueled” a single atomic bomb. (Neither the bomb’s 
creators nor the astounding number of bombs produced at Hanford are mentioned here.) 
In this attempt to be impartial about Hanford’s nuclear activities, the FWS carefully 
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avoids the moral debates surrounding Hanford’s devastation of human and ecological 
communities in the U.S. and abroad. The agency is distant but reassuring when it claims 
that military activities at the Site have ended and environmental cleanup is putting 
everything back in order. Without explicitly connecting war and preservation (as the 
earlier version does), the FWS implies that government activities have been protective of 
life and landscape at Hanford. The nuclear site and the Monument are conflated so that 
both can be purified by resident wildlife, environmental cleanup, and federal protection. 
(See Figure 12.)  
 
Figure 12. Image of the HRNM website captured on September 22, 2012 and available 
through the Internet Archive Wayback Machine under http://www.fws.gov/hanfordreach. 
When this version of the website was live (between 2009 and 2013), the main photo 
rotated between this one and several others, which featured Monument wildflowers, 
jackrabbits, river otters, and fishermen.  
 
 
The FWS has recently made even more extensive alterations to the HRNM 
website. As planning for the Monument has proceeded, the FWS has added more and 
more interpretive text and imagery. This proliferation of discourse became even more 
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pronounced in spring of 2013 when the FWS brought the appearance of the Hanford 
Reach website into alignment with that of other websites maintained for National 
Wildlife Refuges (NWR) across the country. Now, the HRNM website adheres to FWS’s 
standardized format, which makes Hanford Reach look like any other refuge in the NWR 
System. Even though the homepage declares that the HRNM is a “thoroughly unique 
refuge,” the FWS argues that the landscape’s natural qualities—not its atomic history—
make it unique. Nothing on the website’s main page indicates that the HRNM has any 
association with the military, nuclear weapons, or war. This makes it easy to forget that 
the Monument exists on the margins of a nuclear wasteland. 
The current version of the HRNM website (which went live in May 2013) 
contains more interpretation of Hanford’s human history, but the homepage focuses 
solely on the qualities of the Monument that make it suitable for inclusion in the National 
Wildlife Refuge System. A single, close-up photo of a kangaroo rat dominates the 
homepage. The tiny rat is not as immediately symbolic of the landscape as the elk herds 
that the FWS often uses to publicize the Monument, but its photo communicates that the 
FWS is dedicated to protecting all species at Hanford, even those that are smaller and less 
charismatic than the elk. The image is accompanied by an overview of the HRNM that 
paints a dramatic portrait of the Monument’s terrain and its human history: “Born of fire 
and ice and flood over millions of years, preserved through the war and conflict of half a 
century, now protected forever.” In this account, the Monument was created by 
spectacular geological change, threatened, and ultimately saved by human intervention. 
However, the FWS strategically muddles its own meaning when it claims that Hanford 
Reach was “preserved through the war and conflict of half a century.” Whether the Reach 
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was preserved even despite war or by war is made purposely unclear. This allows the 
agency to again suggest that war and preservation are compatible, albeit more subtly than 
it did in the first version of the website. (See Figure 13.)  
 
Figure 13. Screenshot of the most recent version of the HRNM website, taken February 
10, 2014. The website began using this new format in spring 2013. 
  
 According to the FWS, “war and conflict” have left pristine habitat in their wake. 
The pages that fall under the heading “Wildlife and Habitat” on the HRNM website are 
dedicated to overturning readers’ presumed assumptions about the flora and fauna of the 
Monument. On the surface, the agency may seem to be challenging readers’ beliefs about 
desert environments, which are often viewed as sterile and lifeless. Indeed, the FWS 
insists that the desert ecosystem at Hanford is a productive one: “Although it appears 
barren—especially to those from more temperate climates—the Hanford Reach National 
Monument supports hundreds of animal species that have adapted to its dry environment” 
(“Wildlife and Habitat”). The website lists many of these hundreds of species and 
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repeatedly argues that they are all scientifically and ecologically important to the 
Monument’s ecosystem: 
The Monument has its share of “charismatic” wildlife—herds of mule 
deer, plenty of coyotes, chubby marmots, industrious beavers, fun-loving 
otters, and some of the most majestic elk in the West. But you might be 
surprised at what is the most abundant mammal here—and one of the most 
important. The most abundant mammal in the shrub-steppe habitat on the 
Monument is the Great Basin pocket mouse. These [and other] rodents 
form the prey base for much of the rest of the Monument. 
But the FWS is not just listing these species in order to prove that deserts can be 
productive. The agency takes the argument one step farther by asserting that Hanford’s 
vast array of plant and animal species have only persisted because they have been 
isolated. In a short summary about rare species found at the monument, the FWS declares 
that “[s]ometimes sequestration is a good thing. Seven decades of it has left the 
Monument as a bulwark against the tides of extinction.” The FWS does not mention that 
these seven decades of sequestration were an inadvertent consequence of seven decades 
of militarization. Instead, it insists that the Monument’s lands have been a stronghold 
throughout war—paradoxically, a last bastion against environmental destruction.  
The FWS is also ready with reassurances about the health of those species that 
have persisted at Hanford. For example, the agency frequently mentions that “large 
numbers of fall Chinook salmon spawn in the Hanford Reach” in order to support its 
claim that the Reach is healthy (“Fish”). In general, the agency strategically avoids 
mentioning Hanford’s nuclear activities and local wildlife in the same breath, but there 
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are a couple instances when it clumsily refutes claims that Hanford has impacted animal 
health. In one passage, the agency uses a cartoon character to argue that the fish in 
Hanford Reach have not been damaged by Hanford contaminants: “If you’re thinking 
Hanford, and you’re thinking ‘Blinky,’ the three-eyed fish from the Simpsons, you’re 
thinking wrong. The Hanford Reach of the Columbia River supports a varied, important, 
and much-sought-after fishery” (“Wildlife and Habitat”). Though the agency hopes to 
make the comparison seem absurd, simply mentioning Blinky, a three-eyed fish that has 
been mutated by exposure to runoff from an irresponsibly managed nuclear power plant, 
brings a disturbing image to mind.13 The ridiculousness of the allusion also highlights the 
FWS’s tendency to oversimplify environmental health. In this case, it offers only two 
indicators (abundance of fish and lack of mutant characteristics) and no scientific 
evidence to support its claim that local fish populations are healthy. 
 The FWS has ensured that the layout of the HRNM website emphasizes the health 
of the Monument’s wildlife and vegetation, but deeper within its layers of linking pages, 
the FWS also uses the website to advance a version of Hanford’s human history that is 
not unlike the one presented by the DOE. Since the FWS only manages seven national 
monuments, its primary experience is in interpreting the “biological resources” (the flora 
and fauna) at national wildlife refuges. A portion of the HRNM began as Saddle 
Mountain National Wildlife Refuge (managed by the FWS), but the federal government 
eventually made the area into a Monument, thereby acknowledging the significance of its 
human history. Thus, as the primary manager of the HRNM, the FWS is also charged 
with interpreting the Monument’s “cultural resources.” Like the DOE, the FWS uses its 
platform to suggest that white settlement of the Hanford area was part of a natural 
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progression of history, that military operations at Hanford were justified, and that 
patriotic citizens ought to feel a sense of awe in the face of what Hanford engineers 
accomplished at the Site. 
Because the FWS is less experienced with depicting human history (than the 
National Park Service, for instance) and because Hanford provokes heated controversy, 
the agency approaches its interpretation of the HRNM’s cultural resources by making 
vague and evasive statements about the distinctiveness of the landscape. The FWS is 
especially ambiguous when called upon to sum up Hanford Reach in a few words, as it 
does on the “About the Monument” page of the HRNM website: “While many national 
wildlife refuges protect remnants of America’s history, none are as rich, varied and 
complete as Hanford.” Hanford’s history is certainly “rich” and “varied” in that it has 
always been a significant cultural center for Native people in the Columbia Basin and has 
been repeatedly colonized by prospectors, settlers, and the government, but these 
adjectives are equivocal at best.  
The agency’s use of the word “complete” is also difficult to explain, though the 
next sentence on the “About the Monument” page may help to clarify its meaning: “The 
unique and fortuitous circumstances (establishment of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation 
during World War II) that preserved the area since 1943 also created a unique set of 
cultural resources with contextual integrity that may no longer exist anywhere else in the 
region.” The diction and syntax of this passage serve to mystify rather than shed light on 
the Monument. The agency uses the word “unique” twice, as if it does not know how else 
objectively to address the “circumstances” that created Hanford. The agency does seem 
to take a stance when it uses the word “fortuitous,” though it strategically avoids saying 
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what was fortuitous or who benefitted from the good fortune. Finally, the agency 
employs vague and nonsensical jargon like “cultural resources” and “contextual 
integrity” to suggest that Hanford Reach is significant without explaining why. Because 
the FWS avoids the tragic elements of Hanford’s human history, it is left with little of 
value to say. 
As is often the case with agencies that engage in historic preservation and 
preservation of ecosystems, the FWS wants to freeze Hanford Reach in time, to keep the 
landscape empty of people, and to ensure that both history and nature remain static. But 
even as it celebrates that which is still intact at Hanford, the FWS acknowledges that 
Hanford forever changed the local landscape: “Unfortunately, some of the resources, 
such as the historic town sites, homesteads and other structures, as well as Native 
American traditional use areas and aboriginal occupation areas, were destroyed before 
and during establishment and operation of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation.” The 
FWS—as an agency that is loyal to the U.S. government’s narrative of Hanford—cannot 
acknowledge all that was lost when Hanford was built. Instead, it must use what is left to 
shape public memory of what happened there. Thus, the HRNM website draws on 
Hanford’s “cultural resources” to craft a compelling history that distracts from the central 
facts of Hanford: continuous government occupation and unprecedented pollution. The 
HRNM website depicts Hanford’s cultural resources in a four-part progression from 
“Native Americans” to “Modern History” to “B Reactor” and finally to “Cold War.” 
(Conspicuously absent is anything about the area’s contemporary history, an era that has 
been defined by waste removal, remediation, and crisis.) The first two pages in this series 
must be read together as a statement about the agency’s devaluation of Native American 
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history and complicity with the ongoing colonization of the Site, both accomplished 
through physical occupation as well as narrative occupation. 
 One might expect a page headed “Native Americans” to describe the long and 
rich history of the Native people who live in the Hanford area. One might also expect that 
this page would describe how Native people have suffered the worst impacts of the U.S. 
government’s occupation of the land and pollution of the region. Instead, the page puts 
Hanford’s tribes squarely in the Precontact past: “For centuries and into today, the 
Columbia River—‘Chiawana’ (Big River)—and its tributaries were the lifeblood of 
Native Americans in the Columbia Basin, providing food, water, travel corridors, trading 
routes, and religious beliefs.” Though this passage begins with “for centuries and into 
today,” thereby establishing a sense of Native people’s age-old relationship with the land, 
it uses the past tense to suggest that the river was a resource for tribes, sometime long 
ago. The FWS portrays the subsistence and cultural practices of Native people as a part of 
the landscape’s past: “As early as 10,000 years ago, the ancestral inhabitants of today’s 
Wanapum People, Yakama Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Colville, Confederated 
Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, and Nez Perce fished, hunted, and collected a variety 
of natural resources in the area.” Though the FWS names the tribes with historical claims 
to the Hanford area, the agency fails to acknowledge that the descendents of those same 
Native people continue to depend on the area for food and medicine. But the focus on 
Native Americans who lived at Hanford 10,000 years ago suggests either that Native 
people have disappeared—a white myth from the nineteenth century that persists even 
today—or that something has broken their traditional relationship with the land. Indeed, 
early white settlement, Hanford’s plutonium production, and the Monument’s 
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preservation have limited Native people’s access to traditional hunting and fishing areas, 
places where food and medicine are gathered, and sacred sites—though the FWS 
mentions none of this. The last sentence of the paragraph acknowledges the fact that local 
tribes continue to use resources from the Hanford area, but it also refuses to acknowledge 
how Hanford has impacted those resources: “Even today, Native Americans gather tules 
for making house coverings, sleeping mats and other household uses.” The phrase “even 
today” casts gathering tules as an outdated practice. Further, the FWS’s focus on the 
gathering of non-food items neglects the legacy of radioactive colonialism left by 
Hanford’s nuclear activities. Native people—who have traditionally fished, hunted, and 
gathered a greater amount of their food from the area than white settlers—have been 
disproportionately exposed to Hanford’s massive releases of chemical and radioactive 
contaminants.  
 The following section about Hanford’s “Cultural Resources,” demonstrates that 
the FWS adheres to a notion of historical progress in which Native people have simply 
disappeared, thereby making way for waves of white settlement in the Columbia Basin. 
The FWS devotes three successive pages to Hanford’s “Modern History,” and those 
pages are prefaced with a quotation from John L. O’Sullivan, originator of the term 
“Manifest Destiny,” which described the infamous belief (held by many Euro-Americans 
in the nineteenth century) that whites were destined to settle the entire North American 
continent. Though it is today widely acknowledged—by scholars, activists, and the wider 
culture—that Manifest Destiny was founded on belief in the racial and cultural 
superiority of whites, and that it laid the ideological foundation for the violent 
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colonization of North America, the FWS places the quotation in bold, italicized font, 
which would suggest that it supports the doctrine.  
The FWS exhumes the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny in order to portray the 
HRNM as a place of purity and peace, completely devoid of history (though, ironically, 
the agency is interpreting Hanford history on this very webpage). The FWS quotes 
O’Sullivan, for whom Manifest Destiny represented the unbridled optimism associated 
with white settlement of the West:  
We have no interest in the scenes of antiquity, only as lessons of 
avoidance of nearly all their examples. The expansive future is our arena, 
for our history. We are entering on its untrodden space, with the truths [. . 
.] in our minds, beneficent objects in our hearts, and with a clear 
conscience unsullied by the past. We are the nation of human progress, 
and who will, what can, set limits on our onward march? Providence is 
with us, and no earthly power can. 
Ironically, the FWS here describes the history of a Monument that has been designated 
by the Antiquities Act with a passage that denies “interest in the scenes of antiquity.” The 
stated purpose of the HRNM is to preserve a connection with the past, but the FWS here 
endorses complete denial of it. Like the DOE, the FWS erases the history of Native 
people and endorses American exceptionalism, which allows whites—even today—to 
colonize land “with a clear conscience unsullied by the past.” The two agencies view 
Hanford—which they see as a marvel of both the atomic age and the natural world—as 
the climax in a long progression of settlement. Thus, directly after quoting O’Sullivan, 
the FWS insists that “the land comprising the Monument has an unusual and colorful 
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provenance. The history of the Hanford Reach is the history and fulfillment of ‘Manifest 
Destiny.’” While it is true that the endless and brutal march of what whites have called 
“progress” ended in a nuclear wasteland that has been enshrined as a national monument 
and wildlife refuge, the FWS indicates (here and throughout the HRNM website) that this 
is a favorable outcome. The FWS uses ambiguous descriptors like “unusual” and 
“colorful” because it is eager to avoid contentious debate about Hanford, and yet it 
stumbles directly into those debates by embracing the DOE’s interpretations of Hanford’s 
history.  
 The FWS is perhaps especially influenced by the DOE when it describes the B 
Reactor, which is the next subject the agency approaches in its discussion of Hanford’s 
“cultural resources.” The FWS introduces the reactor with yet another ambivalent 
explanation: “Unassuming, looking a bit like a long-abandoned steel factory, B Reactor is 
a testament to both the ingenuity of man and his fractious nature.” In this description, the 
reactor is portrayed as “unassuming”—unpretentious and innocent of its own history. It 
easily masquerades as a “steel factory” and looks “long-abandoned,” as if it were no 
longer in use. Each of these descriptors helps the government portray the B Reactor as 
harmless. Though the second half of the passage hints at the fact that the reactor may 
have been dangerous, the word “testament” suggests that the reactor is more a symbol of 
good and evil (“the ingenuity of man and his fractious nature”) than a real, material 
threat. While the B Reactor—which has been preserved as a National Historical 
Landmark—could reasonably be interpreted as a monument to the recklessness of war, 
the FWS interprets it as a neutral outcome of humanity’s capabilities and childish 
irritability.  
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It may be surprising that FWS even comments on the B Reactor, given that it is 
located on the Hanford Site and not on Monument lands. The FWS reveals why at the 
end of its description of the reactor: “Because of its historical importance and 
contributions to world events, there is a significant movement to preserve this landmark. 
The National Park Service has studied the B Reactor and determined that it should be 
preserved as part of a national historical park. Legislation to create just such a park is 
working its way through Congress.” The FWS’s political agenda here, which aligns with 
that of the DOE and other government agencies, is to support the creation of a Manhattan 
Project National Historical Park (which I will discuss in Chapter IV of this dissertation). 
Each of these agencies supports plans to bring more visitors to the Hanford Site, in part 
because they hope to convince the public that the Site’s threats to environmental and 
public health have been contained.  
 The last section of the HRNM website’s four-part description of Hanford’s 
“Cultural Resources,” which focuses on the Cold War, draws connections between U.S. 
weapons production, the events of the Cold War, and the landscape of Hanford Reach but 
does so without any reflection on Cold War waste production at Hanford. The webpage 
provides a brief background on the Cold War and then details how international events 
that threatened U.S. world dominance were met with increased construction at Hanford: 
What is interesting about the Hanford Site is that, in addition to fueling the 
Cold War arms race, key events in the Cold War can be traced here [. . .]. 
So, as you look down the river at the various generations of reactors, you 
can see world events unfolding—the Truman Doctrine, the formation of 
NATO, the end of the American policy of “isolationism,” the Marshall 
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Plan, the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, the rise of Mao Tse-
tung and Nikita Khrushchev, the space race and the launching of Sputnik, 
the period of “McCarthyism,” the spy trials of Alger Hiss and Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg, the eras of “massive retaliation” and “mutually assured 
destruction,” and many other world-changing events. All of these are 
etched into the banks of the Hanford Reach. 
The FWS does little to interpret these events and instead treats them as interesting bits of 
Hanford-related trivia. The agency seems to look back on them with nostalgia, or at least 
with an admiration for Hanford’s part in them. This sense of wonder in the face of what 
Hanford has accomplished certainly evokes the DOE’s descriptions of the Site. While the 
DOE’s pride in Hanford’s work can be explained by its direct involvement in weapons 
production, the FWS’s apparent satisfaction in seeing “world-changing events [. . .] 
etched into the banks of the Hanford Reach” is more puzzling. Though the FWS arrived 
at Hanford to preserve and restore valuable habitats, it fails to interpret how militarization 
and nuclearization have impacted the areas it claims to protect. Just when it might 
describe how plutonium production during the terrifying decades of the Cold War did 
extensive damage to Hanford and its surrounding environment, the FWS turns its 
attention away from the Hanford’s natural landscape and towards the wider world. 
Tellingly, the FWS isolates its discussions of the Reach’s wildlife from its 
interpretation of the area’s human history. Portions of the website devoted to “wildlife 
and habitat” are neatly divided from pages about the Monument’s “cultural resources.” 
Thus, our general tendency to separate humans from nature proves convenient for the 
U.S. government. The FWS can convincingly discuss the health of the flora and fauna at 
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a nuclear site without acknowledging how colonization and war have irrevocably 
impacted the local environment. And even though the FWS claims to be devoted to 
habitat protection and public education at the HRNM, it can operate an entire website 
about the Monument without discussing Hanford’s pollution in any substantive way. 
By designating the HRNM a Monument and not just a wildlife refuge, the federal 
government gave it special status as a place to remember the nuclear history that we all 
(in most cases, involuntarily) share. However, when the FWS argues that world-changing 
events of the twentieth century are “etched into the banks of the Columbia,” it fails to 
admit that those etchings are deep and permanent scars (“Cold War”). Instead of 
challenging the DOE’s narratives about the health of Hanford’s natural systems, the FWS 
repeatedly works to make Hanford’s pollution invisible. While the FWS might be seen as 
noble for pursuing conservation and restoration in compromised landscapes like the one 
at Hanford, it is also important to recognize that the agency actively downplays hazards 
at the M2W and N2W refuges it manages. When the FWS argues that government 
“sequestration” of land protected the health of plant and animal species at Hanford, refers 
to Hanford’s removal from the public domain as “fortuitous,” and explicitly dismisses 
concerns about the effects of radionuclides on resident species, the FWS supports the 
DOE’s mission of assuring the public that Hanford is safe for—and even protective of—
life. Thus, scientists and managers of today’s FWS who quietly accept landscapes 
damaged by the military have something in common with U.S. ecologists of the mid-
twentieth century who, in their eagerness to conduct experiments on the government’s 
vast and enclosed tracts of land, implicitly supported the practices of the U.S. military. 
The DOE, for its part, continues to use the Monument as a buffer zone between 
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Hanford’s lethally toxic core and neighboring landscapes that are heavily cultivated and 
well populated. The DOE also uses the Monument just as the Atomic Energy 
Commission used its mid-century preservation schemes—as a bulwark against public 
curiosity and criticism. By offering scientists and the public access to the land 
surrounding Hanford (limited though that access is), the DOE reduces the threat 
perceived by outsiders while “preserving the appearance of open space” (Findlay and 
Hevly 202). Claims to openness are deceiving, however, given that the public is not 
allowed to access much of the Monument. People cannot camp there, boaters cannot dock 
their boats on the Columbia River shoreline (which is managed by the DOE), and the area 
is subject to nuclear emergencies caused by fires, floods, earthquakes, human error, and 
chance. By transferring land to the FWS, the DOE associates itself and Hanford with the 
FWS’s relatively unsullied reputation. However, as Havlick warns, this redesignation of 
military sites comes at a cost: “merely as a result of the shifting nomenclature of these 
sites we risk the historical erasure of military operations in exchange for the easy 
acceptance of a new conservation mission” (“Logics” 162). Indeed, the FWS’s emphasis 
on the health of plants and wildlife at the HRNM erases not only Hanford’s military past 
but also its militarized present, thereby contributing to the cultural amnesia that enables 
continued government occupation (and destruction) of Hanford lands.  
 
Notes 
1 The Hanford Education and Outreach Network Facebook page, operated by the 
Washington State Department of Ecology, updates FB users on Hanford news and 




2 Bald eagle populations are growing quickly now that some of the pressure from 
insecticide use has been removed (Shogren). The vast tracts of “undisturbed” land at 
places like Hanford and Rocky Mountain Arsenal are undoubtedly attractive to nesting 
birds, but foraging and reproducing in these irrevocably polluted places presents new 
threats to the birds’ health. 
3 U.S. Fish and Wildlife (FWS) claims that the appearance of bald eagles at 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) led to the site’s transformation into a wildlife refuge: 
“In the early 1980s, the Army and Shell began an extensive environmental cleanup under 
the oversight of federal, state, and local regulatory agencies. Soon after, a roost of bald 
eagles was discovered prompting the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to become involved 
in managing wildlife at the site. The discovery also led Congress to designate the site as a 
national wildlife refuge in 1992” (U.S. FWS RMA).  
4 The recent cultural fascination with the resilience of nature in the face of 
pervasive pollution, landscape destruction, and climate change has spawned a new genre 
of literature, films, and television shows. There are wildlife documentaries about animals 
living in Chernobyl’s exclusion zones, books and television programs like The World 
Without Us (by Alan Weisman) and Life After People (on A&E)—both of which imagine 
how the world will look once people have disappeared—and countless magazine and 
newspaper articles about life in the aftermath of Chernobyl and Fukushima. 
5 Coincidentally, the Fukushima meltdown occurred in the same year as 




people, plants, and wildlife are coping in the toxic environments created by those two 
disasters. 
6 Scientists have argued about whether radiation has had a lasting effect on birds 
in the Chernobyl exclusion zone (Gill). The most prominent voices are those of Jim 
Smith, a radioecologist who has studied Chernobyl for over 20 years and concluded that 
the site’s radiation has not done significant permanent damage to wildlife, and Tim 
Mousseau and Anders Møller, who have published numerous studies on the devastating 
but subtle effects radiation has had on the abundance, diversity, physiology, and fitness of 
birds living in the exclusion zone.  
7 The Hanford Site is about half the size of the state of Rhode Island because the 
government wanted a large buffer zone around the production facilities both for secrecy 
and public safety. Fortunately, only about 10% of the 586-square-mile site has 
radioactive or chemical contamination. So, yes, Hanford is generally safe because the 
waste there is contained. Further, it isn’t accessible to the public, and employees who 
perform cleanup work receive specialized training and wear protective gear (Washington 
DOE).  
8 Ironically, though, the government does not claim to protect Hanford species 
from contaminants; instead, it identifies land development as the greatest threat to 
wildlife. 





10 “Section 2 of the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. 431, authorizes the President to 
establish as national monuments “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, 
and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned 
or controlled by the Government of the United States.” 
11 The FWS is required by the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act 
to write a Comprehensive Conservation Plan (CCP) for each refuge in the National 
Wildlife Refuge System. According to the FWS, “Comprehensive Conservation Plans 
provide long-term guidance for management decisions and set forth goals, objectives, and 
strategies needed to accomplish refuge purposes and identify the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service’s best estimate of future needs” (CCP 2). Both the draft CCP (and the 
accompanying Environmental Impact Statement for the Monument) and the final version 
of the HRNM CCP are available via the HRNM website. While the final version guides 
the FWS’s management of the Monument, the draft version lays out the various 
management alternatives that were explored during the planning process. 
12 The HRNM Comprehensive Conservation Plan, published in September 2008, 
lays out FWS’s management plan for the Monument, which came about after an 
extensive planning process, public comment, and an Environmental Impact Statement. 
The focus of the preferred alternative—which was ultimately chosen through the 
planning process (Alternative C-1) “is on protecting and conserving the biological, 
geological, paleontological and cultural resources described in the Monument 
Proclamation by creating and maintaining extensive areas within the Monument free of 




“based on comments received on the draft CCP/EIS from Native American tribes, other 
agencies, special interests, and the public regarding limiting extremes in both providing 
and controlling public uses.” Thus, FWS justifies the lack of facilities by claiming that 
the tribes, agencies, and the public called for that approach. It may also be true that 
relevant agencies have lingering concerns about contamination and attracting people to a 
hotly contested government site that has already attracted its share of negative attention 
from the media. 
13 However, “Blinky” has powerful cultural resonance, and this comparison may 
have the unintended consequence of bringing to mind the mistrust of government and 
corporate America that pervades The Simpsons. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DENIAL AND COMMODIFICATION: NUCLEAR TOURISM AT HANFORD 
After decades of keeping the public and the press away from the radiating disaster 
of the nuclear weapons complex, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) now invites 
people to tour some of its most dangerous sites. In January 2013, the DOE proudly 
advertised one of its nuclear sites on Energy.gov in an article titled “A Marvel of Science 
and History is a Must-See in the Northwest” (Mikell). The “marvel” was Hanford, a 
nuclear site regularly featured on the evening news for its gross mismanagement of 
radioactive and chemical waste leftover from the Manhattan Project and the Cold War. 
The DOE happily reported that “[t]he B Reactor National Historic Landmark tour and the 
Hanford Site cleanup tour in Washington State are getting a positive reaction from Seattle 
Met magazine. The publication added the historical tours to its list of best places to visit 
in the Northwest.” The agency’s report of this “positive reaction” ignored the Met’s 
critical analysis of the tours; instead, the DOE cites the award (with purposeful 
vagueness) as proof that Hanford Site offers visitors an extraordinary experience:  
Tens of thousands of visitors from every state and more than 48 countries 
have toured B Reactor, the world’s first full-scale plutonium production 
reactor. This firsthand view of history, science and the scale of the reactor 
provide guests with a scope of the enormous intellectual and physical 
collaboration known as the Manhattan Project. (Mikell) 
Everything in the DOE’s account of Hanford is big: “tens of thousands” of visitors have 
toured the Site to witness the “scale” of the B Reactor and the “scope of the enormous” 
project that built it. The DOE typically describes features of Hanford’s wasteland as awe-
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inspiring, but here, the large number of tourists who have visited the Site is invoked to 
suggest safety. A few sentences later, the agency notes that tours “fill up quickly,” 
thereby framing them as desirable commodities for which one has to compete (Mikell). 
At first glance, the Met might seem to be participating in the same type of unexamined 
commodification, given that it lists Hanford as one of the “best places to visit” in the 
Northwest, alongside a series of leisure destinations, including a luxury hotel, kayak tour, 
bike trail, and car museum. 
But even the Met, which tends not to engage political issues when advising 
readers about how to spend their time and money, provides a brief, critical analysis of the 
DOE tour program. Though it lists Hanford as one more travel destination to be 
consumed, the magazine recognizes that the DOE’s Hanford tours are deceptive: 
It’s a marvel, an engineering marvel. Those words are repeated throughout 
the five-and-a-half-hour tour of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, a free 
outing that’s open only to adult U.S. citizens without cameras. The B 
Reactor in the middle of the Department of Energy site truly is a marvel; 
the world’s first plutonium reactor was built in just over a year. Though it 
looks like a three-story telephone switchboard, the reactor represents a 
great leap forward in American science. Just don’t expect to hear much 
about why that plutonium was created—rare are the words “atomic bomb” 
or “Nagasaki.” (Williams) 
In a short paragraph, the Met identifies both the serious omissions in the DOE’s tour 
script and what the agency does to distract attention away from the historical holes left by 
those omissions. The magazine assesses the tour program accurately; B Reactor tours 
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focus primarily on the engineering achievements that created the U.S. nuclear arsenal, 
and they say almost nothing about the human costs of manufacturing plutonium for 
weapons. The DOE hopes its guests will experience such a sense of awe when confronted 
with the reactor face that they give little thought to what the reactor produced, namely, 
the suffering and death of the people at home and abroad. 
Hanford is not the only nuclear site to become increasingly accessible to tourists. 
The post-Cold War era has seen a widespread opening up of sites of nuclear production, 
design, testing, and accident. Chernobyl’s exclusion zone is now open to tourists, and 
private tour companies depart Kiev for the zone every day. Radiation “hotspots” (where 
radiation is much higher than in surrounding areas) dot the zone, but the Ukrainian 
government and tour companies suggest—just by offering the tours—that people can 
visit safely as long as they adhere to tour rules and regulations. Similarly, the DOE today 
offers a number of museums and guided tours that take people through the U.S. weapons 
complex. The agency does not invite people to areas that have been irradiated by a 
nuclear meltdown (as Chernobyl tour companies do), but some tours do bring people 
relatively close to contaminated sites. At Hanford, tourists stand above the dusty, 
windblown Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (which holds low-level 
radioactive waste) and ride by waste tank farms, which are leaking into the groundwater 
and belching flammable gasses that could cause a tank explosion. This willingness on the 
part of the DOE to operate tours suggests that the agency is more interested in bringing 
people to Hanford to make the argument that the Site is safe than it is in protecting the 
public. The agency has increasingly commodified these sites of disaster by turning them 
into landmarks, monuments, and parks; funding atomic museums that interpret the bomb 
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as a spectacular American achievement; and offering tours that make visitors feel as if 
they are getting an insider’s look at the weapons complex. Though the U.S. government 
has traditionally concealed its nuclear activities, it now makes claims to transparency by 
inviting people to visit its nuclear sites. Further, it interprets public interest generated by 
nuclear tours as public approval of its remediation work, which draws a false correlation 
between curiosity and assent. 
 Thus, the DOE invites and, in fact, produces nuclear tourists. The agency’s ability 
to attract visitors may be explained by the current era’s distance from WWII and the Cold 
War: “The term ‘nuclear tourism’ may seem like an oxymoron but, as we enter what 
Jonathan Schell calls ‘the second nuclear age’ in the era following the end of the Cold 
War, the sites/sights of the first nuclear age are increasingly being commodified as tourist 
attractions and national commemorative sites” (Gusterson, “Nuclear” 23). That 
commodification allows visitors to experience the thrill of contact at a consumer’s 
distance. Because the government claims that tours are relatively safe, people visit 
without much thought to the risks involved. The public’s puzzling eagerness to visit 
nuclear sites can also be explained by the irresistibility of that which is off-limits; as one 
journalist writing about Chernobyl put it, “the zone possesses the allure of the forbidden 
and a promise of rare, personal insights into history” (Chivers). The “new post-war 
pilgrim—the nuclear tourist”—is driven by curiosity as well as the desire to have a bodily 
experience of a nuclear site (Gusterson “Nuclear” 23). That desire is, of course, 
paradoxical; an authentic bodily experience of nuclear technology would involve 
radiation sickness and death.  
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Though the DOE might just as easily raze any visible evidence of its nuclear 
activities—which it has done at sites like Rocky Flats (a plant in Colorado that made 
plutonium triggers for atomic weapons)—it has chosen to preserve artifacts and buildings 
at many sites within the nuclear weapons complex. Hugh Gusterson lists a series of 
unusual sites affected by the U.S. nuclear weapons complex that tourists can now visit, 
including Bikini Atoll, where one can dive to the ocean floor to visit ships sunk by 
nuclear tests; a nuclear bunker built for President John F. Kennedy on Peanut Island, 
Florida, which is now a museum; and the Nevada Test Site, where one can ride in a 
chartered bus across the bomb-cratered landscape (“Nuclear” 23). These sites are 
complemented by DOE-funded museums in New Mexico, Nevada, Washington, and 
Tennessee, which feature interpretive exhibits on the Manhattan Project and Cold War, 
bomb memorabilia, and other artifacts from the nuclear age. The agency has preserved 
these sites under pressure from organized preservationist groups operating at both the 
national and local levels. The communities created by the establishment of the nuclear 
weapons complex are especially dedicated to preserving nuclear sites because they value 
local history and the economic benefits associated with preservation (including 
employment and revenue from tourism). This preservationist impulse benefits the DOE, 
which is eager to prove that it is operating safely and openly. By supporting atomic 
museums and inviting controlled access to the weapons complex, the agency satisfies 
public curiosity about sites that have long been off-limits even as it makes a spectacle of 
its own transparency.  
The DOE ostensibly operates tours to enhance public understanding, but it also 
uses them as a means of persuasion. The tours, ironically, help the U.S. government hide 
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the contradictions in its own nuclear policies. Though the government claims to be 
pursuing disarmament, “U.S. officials have sustained nuclear weapons as a seemingly 
permanent fixture of American foreign policy and military strategy [. . .]. Awkwardly 
suspended, [these weapons] continue to radiate threat and paradox” (Taylor, “(Forever)” 
199). One paradox is that each of the U.S. nuclear sites that hosts tours appears to have 
disarmed but continues to engage in activities that support the use of nuclear weapons. 
Los Alamos, for example, looks after the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, while Hanford 
hosts a remediation program that helps to maintain the illusion that we can simply clean 
up after weapons production. These conditions mean that, in the nuclear age, both 
citizens and the government must find ways to manage paradox: “citizens must develop a 
story enabling them to rationalize the simultaneity of possessing old weapons, making 
new weapons, and cleaning up. If they are to continue to enjoy citizen consent, nuclear 
officials must minimize potential incongruity surrounding these activities” (Taylor, 
“(Forever)” 199-200). One way the government minimizes incongruity is to establish 
wildlife refuges at the country’s nuclear sites, a move that hides these sites’ troubled 
pasts by offering nature as both distraction and as evidence that weapons production can 
actually protect the environment. Another way the government smoothes over 
contradictions is to open nuclear sites to tourism. On the surface, inviting tourism appears 
to be the ultimate form of transparency. In reality, it gives the DOE a way to engage the 
public in a rhetorical reimagining of what the nuclear weapons complex has meant for 
local populations and the country as a whole. 
Given that Hanford still presents active threats to the environment and public 
health, it is more hazardous to invite people there than to other sites where the DOE 
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operates tour programs (such as Trinity, New Mexico, which hosted only a single nuclear 
explosion, decades ago). However, preservation and tourism activities at Hanford are 
particularly valuable to the DOE for the very reason that Hanford’s waste problems are 
ongoing. The agency must work harder to contain materials—both physical and 
discursive—that are still actively leaking. Thus, the Hanford area is now home to several 
government-sponsored tourist attractions, including the Hanford Reach National 
Monument (discussed in Chapter III of this dissertation), the B Reactor National Historic 
Landmark, both of which were declared in the early 2000s, and the Hanford Reach 
Interpretive Center, which will open in July 2014. The Monument and the Interpretive 
Center are located outside the DOE-operated Hanford Site, but the DOE’s public tour 
program brings people onto the Hanford Site. And so, even as Hanford’s waste tanks 
spring leaks and Site workers are sickened by exposure to chemical vapors, Hanford 
visitors ride across the desert landscape in buses, stopping at attractions like the 
Plutonium Finishing Plant, the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, and the half-
built Waste Treatment Plant. Preservationists and nuclear enthusiasts—including many in 
Richland—hope that more people will visit Hanford in the coming years; they are 
currently promoting a proposal that would create a Manhattan Project National Historical 
Park, a multi-site park that would include Hanford’s B Reactor as well as facilities in Los 
Alamos, New Mexico and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The DOE is directing environmental 
cleanup at all three of these sites, but Hanford hosts the largest and most controversial 
cleanup project.  
 To distract attention from the failures of that project, the DOE supports 
preservation and tourism at Hanford. When it preserves Hanford’s relics, the DOE hopes 
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to argue that those relics represent a different time and that the danger of nuclear 
weapons is in the past. Similarly, by inviting people to visit the Site, the DOE suggests 
that it is safe enough for tourists and therefore not a threat to the region. However, the 
appearance of safety at Hanford is an elaborately constructed illusion built on denial and 
deceit. Over the decades since Hanford cleanup began, countless incidents have revealed 
that the DOE is hiding critical information about Hanford’s contamination from the 
public. Thus, the strategy of bringing the public to the Site is especially dangerous for 
two reasons. First, workers are still uncovering new contamination at the Site, and much 
of the waste is less stable than the DOE would have people believe, which means that 
there is a safety risk associated with allowing the public on site. Second, when the DOE 
brings people to Hanford and presents them with evidence of environmental remediation 
successes, people are less likely to voice concern or become actively involved in 
advocating for safer, more efficient, and more thorough cleanup of the nuclear 
reservation. Many would argue that it is important for people to have some access to 
Hanford in order to understand its immense scale and the challenges of environmental 
remediation, but the public can only visit the Site on DOE tours, and those tours actually 
undermine visitors’ ability to comprehend the full extent of what has happened at 
Hanford. 
In this chapter, I will argue that the DOE uses historic preservation, museums, and 
tours of the nuclear weapons complex to normalize militarism and environmental 
contamination. Ironically, the agency believes it can most effectively contain and 
constrain discourse about the weapons complex by bringing citizens to witness it. In 
order to provide context for my argument, I will explain how DOE preservation and 
 177 
tourism initiatives function rhetorically. The agency has exerted a controlling influence 
over the messages these programs communicate by silencing controversy and offering 
only sanitized stories of nuclear weapons, waste, and war. I will also explain how nuclear 
tourism has created the conditions for direct confrontation between the DOE and its 
detractors. Scholars and journalists writing about the weapons complex have shown how 
the DOE uses its tours to cultivate cultural amnesia about the Bomb.  
Hanford offers a particularly timely and relevant example of how preservation 
initiatives and tours serve to pacify the public. To support this argument, I will describe 
the variety of schemes that are encouraging the growth of nuclear tourism at Hanford and 
analyze the Hanford tour program. I will then close the chapter with an examination of 
the controversy over the proposed Manhattan Project National Historical Park (MPNHP). 
Advocates are determined to push the proposal through Congress, but many are 
concerned that the government’s current narratives about the nuclear weapons complex 
would simply be fortified by the creation of a MPNHP. At stake in debates about 
preservation in the weapons complex is “the power of language to make weapons 
programs seem natural and safe or to erase from consciousness the suffering of those 
maimed and killed in war” (Gusterson, People xxii). As it stands, DOE landmarks, 
museums, and tours not only normalize nuclear weapons and erase the most devastating 
aspects of our shared nuclear history but also celebrate events that have destroyed life and 
made vast tracts of land unsuitable for habitation.  
 
The first atomic museum in the U.S., the American Museum of Atomic Energy 
(now the American Museum of Science and Energy), opened in a wartime cafeteria at the 
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Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1949 (AMSE). Like its sister museums at other sites in 
the nuclear weapons complex, AMSE has been heavily influenced by the imperatives of 
the federal agencies and government contractors in charge of the nuclear weapons 
complex. Many of these museums are owned by the DOE and operated by its contractors, 
though local preservation groups have also made significant contributions to the work of 
running these museums. Indeed, such groups have been instrumental in the creation and 
maintenance of the country’s atomic museums, and they have had immense influence 
over the country’s nuclear narratives and the shape of historic preservation initiatives. 
Despite the power of these groups, the DOE wields the ultimate authority over 
preservation and tourism within the nuclear weapons complex because it controls access 
to buildings and artifacts and massive amount of federal funding. In fact, atomic 
museums could not display government-owned artifacts and would be unlikely to survive 
without DOE funding (particularly since they operate in remote places where they would 
be unable to fund themselves through ticket sales or local donations). However, 
affiliation with the DOE means that atomic museums must adhere closely to the 
government’s version of the country’s atomic history. The DOE’s own proud summary of 
its historic preservation efforts hints at how the agency seeks to frame U.S. nuclear 
activities through these programs: “The Department of Energy (DOE) supports exhibits, 
museums, and historic facilities across the country dedicated to displaying and 
interpreting the history of the Department and its scientific and technological missions 
and accomplishments” (“Exhibits”). As this description reveals, the DOE uses the 
country’s atomic museums to celebrate the Department’s technological 
“accomplishments” and downplay the legacy of harm left by U.S. nuclear activities.  
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The DOE helps to sustain four major atomic museums, each of which is located at 
or near its associated nuclear site: the American Museum of Science and Energy (in Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee), the Bradbury Science Museum (in Los Alamos, New Mexico), the 
National Atomic Testing Museum (in Las Vegas, Nevada), and the National Museum of 
Nuclear Science and History (in Albuquerque, New Mexico) (“Exhibits”). (As of June 
2014, Energy.gov still claims the Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and 
Technology (CREHST) in Richland, Washington as one of the DOE’s atomic museums, 
but CREHST closed in January 2014.) The museums are charged with preserving, 
exhibiting, and interpreting artifacts, as well as increasing public awareness of nuclear 
history.  
The DOE insists that these museums are heavily influenced by local conditions 
and therefore do not conform to a prescribed format: “Each museum is idiosyncratic, 
arising from particular local needs and with varying funding and management 
relationships with DOE” (“Exhibits”). However, each is shaped by the dual influences of 
the DOE and a local community that grew up around the Bomb, so they bear striking 
similarities to one another. All of the museums characterize the Manhattan Project as a 
success and portray its scientists as brilliant, and all of them argue that the weapons 
complex was instrumental to U.S. victory in WWII and the Cold War. None of the 
museums says much about how the weapons complex has caused devastation at home 
and abroad and none of them dwell on the extensive environmental remediation projects 
happening at DOE sites. Instead, they distract attention from site remediation work by 
describing the other scientific projects underway at laboratories in the nuclear weapons 
complex, including research on lasers, nanotechnology, and the human genome. Thus, 
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Arthur Molella contends that despite their regional flavor and the “wide variety of sites, 
the [country’s atomic] museums show little variation in theme or general approach. 
Shaped by the same political, cultural, and economic forces, they express a common 
ideology based on an unquestioned belief in the nation’s nuclear mission” (“Exhibiting” 
214). Because the DOE is a major backer, and because these museums were established 
by communities that were themselves created by nuclear weapons production, many of 
them celebrate the nation’s nuclear mission and describe it as one driven by self-sacrifice. 
Atomic communities that have been less inclined to submit to the government’s narrative 
have seen their preservation efforts obstructed by the DOE. 
Indeed, several atomic communities have met with opposition from the DOE 
when they have sought to preserve the buildings, artifacts, and stories of the nuclear 
weapons complex. Jason Krupar and Stephen Depoe discuss two nuclear sites in 
particular—Fernald and Rocky Flats—where “DOE leaders have generally resisted [. . .] 
preservation efforts, even as they moved ahead with remediation activities” (136). The 
danger in such a situation is that all physical evidence of a nuclear site would simply 
disappear without a trace. For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, concerned 
citizens’ groups, the Ohio EPA, and county waste management organizations sought 
DOE support for historic preservation and public education at Fernald, a former DOE 
uranium refinery west of Cincinnati, Ohio. These groups envisioned the creation of a 
federally owned “multi-use education facility” that would attract people from all over the 
region to learn about Fernald’s history and the threats it might pose to local populations 
(Krupar and Depoe 149). Fernald’s neighbors were particularly concerned that the DOE 
would pursue only limited cleanup of the nuclear site and then abandon it. These groups 
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had to press the DOE for over a decade to get the agency to leave behind more than an 
unmarked, superficially restored landscape. In the end, the DOE established Fernald 
Preserve—a landscape “restored to pre-settlement conditions using native plants and 
grasses”—where the Fernald plant once stood (US DOE LM, “Fernald”). Though the 
Fernald Preserve Visitors Center, built in 2008, does offer some information about 
Fernald’s nuclear history, the DOE has publicized the preserve’s green virtues (the 
Visitors Center is a LEED-certified building, and the Preserve is popular among birders) 
over and above the site’s legacy of contamination (Kupfer; US DOE LM “Fernald”).1  
At Rocky Flats, a plant located west of Denver, Colorado that made plutonium 
triggers for the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal, local residents, politicians, academics, and 
community activists were similarly concerned that the DOE would simply demolish 
buildings, transfer land to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for the establishment of a 
National Wildlife Refuge, and vacate the site without leaving behind evidence about what 
had happened there. During its operation from 1951 to 1989, mismanagement and safety 
issues at the plant led to several nearly catastrophic incidents. Two major plutonium fires 
there in 1957 and 1969 sent clouds of toxic smoke over Denver and led federal 
investigators to raid the site in 1989. The Rocky Flats History Project (later the Rocky 
Flats Cold War Museum, or RFCWM)—a coalition of local groups—sought to preserve 
artifacts and stories from this troubled site. The DOE agreed that the local area might 
benefit from a museum that would educate the public about the site’s history and hazards, 
but it said that the RFCWM would have to acquire private funding for an exhibit space. 
The RFCWM observed that the DOE already supported atomic museums at other sites 
through public-private partnerships, but this argument did not change the DOE’s stance 
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(Krupar and Depoe 155). Today, the area where the Rocky Flats plant once operated is 
called the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge, and there is no museum to acknowledge 
the thirty-plus years of plutonium production that occurred there.2 Many local residents 
and activists are concerned that construction projects happening at the edge of the former 
nuclear site will stir up plutonium and other contaminants (Draper). Such construction is 
enabled by the failure to remember the vast extent to which Rocky Flats contaminated the 
soil, water, and air in its vicinity.  
Historic preservation may seem inconsequential in comparison to the other work 
that needs to be done at nuclear sites, considering the toxic legacy that threatens human 
and environmental health now and in the future, but choosing not to preserve cultural 
memory of the nuclear age may prove just as hazardous as mobile nuclear waste. Indeed, 
Krupar and Depoe argue that the resistance exhibited by the DOE in the cases of Fernald 
and Rocky Flats can have disastrous results. They contend that local populations are 
directly endangered when the DOE pulls up stakes without leaving behind informational 
exhibits to explain the variety of consequences to health and environment that can arise 
from nuclear production. Further, the disappearance of a nuclear site undermines our 
collective need to understand the complex legacies of the weapons complex: 
[t]he histories and landscapes of sites such as Fernald and Rocky Flats are 
being scrubbed away. Institutional memories, personal remembrances, and 
physical artifacts are all in danger of being removed from not only the 
local sites, but from the national conversation about the legacy of nuclear 
weapons production. DOE officials, through their actions, are replacing 
the “atomic spaces” of the Cold War nuclear arsenal with a network of 
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historical black holes dispersed throughout the country. (Krupar and 
Depoe 136) 
This historical erasure impacts not only our capacity to interpret the lessons of the past 
and advocate for sound policy (relating to atomic energy, nuclear weapons, and 
remediation of nuclear sites) but also our ability to preserve awareness of ongoing threats 
posed by DOE sites. People may be conscious of the dangers presented by sites in active 
cleanup (like Hanford), but most people are not aware that even those sites that have been 
cleaned up and transferred to the DOE’s Office of Legacy Management (which manages 
the DOE’s “legacy responsibilities” through long-term surveillance) have the potential to 
endanger surrounding populations (US DOE LM).3 Such lack of awareness leads to 
“public inattention” to nuclear sites, which allows the government to close nuclear sites 
without preserving people’s stories about them (135). (Cases like Rocky Flats prove that 
even when people are paying attention and they organize to preserve the history of a 
given site, they may not be able to establish and run a museum without DOE support.4) 
 National museums in Washington, D.C. have collected some artifacts and stories 
related to U.S. atomic history, but these museums have encountered strong opposition 
when their exhibits have confronted the ethical questions associated with the Bomb. The 
controversy surrounding the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian National Air and 
Space Museum (NASM) provides the most famous example of this. Prior to the opening 
of the exhibit, the Smithsonian acquired the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the first 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945 and also participated in the Nagasaki bombing. The 
NASM planned to display the plane in an exhibit called The Crossroads: The End of 
World War II, the Atomic Bomb and the Cold War in 1995, fifty years after the end of 
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WWII. The contents of The Crossroads immediately ignited debate about how the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings should be remembered, and museum staff ultimately 
had to cancel the original exhibition. Opposition came largely from the American Legion, 
the Air Force Association, and members of Congress, who felt that the exhibit focused 
too much on Japanese casualties and not enough on the Bomb’s role in ending WWII. 
Meanwhile, antinuclear protesters claimed that the exhibit defended the U.S. for what it 
viewed as indefensible actions. The museum and its critics could not come to consensus 
on what would constitute a fair portrayal of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, so 
the original plans for the exhibit were abandoned (Gallagher). A “much-reduced exhibit” 
that displayed the plane’s fuselage and “videotaped statements from World War II 
veterans” opened in 1995, thus demonstrating how groups aligned with the government 
ultimately prevented the museum from encouraging reflection on the U.S. nuclear 
weapons program: “At the Air and Space Museum the national fetish [the Bomb] was 
ultimately protected by political interests who denied the possibility of interrogating the 
terms of World War, the meaning of the bomb, or the evolution of the nuclear security 
state” (Masco, “Nuclear” 240-41). Conservative interests influenced the debate but also 
provoked a response; shortly after the exhibit opened, protesters entered and poured ashes 
and human blood on the Enola Gay, in an effort to represent the consequences of the 
Bomb that went unrepresented in the exhibit’s final version (Associated Press).   
 Another Smithsonian exhibit that explored the use of the Bomb generated 
controversy at relatively the same time. In April 1994, Smithsonian curators unveiled an 
exhibit called Science in American life at the American History Museum. The exhibit 
explored “the interaction between science and society from 1876 to the present” and thus 
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included some displays on the Manhattan Project and the Bomb (Smithsonian). Curators 
of the exhibit, including Arthur Molella, encountered pushback when they portrayed 
nuclear fear, atomic testing, and downwinders as crucial features of American life in the 
nuclear age: “This display got us into immediate trouble—plenty of it—with our 
sponsors, the American Chemical Society, and various other quarters of the scientific 
establishment. They accused us of maligning America’s physicists, chemists, and 
scientists in general by associating their work with forces of destruction” (“Exhibiting” 
213). No one associated with the development and deployment of the Bomb (not 
veterans, the military, the federal government, or scientists) has wanted to be 
remembered in association with its most devastating consequences.  
In the absence of Smithsonian exhibits, the country’s atomic museums have taken 
on new importance. Since Science in American Life was taken down in November 2011, 
the Smithsonian has not presented the Manhattan Project or Cold War weapons programs 
in any significant way. This makes the museums of the nuclear weapons complex 
particularly influential. They are, in fact, the only museums interpreting U.S. nuclear 
activities for the public: “by default, the atomic museums are becoming the principal 
venues for artifacts and exhibitions documenting the nation’s Atomic Age. These are thus 
the museums that will help mould much of what the general public understands about 
nuclear bombs and the era of their creation” (Molella, “Atomic” 23). In other words, 
these museums, which offer people rare access to some of the secrets of the nuclear 
weapons complex, have enormous potential to influence public opinion. Because they tell 
the story of the Bomb in the places where it was created, visitors may think that they gain 
access to legitimate stories about it. However, these museums are not always subject to 
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the kind of scrutiny that a Smithsonian exhibit might receive; in fact, atomic museums 
are located in relatively out-of-the-way locations where there is strong support for nuclear 
technologies, so they are in a position to exhibit bias without sparking national debate.   
In this environment, relatively free from criticism, the museums of the nuclear 
weapons complex provide a platform for the federal government and atomic communities 
to tell their own sanitized stories of the Bomb, its construction, and its effect on people’s 
lives. While these museums are presented as a way of remembering, they often facilitate 
forgetting: “Just as individual human memory can be selective and contradictory, the 
collective memory inscribed in museum collections and exhibitions is prone to similar 
confusions and lapses [. . .] memories can be dim or partial, selected to conform to deeply 
ingrained self-images or even suppressed outright, almost to the point of amnesia” 
(Molella, “Atomic” 21). This amnesia plays out in similar ways at each of the five DOE-
supported museums. Rather than shedding light on what might seem to be the most 
conspicuous consequences of nuclear weapons development, the museums’ “views of the 
Bomb and the Atomic Age remain oddly distorted and veiled, revealing much about the 
imperatives and technical aspects of atomic bomb development but virtually nothing 
about their actual uses and unimagined destructiveness” (Molella, “Exhibiting” 211). 
They celebrate nuclear technology itself but say little about its consequences for people 
and environment.  
 The American Museum of Science and Energy (AMSE) exemplifies the strategic 
amnesia of DOE museums. AMSE is located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, just a few miles 
from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), one of the original Manhattan Project 
weapons production sites. Established in 1949—only a few years after the bombs were 
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dropped on Japan—the museum is owned by the U.S. government but operated by 
private contractors. Though decades have passed since Oak Ridge made uranium fuel for 
the bomb the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima, AMSE works to keep the patriotic, pronuclear 
spirit of the Manhattan Project alive. The museum’s central exhibit, The Story of Oak 
Ridge, is strikingly enthusiastic about nuclear technology; it “presents an unmistakably 
celebratory history, a tale told in heroic terms. It tells the story of such atomic pioneers as 
Enrico Fermi, Albert Einstein, and Robert Oppenheimer and describes the process of 
making bombs and enriching uranium fuel” (Molella, “Atomic” 22). The Story of Oak 
Ridge is complemented by other nuclear-themed exhibits, including The World of the 
Atom, which features a “cross section model of a nuclear reactor and a simulated 
underground nuclear waste storage area” as well as displays on “pioneering atomic 
scientists, natural radiation, fusion, and nuclear energy in space” (AMSE). The museum 
also “proudly” displays a “vast array of atomic shelling casings” (“Exhibiting” 215). For 
all its descriptions of the technical aspects of nuclear weapons, the museum exhibits 
contain “almost nothing on the human costs of the bomb” (Molella, “Atomic” 22).  
 According to Molella, the reasons for AMSE’s unsettling lack of self-reflection 
are two-fold. First, Oak Ridge, like other atomic cities, continues to be shaped by its 
relationship to the nuclear weapons complex. Molella observes that the city was built for 
“livability”; from the beginning, it was imagined as an idealized community that would 
support men and families working for the American war effort (“Atomic” 22). Even 
today, the city is obliged by its economic ties to the DOE and its contractors to support 
government programs: 
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the citizens of Oak Ridge continue to base their future on nuclear research 
and development, always seeking to attract new government contracts 
from the Department of Energy (DOE) and nuclear industries. Cold War 
weapons programs kept pumping money into the area for decades, 
stunting any prospects for economic diversification. A wholly owned 
subsidiary of the DOE, it is still the government equivalent of a company 
town.” (23) 
Since nuclear weapons production ended, Oak Ridge has worked to stay in the good 
graces of the DOE, which owns ORNL. Further, the DOE and its contractors exercise 
direct influence over the exhibits at AMSE: “To ensure adherence to its primary 
messages, the DOE and its subcontractors maintain tight control of the museum’s 
exhibitions and educational programs, determining subjects, themes, and even wording of 
labels. It is no secret that they reserve the right to censor presentations that fail to toe the 
company line” (24). The Oak Ridge community has, to some degree, been coerced into 
adhering to the government’s story about it, and alternative narratives about the nuclear 
weapons complex have had little opportunity to emerge there. 
Another atomic museum, the Bradbury Science Museum (BSM) in Los Alamos, 
New Mexico, expresses the same patriotism and pride in the Bomb that characterize 
AMSE, but the BSM has been forced to invite dissent into its exhibit spaces. Founded in 
1953, the BSM is located at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the so-called 
“birthplace” of the bomb. Scientists assembled the first nuclear weapons at LANL in 
1945, and most of the weapons in the U.S. arsenal were designed there. Thus, LANL has 
become a focal point for contention over the Bomb; anti-nuclear organizations see it as an 
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epicenter of evil, while patriotic groups view it as “a symbol of American expertise [. . .] 
and of sacrifice for global peace, freedom, and democracy” (Taylor, “Revis(it)ing” 121). 
Because LANL is so ideologically charged, the BSM is too. Like other DOE-supported 
museums, the BSM celebrates weapons science and the country’s nuclear history. Bryan 
C. Taylor provides an account of the BSM’s exhibits, which manifest LANL’s biases. He 
claims that the exhibits  
typically emphasized positive themes such as innocence, control and 
rationality over negative themes such as guilt, failure and death. [. . .] The 
exhibits also promoted particular sectional interests in nuclear culture 
(such as national security) over others (such as environmentalism, for 
example, in an absence of discussion about safety problems facing 
radioactive waste-storage facilities). (122) 
According to Taylor, one BSM exhibit in particular, called “Weapon Engineering,” 
invited visitors to stand at a workstation and simulate the process of designing a warhead. 
Once visitors had designed their weapons, they could play a game that would allow them 
to launch their “customized warhead” to determine whether it would work (122). 
 In the early 1990s, this and other exhibits inspired a peace and environmental 
group, the Santa Fe-based Los Alamos Study Group (LASG), to request space at the 
BSM for the creation of an alternative exhibit. Joseph Masco visited the museum and 
spoke to members of LASG, who felt compelled to challenge the museum’s “carefully 
sanitized view of the nuclear age”: “One LASG member told me that the alternative 
display idea was provoked by a brass plaque positioned near casings of the bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki [. . .], which declared ‘These bombs represent the 
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highest achievement of the human intellect.’” (Masco, “Nuclear” 240). LASG could not 
allow such outrageous statements to remain unchallenged. The group cited a precedent 
for its request to put up an alternative exhibit; in the 1980s, activists in California had—
after a long legal struggle—won the right to put up an alternative exhibit at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory’s museum. In 1993, shortly after the BSM moved to a 
more visible location in Los Alamos than it had previously occupied, the LASG was 
allowed to create an “alternative views” wall. The LASG used the wall to explore the 
costs of the Bomb to the U.S. and the world. The organization also erected a display from 
the Hiroshima Peace Museum that vividly depicted how bomb blasts and radiation 
exposure harm the human body. The display “gave visitors to Los Alamos a vision of an 
alternative history of the nuclear age, one not focused on technoscientific achievement 
but on damaged bodies and ecosystems” (Masco 241). This angered many people in the 
local community, who felt that U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons during WWII had 
been justified.  
 The LASG’s exhibit attracted more attention than it otherwise might have, had it 
not been created around the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki and the Smithsonian’s Enola Gay controversy. In 1995, veterans and 
LANL retirees formed their own group, the Los Alamos Educator’s Group (LAEG), 
which argued that it should be allowed to put up a “counter-counterexhibit” at the BSM 
(Masco 242). The LAEG felt that the LASG’s alternative exhibit and indeed the rest of 
the BSM museum was engaging in “revisionist history” that failed to recognize Japanese 
war crimes during WWII or the Bomb’s role in ending one war and preventing another 
(Masco 242). The BSM determined that the LASG and the LAEG would have to share 
 191 
the exhibit space and so, for a while, their competing narratives existed side by side. The 
LASG did not think it was fair for the LAEG to have access to “alternative” exhibit space 
since it viewed the LAEG’s pronuclear exhibits as fundamentally similar in tone to the 
rest of the museum (Masco 243). The LASG eventually removed its exhibit in protest, 
which demonstrated how effectively DOE-sponsored museums discourage and suppress 
dissent. 
 One might think that an atomic museum devised in the contemporary period, long 
after the end of widespread support for the maintenance of a U.S. nuclear arsenal, would 
reflect a diversity of perspectives on the Bomb. However, the Atomic Testing Museum 
(ATM), established in 2005, advances pronuclear narratives that are striking similar to 
those of AMSE and the BSM. The ATM not only rehearses the patriotic and militaristic 
viewpoints that are characteristic of atomic museums but also looks back on the era of 
atomic testing with nostalgia. Located in Las Vegas, only sixty-five miles southeast of 
the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the ATM celebrates the decades of nuclear bombings that 
the U.S. carried out on what it recognized as its own soil though Shoshone people 
inhabited the area prior to the establishment of the Test Site and continue to have legal 
claim to the area via the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley. The U.S. government conducted 
hundreds of experimental nuclear tests at NTS beginning in 1951 (though it must be 
noted that these explosions were only “tests” in the sense that they did not occur on 
enemy territory; they still exploded with all the force that would be present in any nuclear 
detonation).5 The tests occurred first above and then below ground, and they continued—
sometimes at a rate of one bomb every three weeks—up until 1992, when a moratorium 
was placed on all atomic tests. While the tests were happening, people in the surrounding 
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areas—including tourists in Las Vegas—would gather to watch the spectacle of 
mushroom clouds swelling in the distance. In fact, the tests drew people into the city, 
thereby helping to stimulate tourism and casino economies in Vegas (Krupar and Depoe 
141). When testing ended, people became especially concerned that the Test Site’s 
history would be lost. Volunteers collected artifacts and oral histories and eventually 
formed the Nevada Test Site Historical Foundation (NTSHF). NTSHF, along with other 
organizations, the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Test Site 
Office, and NTS contractors, such as Bechtel Nevada and Lockheed Martin Nevada 
Technologies, acquired millions in public and private funds to build the ATM (Krupar 
and Depoe 142-43). These interests have used the museum to emphasize the importance 
of weapons testing to U.S. victory in the Cold War. 
 The ATM offers displays that would be considered standard fare for an atomic 
museum, including artifacts and a timeline of NTS tests, but it also features some 
extraordinary exhibits that demonstrate the degree to which the museum has 
commodified nuclear testing. In a review of the museum for The New York Times, 
Edward Rothstein refers to the ATM as “a place to consider the apocalypse.” He 
describes the museum’s Ground Zero Theater, which not only shows videos of nuclear 
blasts but also attempts to give visitors a sense of how nuclear explosions felt:  
But here [in the Theater], the impact of the virtual blast is thoroughly 
visceral. Bursts from air cannons blow against your body imitating the 
bomb’s shock wave; vibrations from subwoofers shake your equanimity. 
In their theme-park manner, the unexpected effects give some credence to 
the words of participants in the atomic tests, whose voices are heard in that 
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theater and on video monitors throughout the museum. “There was never a 
detonation when you weren’t scared,” one participant said. 
The Ground Zero Theater evokes the fear associated with standing near an atomic test but 
only simulates that experience in the most limited way. Instead of inspiring empathy for 
those soldiers and civilians who actually stood at the sites of nuclear blasts (and lost their 
health or their lives), the theater makes people feel safe in the presence of the bomb. In 
that way, the theater imitates the Nevada testing program, which the U.S. government 
used to “strip the bombs of the fear and awe they inspired” (Rothstein). For decades, the 
U.S. detonated bombs at NTS, hoping that it could normalize nuclear weapons by 
exposing the public to them.6  Today, the ATM engages in similar work; indeed, 
Rothstein argues that “stripping nuclear testing of fear and awe is also one of the goals of 
the museum itself, which has, after all, come to life in a company town that may once 
have had as strong a connection to nuclear testing as to gambling.”7 The ATM aims to 
ensure that people remember Nevada’s atomic past but forget the collateral damage it 
caused. 
 It is, in part, this normalization of atomic weapons that has created controversy 
around the ATM. Downwinders—those who lived near NTS and suffered health and 
other effects from exposure to fallout—have been critical of the museum, especially since 
it makes no mention of the health effects caused by the hundreds of bombs detonated at 
NTS. In an editorial for the Salt Lake Tribune, Mary Dickson, a NTS downwinder, wrote, 
“Missing are exhibits about the human toll of nuclear testing, about downwinders, about 
how far the winds carried radioactive fallout and about the death and disease it caused. 
This omission comes as a crushing blow to the tens of thousands of Americans who have 
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suffered the health effects of fallout and who continue to lose loved ones to fallout-
related illnesses.” Indeed, Rothstein corroborates Dickson’s view that the ATM largely 
celebrates the nuclear testing program: “the history of testing, as told here, is largely the 
history of its justification. Problems and issues are noted, including the debates about the 
effects of fallout that grew more intense as the testing proceeded. But such issues are 
mentioned and then put aside, to get on with the main story.” At the ATM, the main story 
presents the visible traces of nuclear tests as a dazzling spectacle that simultaneously 
encouraged local tourism and helped to bring the Cold War to an end.  
Indeed, the museum’s exhibits and even its executive director look back on the 
era of testing with surprising fondness. In a March 2014 interview with Las Vegas’s 
public radio station, the ATM’s Executive Director, Allan Palmer, waxed nostalgic on the 
days of atomic tourism in Las Vegas, claiming that the mushroom clouds that could be 
seen from the city were “a great attraction.” Palmer repeatedly insisted that, in the early 
days of testing, residents and people around the country supported the testing because 
“everybody was pretty patriotic at the time.” Though the interviewer seemed vaguely 
aware of the horror associated with the bomb, he also wondered whether the testing 
program might ever be restarted at NTS, and Palmer offered this bewildering reply: 
The world, the world is always changing. The geopolitical situations are 
changing. We can see that today with Ukraine. Some people have even 
suggested the Cold War might be a possibility of returning. Who knows if 
it does. But if it does, I think our country is prepared for whatever’s gonna 
be. And if it meant retesting again, the Test Site would be a place you 
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could do it. We had decided not to, but we reserve the right to do it in the 
future, I think, if it’s necessary. 
Though the U.S. and the world community agreed over twenty years ago to end nuclear 
testing, Palmer, a former military pilot, acknowledges (and almost seems to take comfort 
in) the possibility that NTS could be reopened to nuclear testing. This is a nightmare 
scenario for downwinders, anti-nuclear activists, and many others, but Palmer’s 
statements about Ukraine and the possibility of a renewed Cold War point to the ways 
pronuclear advocates might use fear to push for the reopening of closed weapons 
production and testing sites. Though the government is unlikely to acknowledge the fact, 
its continued ownership of NTS lands leaves an opening for the resumption of atomic 
testing there.  
  
 Atomic museums allow visitors to pretend that they are weapons scientists or 
military personnel, but of course they merely simulate the experience of standing at 
ground zero and its equivalent. The DOE’s public tours, on the other hand, actually bring 
people to a number of sites within the weapons complex. The agency offers tours of 
several nuclear facilities and test sites, including the X-10 Graphite Reactor in Oak 
Ridge, the B Reactor and several other areas of the Hanford Site, the Trinity Site in New 
Mexico, and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site) outside 
Las Vegas. The DOE refers to these sites as “historic facilities,” but each one exists 
inside a fully operational military or nuclear site (US DOE, “Exhibits”). Though most of 
the tour sites are located in the relatively inaccessible deserts of the western U.S., they 
draw thousands of visitors each year. Hugh Gusterson explains that a variety of people, 
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including “history enthusiasts,” those who patriotically support the U.S. weapons 
program, and protesters, visit weapons sites because they “are drawn to the nuclear [. . .] 
by a sense of awe and mystery” (“Nuclear” 24). Tours of formerly secret facilities and 
testing grounds like Hanford and NTS “promise a glimpse into the sublime and the 
forbidden” (24). And because they invite people to pass through security gates and “plant 
their feet where history was made,” tours have the potential to show visitors how severely 
weapons tests have marred the landscape and how thoroughly nuclear waste has 
permeated the environment (25). 
 But this is not how the DOE’s public tours function. Instead of giving visitors 
perspective on how the government has sacrificed life and health to prepare for war, the 
DOE’s tours portray the nuclear weapons complex as evidence of American ingenuity 
and patriotism. The DOE is not the only organization that engages in such 
reinterpretation; “war tourism is often predicated on a ‘process of sanitation’ that seeks to 
cleanse war sites of danger and controversy, packaging them as opportunities for 
education, commemoration, and the commodified consumption of spectacle (Gusterson, 
“Nuclear” 24). The U.S. government takes those methods of reframing a war site one step 
further by packaging its nuclear facilities and testing ranges as historical sites rather than 
sites that present an active threat to the public. By placing the dangers of a nuclear site in 
the past, the government can invite people to visit and cleanse the site of any undesirable 
meanings. The DOE does this by ensuring that people can only visit at prescribed times 
and with DOE or military oversight. 
The Trinity Site, the location of the first atomic explosion, is one such site where 
the government invites tourism but also maintains strict control of both the physical and 
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discursive environment. The U.S. Army detonated the Trinity explosion at the 
Alamogordo Bombing Range in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. The site was declared a 
National Historic Landmark in 1965. Though the Trinity Site could be considered part of 
the nuclear weapons complex, it is operated by the U.S. Army rather than the Department 
of Energy. Until recently, the Army held an “open house” twice a year at Trinity (one 
weekend in April and another in October). Today, the Army claims that “due to fiscal 
constraints within the Department of Defense, WSMR must reduce the frequency of the 
Trinity Site Open House from twice to once a year” (U.S. Army). The government may 
feel less urgency to interpret Trinity for the public because—unlike other nuclear sites—
it has not hosted a nuclear laboratory or environmental cleanup project about which the 
DOE needs to maintain good public relations. However, the government still exercises 
power over Trinity by limiting public access, framing the bombing within its established 
narratives, and prohibiting protest. 
Despite these regulations, several protest events occurred during the fiftieth 
anniversary of the bombing in 1995. About 5300 visitors showed up on that day. 
According to Gusterson, who attended the anniversary, one man dragged a “life-size 
replica of a nuclear waste cask behind his truck all the way from North Carolina” (27). 
(He was forced to leave it behind at the perimeter of the site.) Another man from the area 
near Three-Mile Island “threw mock blood on the obelisk at Ground Zero.” Finally, a 
group called the Atomic Mirror Pilgrimage gathered around the obelisk, held hands, and 
hummed (28). The Army’s prohibitions against protest could not contain the dissent 
inspired by the decades of weapons development, production, and testing that came after 
Trinity. Whereas the government may find it relatively easy to control the discourse 
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about nuclear sites when it keeps people away from them, it gives up some power when it 
allows people to visit on tours. Military officers and government officials may prevent 
protests before they happen or imprison those who disrupt the tour script, but they can 
neither stop protest entirely nor prevent people from later representing their tour 
experiences in terms that are critical of the government’s actions. 
 Rebecca Solnit offers one such condemnatory account of a DOE tour of the 
Nevada Test Site (NTS) in her book Savage Dreams: A Journey into the Landscape Wars 
of the American West. Solnit protested outside the gates of NTS at the annual Peace 
Camp demonstration, researched the history of the Test Site, and talked to local people 
about the effects of radioactive fallout in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was only after 
those experiences that Solnit went on a DOE tour, “only to see the place and scribble 
down the DOE’s version of things” (204). Her tour description is something of a post-
script; it fills the last few pages of her two-hundred-page political and cultural history of 
the Test Site. By leaving the DOE’s “version of things” until the end, she decenters the 
agency’s narrative and gives priority to the stories of antinuclear activists, local people, 
and Native Americans, whose stories have been buried by the government. Solnit’s tour 
description is darkly humorous. Before she and her guide set out, she is given a radiation 
badge that she says “would measure how much radiation I was exposed to, and if they 
considered it too much, they would notify me. (They didn’t.)” (205). In Solnit’s 
estimation, this would be a typical sequence of events: the government would expose her 
first and (possibly) let her know later. 
 Solnit goes to the Test Site to gain a direct experience of a landscape that the 
public is barred from visiting. On the tour, her guide tells her about detonations, bomb 
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craters, and underground pockets of radiation—aspects of the Test Site that are offered as 
entertainment. Solnit rejects the idea of finding amusement in nuclear tests and, as she 
and her guide move closer to the center of the site, where the most iconic tests have 
occurred, she shifts away from the government’s narrative and defines the Test Site in her 
own terms: “We approached the pass of the ranges that had always defined the horizon of 
the Test Site I walked into, and crossed over it into a new landscape, the imagined 
landscape I had always been walking toward [as a protester], the most bombed place on 
earth” (208). Prior to this passage, Solnit has dismissed the notion that a nuclear 
detonation can be understood as “test.” Instead of accepting the DOE’s narratives about 
testing, she repeatedly redefines the Test Site as the “most bombed place on earth.” As 
Solnit travels through the site, she registers the experience in her body: “I was queasy 
about the dust, but it was a dank, still day, a good day to be out in a contaminated area” 
(209). This echoes passages at the beginning of the book, in which she worries about 
exposure to radioactive dust as she is traveling through the area as a protester. Though 
her tour guide assures her that the DOE has the site’s waste problems under control, the 
agency’s narratives are out of sync with what Solnit knows intellectually and what she 
feels viscerally. 
 According to Solnit, NTS employees have buried their own concerns about 
working at the Test Site beneath several layers of denial. She observes her DOE hosts 
speaking in coded language: “The first thing I noticed was that they always spoke of the 
DOE as ‘we,’ and that bombs were never called bombs, they were ‘devices’” (204). The 
government initially used the word “device” to maintain secrecy about the Bomb and 
then later employed it to domesticate nuclear weapons. Solnit leaves NTS with the 
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impression that employees continue to use such euphemisms because the site’s culture 
demands evasion. Solnit also notes that DOE employees are unusually obsessed with 
wildlife living at the Test Site. She sees this as a symptom of their unease: “It seemed as 
though the Test Site workers displaced their anxiety about their work into elaborate care 
for the wildlife” (205). In Solnit’s account, NTS workers exhibit disproportionate 
concern for animals even as they dismiss the notion that radioactivity at the Test Site 
might be harmful. 
Ultimately, Solnit concludes that the DOE’s narratives are deceptive and empty. 
The tour provides her with her first opportunity to see the Test Site, but the landscape and 
the DOE script cannot provide her with the kind of deep understanding of NTS that she 
has gained from interacting with local people and protesters: 
The landscape of the Nevada Test Site was strangely innocent of its own 
history, even with all its craters and ruins. It was the stories that brought it 
to life for me, the stories of Pauline and Rachel and Janet, of the atomic 
veterans, the local people. When I had come to it from the Peace Camp, I 
had always been walking on a strong foundation of stories; now I was 
being wafted around on a tissue of tourism—on nuggets of curious 
information that painted no picture of the real effect of the 953 or so 
nuclear bombs that exploded in this place. (211) 
Solnit’s criticism cuts to the heart of what disturbs many people about the DOE’s tours of 
nuclear sites: they present “nuggets of curious information” without even alluding to the 
stories of people whose lives have been permanently impacted by the development, 
testing, use, and disposal of nuclear materials. For Solnit, a tour of NTS is not a 
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fascinating and informative view into a secret era of modern history; it is instead a 
troubling manifestation of the DOE’s attempts to cultivate cultural amnesia of the story 
of the Bomb. 
 Ten years after Savage Dreams was published, Joseph Masco took his own DOE-
led tour of NTS and found similar evidence of the U.S. government’s strategic amnesia. 
Masco’s “Desert Modernism” looks at strange spectacles that have been hidden in the 
Nevada Desert. The essay is a four-part portrait that leads the reader through a tour of 
NTS, a tour of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, a trip to Rachel, Nevada (a 
town populated by conspiracy theorists), and a visit to the Liberace Museum in 
downtown Las Vegas. Masco claims that many U.S. citizens continue to see the western 
half of the country as an “endlessly renewable frontier” where people can go to remake 
themselves, but the West has actually become a “technoscientific wasteland where the 
most dangerous products of a militarized society are located.” Masco further argues that 
in order to minimize the cognitive dissonance that results from these contradictions, 
“both citizens and officials have come to rely on tactical amnesias, temporal sutures 
enabling a precarious—if addictive—cosmology of progress.” That addiction to 
“progress” is especially evident in the two government projects Masco describes: NTS, 
where mushrooms clouds explode in a “highly gendered performance” of patriotic 
masculinity, and Yucca Mountain, where the government hopes to master nature by 
digging miles of tunnels and then burying nuclear waste there. 
 Like Solnit, Masco shows—through a description of his NTS tour—how 
individuals working at the center of government nuclear projects exhibit a sense of 
certainty based on amnesia. According to Masco’s impressions, Cold War masculinity 
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has not died at NTS: “Our guide is utterly charming. A 35-year career at the Nevada Test 
Site making detonation mechanisms for nuclear weapons has obviously been good to 
him. He carries himself with the cool assurance of someone who has performed well at 
the center of a national undertaking, a Cold Warrior in the truest sense.” The tour guide 
becomes the main character in Masco’s story—an individual with profound faith in the 
U.S. nuclear project who propagates the DOEs’ narrative about NTS. Repeatedly, the 
guide denies any knowledge of harm that has come from the explosions at NTS: “When 
we ask about contamination, our guide assures us that he has walked ‘every inch of this 
site’ and suffered ‘no ill effects.’ There is some contamination, he acknowledges, but it is 
contained and poses no public risk.” The guide then tells them about something that 
might have been a real danger at the site: a rattlesnake that bit his boot. In response, 
Masco concludes that “Dangers at NTS, in his presentation, are natural or international, 
but never nuclear or technoscientific.” Again, and as at other nuclear sites, the DOE 
displaces threat, finding it in the warlike ambitions of other countries or the wildness of a 
nuclear site’s landscape—but not in the radioactivity of nuclear materials.  
Writers like Solnit and Masco use the opportunity to tour NTS not only to 
challenge the DOE’s narratives, but also to raise questions about who can interpret 
information about the weapons program authoritatively. By restricting access to the 
nuclear weapons complex, the DOE has limited the public’s ability to understand and 
interpret it. However, the agency can neither exert complete control over its tourists nor 
contain the critical narratives that emerge after it invites the public to visit its most secret 
sites. Robert Jay Lifton argues that people must find ways to visualize the impacts of 
nuclear weapons—to “imagine the real”—even as government agencies try to make those 
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realities invisible (qtd. in Gusterson, “Nuclear” 28). For critics of the nuclear age, visiting 
nuclear sites is a strategy for countering the government’s refusal to acknowledge the 
destructiveness of nuclear technologies: 
Since nuclear weapons are rarely seen, except by those who take care of 
them, and the government often refuses even to confirm where they are 
stored, it is easy to forget that the weapons exist at all. It is in order to 
break through this membrane of denial and help us all to ‘imagine the real’ 
that anti-nuclear activists have wanted to display photographs of 
Hiroshima, spill blood at the Trinity site, and carry banners condemning 
the unseen but quite real testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. (29) 
When they carry out protests at nuclear sites, activists seek to lift the veil on the 
government’s nuclear activities and to sustain national memory of the nuclear age. 
Similarly, authors like Solnit and Masco publish accounts of DOE tours to reinterpret 
them for a larger audience. By contextualizing nuclear sites and reporting on the 
contradictions they discover when they visit them, these authors show readers how 
nuclear activities mar the physical—as well as the social and political—landscape. 
  
 Despite the cynicism expressed by outsiders, people living near nuclear sites 
continue to support programs that would bring more people to visit the nuclear weapons 
complex. In the Hanford area, local citizens are working to preserve the area’s nuclear 
history, create more public access to Hanford lands, and develop tourist destinations. In 
recent years, these local priorities have resulted in new opportunities to explore aspects of 
Hanford’s natural and cultural history. Hikers and naturalists can visit the Hanford Reach 
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National Monument, and history enthusiasts can register for an official Site tour or view 
Hanford artifacts on display at a local museum. Though Hanford has the potential to 
become even more dangerous than it is today (since contaminants are constantly moving 
and interacting with one another in new ways), many area residents embrace the idea of 
living in an atomic community and hope to attract more tourists on the basis of the area’s 
nuclear history. Though local citizens—and particularly those who have worked at 
Hanford—have instigated many of the area’s preservation and tourism activities, the 
DOE has not hesitated to use this local energy to its advantage. 
 The DOE sponsored the first efforts to put Hanford’s history on display at a local 
museum. That museum—originally called the Hanford Science Center and later renamed 
the Hanford Museums of Science and History—collected and displayed artifacts from the 
nuclear reservation. Funded in part by the DOE and run by Westinghouse Hanford Co., 
the museum was closed in 1995 in response to DOE budget cutbacks (Associated Press, 
“Budget”). Shortly thereafter, in 1996, it was resurrected as the Columbia River 
Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology (CREHST), a private nonprofit that 
billed itself as “a museum and science center created to tell the dynamic story of the 
Columbia Basin and surrounding region” (CREHST Museum). The museum looked more 
broadly at the region’s history but maintained a specific focus on the Hanford Site. 
Docents were from Richland and some had even worked for Hanford in its early days. 
CREHST was supported, in part, by funds from the DOE and one of its contractors, 
Mission Support Alliance. That funding was repeatedly cut, and curators were pulled 
from the museum to work at the Hanford Site, where preservationists were needed to 
catalog and remove artifacts from buildings that were being torn down as part of cleanup 
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operations. CREHST suffered from these reductions in funding and staffing. Like 
museums in other atomic communities, the museum found it hard to operate without 
DOE sponsorship. CREHST closed in January 2014, in part because the DOE and area 
residents are trying to shift focus away from Hanford and towards the natural qualities of 
the Hanford Reach National Monument (HRNM). 
As CREHST was struggling, the local community was raising funds to build an 
interpretive center that would serve as a “gateway” to the HRNM. The Hanford Reach 
Interpretive Center (known as “the Reach”), which will open in summer 2014, will offer 
some exhibits about the history of the Hanford Site, but it will primarily pay tribute to 
regional identity. The facility, which is located on the Columbia River in Richland, has 
thus far been enthusiastically imagined as a place that will “celebrate the natural and 
cultural history of the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River, the only free-flowing 
section of the river in the United States” (Richard). The Reach’s Executive Director 
described the museum as a place for Columbia Basin residents to honor their history and 
identity: 
The Reach will be a hybrid institution. Part museum, part interpretive 
center, part visitor center and all about telling our stories and defining the 
character of the community, the Reach will act as a guide to inspire us all 
to embrace learning with passion and joy, and to honor who we are, where 
we’ve been and where we are going. (Toomey) 
What this declaration does not mention is that Hanford has been an integral part of 
regional history. The Tri-Cities have been sustained by Hanford even as they have been 
betrayed by its contamination of the local environment. Thus, when a community-run 
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museum proposes to “honor” the people of the region but maintains a focus on the natural 
environment rather than the unfolding nuclear disaster in its backyard, that museum has 
been designed as much to forget as to remember. 
The Reach may be a descendent of CREHST and the Hanford museums that came 
before it, but the new interpretive center will not replace those Hanford-focused 
museums. Some artifacts from CREHST will be on display at the Reach, but other 
CREHST holdings will be returned to the DOE, which maintains ownership of all 
Hanford artifacts that were not officially purchased from the government (Cary, 
“Hanford”).8 The Reach will not have as much room for Hanford interpretation as 
initially hoped because museum supporters were not able to raise enough money to build 
the facility as it was envisioned. Still, the Reach will feature a Manhattan Project exhibit 
when it opens in July. 
By all accounts, that exhibit will advance the same uncritical narrative of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons program that the country’s atomic museums express. This may be a 
result of the fact that the Reach has already received large donations from two DOE 
contractors, Battelle and Mission Support Alliance. According to museum staff, the 
Manhattan Project exhibit will focus on “the urgency of producing an atomic bomb,” a 
theme that is emphasized across the DOE’s atomic museums (including AMSE, the 
BSM, and the ATM). Enthusiasm for Hanford’s work will be further demonstrated by “a 
replica of the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, fueled with plutonium made at 
Hanford,” which will be suspended above visitors (Cary, “Concept”). The museum plans 
to create three more Hanford exhibits (on “the Cold War years, environmental cleanup, 
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and public access to Hanford”), but it will have to solicit more donations in order to 
expand its interpretation of Hanford (Cary, “Concept”). 
Even if the Reach devotes more space to Hanford, it will continue to focus 
primarily on the natural and cultural history of the region. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service has donated $2.4 million “to tell the story of the Hanford Reach in the main 
gallery, including information about the Ice Age floods, tribes, settlers, and plants and 
animals and [that] narrative will dominate the museum space” (Cary, “Concept”). Thus, 
the Tri-Cities has lost a DOE-sponsored museum dedicated solely to the exhibition of 
Hanford history and gained a flashy new facility that expresses an optimistic view of the 
region. Though the local community facilitated this shift in interpretation, the 
government made it possible. Besides donating funds, it contributed a hopeful 
perspective on the environment of the mid-Columbia Basin. Many people in the Tri-
Cities are counting on the National Park Service to take over Hanford interpretation (if a 
Manhattan Project National Historical Park is created), but until then, Hanford will take a 
backseat to the Hanford Reach National Monument at the region’s major museum.  
 While local residents have been focused on the construction of the Reach, the 
DOE has been saving historical objects from destruction. Remediation has entailed the 
demolition of hundreds of buildings and therefore an untold number of artifacts. The 
DOE’s Hanford Site Facebook page has publicized some of the artifacts that have been 
preserved. For example, on January 24, 2014, the DOE posted a status update with eight 
photos of historic facilities and artifacts along with this caption:  
The artifacts from Hanford’s Manhattan Project and Cold War era (1943-
1990) that have been generated, tagged, and mostly collected are going to 
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be critical to telling the stories of ingenuity, industrial production, 
creativity, problem-solving, safety, and many more. These artifacts 
include things like tools, machinery, signs, instruments, period-correct 
household or office products, first-of-their-kind pieces of equipment, the 
desk of famed physicist Enrico Fermi, and original reactor-area phone 
booths. DOE believes these treasures of history should eventually be made 
available for the public to enjoy and for students, teachers, and researchers 
to learn from in the future and is working toward this goal. Until then, we 
hope you enjoy these photos. (See Appendix C for a screenshot of this 
status update, which includes photos of Hanford artifacts.) 
Though it has not announced where the “treasures of history” featured in its photos will 
be displayed, the DOE insists that they will be “critical” to telling the story of the 
“ingenuity” exhibited during Hanford’s production years. Thus, the tools and machinery 
pictured in the status update are more than historical objects; they are means of shaping 
the public’s understanding of Hanford.9 Besides functioning to define Hanford’s story as 
one that reflects the integrity and genius of Site workers, these artifacts also help the 
DOE show that it has made Hanford accessible to the public—to “students, teachers, and 
researchers” alike. Offering photos of Hanford artifacts on Facebook helps the DOE 
establish trust and credibility. 
Hanford tours perform similar work. In the contemporary era, the DOE must 
simultaneously mislead the public about the dangers of Hanford contaminants (so as not 
to admit to wrongdoing and deceit) and maintain the appearance of openness and 
transparency. In order to balance these competing imperatives, the agency began offering 
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public tours. It offered limited tours of the Site before 2001, but they were stopped after 
the September 11 terrorist attacks that year. The tours were reinstated in 2004, and the 
DOE (via Mission Support Alliance, the contractor that operates the tours) has greatly 
increased their availability since then.10 The agency offered only four tours in 2004, but 
that came nowhere near meeting public demand; in fact, the agency maintained a waiting 
list with the names of 100 people (Sinclair 3). After that, the DOE revamped the tour 
program and, in the words of the tour manager, “looked for ways [. . .] to market the tours 
to a larger audience.” The fact that the DOE has attempted to “market” the tours suggests 
that it benefits from them and, indeed, they serve a promotional function.  
Because Hanford’s environmental cleanup project has been a failure in recent 
years (as the DOE has missed multiple legal deadlines for cleanup and run into countless 
unexpected problems), the agency has had to work even harder discursively to contain the 
Site’s problems. It has done this by selling Hanford as a tourist destination. Even as 
multiple crises unfold at the Site, including waste tank leaks, design and construction 
problems at the Waste Treatment Plant, and mysterious tank vapor releases that sicken 
workers, the DOE publicizes and operates public tours of Hanford. This helps the agency 
argue that the Site’s threats have been contained and that remediation efforts are going 
according to plan.  
The DOE strikes a delicate balance when it brings the public to Hanford. It 
promotes the Site as a spectacular relic of the Atomic Age even as it attempts to make 
people feel safe there. Like tours of Trinity and NTS, Hanford tours offer an 
unprecedented chance to view “the sublime and the forbidden” (Gusterson, “Nuclear” 
24). However, a real experience of the sublime—“an awe and wonder [. . .] tinged with 
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terror”—may have been more accessible in Cold War Nevada (when mushroom clouds 
filled the desert sky and the American public perceived nuclear war as imminent) than it 
is at Hanford today. On today’s Hanford tours, the DOE portrays even those features of 
Hanford that might evoke the terror of the sublime—like the B Reactor, which produced 
the fuel for the bomb the U.S. dropped on Nagasaki, Japan—as awe-inspiring but 
ultimately harmless artifacts. People can take these tours without contemplating the 
morality of nuclear weapons production or perceiving the seriousness of Hanford’s waste 
problems because appearances are deceiving. If one ignores its massive size, Hanford 
looks like any other industrial site. Since it was never a test site, there are no nuclear 
bomb craters there. The only thing that marks Hanford as a nuclear landscape is the 
presence of countless nondescript production buildings, and many of those are being 
demolished as part of the remediation project. 
Tourists can also leave Hanford without an understanding of the challenges the 
Site’s waste presents because the DOE’s tour publicity and scripts are carefully crafted 
for public consumption. As the tour program manager wrote in the text of a talk she gave 
at a waste management conference,  
all communication efforts surrounding the tours (e.g., instructions and 
guidelines for participation in public tours, the tour script, website content, 
and collateral literature and press releases) required thorough reviews and 
approvals from DOE and its prime contractor before anything was issued. 
This approval included consent by personnel from the communications, 
security, and legal divisions, along with that of senior management. 
(Sinclair 2) 
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These “reviews and approvals” ensure that the DOE is protected from legal action as well 
as public criticism. In order to bring people to the Site to advance its own narratives 
about the Manhattan Project, Cold War, and environmental remediation, the DOE has 
done a number of other things to increase the attractiveness and accessibility of its tours: 
it has developed an online registration system to streamline the signup process, shifted 
tour dates so that they occurred during the week (and therefore when Hanford cleanup 
work is occurring), changed the tour route yearly to highlight the most relevant projects, 
and started to offer up to sixty tours per year rather than the original four.  
Today, the Hanford DOE offers two types of tours: one that focuses on the 
Manhattan Project and another that takes tourists to several parts of the Site and 
emphasizes its environmental cleanup project. The first type of tour, which visits only the 
B Reactor, was created in 2009 (Sinclair 6). Called “Manhattan Project B Reactor Tours,” 
these are open to people as young as 12 years of age, and they allow tourists to carry 
cameras, cell phones, and recording devices. Because they access the Hanford Site via a 
public road, there are no security badge requirements. And so, even though the Reactor is 
located on an active remediation site and can only be accessed through an official tour, it 
has come to be treated essentially like any other museum. In fact, the B Reactor has 
become its own, independent tourist attraction within the larger Hanford Site due in part 
to the way the DOE has publicized it and in part to the way local people have taken up 
the cause of preserving it as a museum. 
The DOE tries to generate enthusiasm about the B Reactor to distract the public 
from its most devastating effects. The agency repeatedly describes the Reactor as “an 
engineering marvel” that was “built in only thirteen months” and without blueprints (“B 
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Reactor”). It also consistently emphasizes the B Reactor’s first, most famous mission—
the production of fuel for one of the world’s first atomic bombs—over and above the fact 
that it produced plutonium (and polluted the local environment) for over twenty years 
after the end of WWII. On Hanford.gov, the DOE argues that the B Reactor played a 
heroic role in American history: 
One of the most historic buildings at Hanford is the B Reactor, code 
named 105-B during World War II. The B Reactor was the world’s first, 
full-scale nuclear reactor and produced the plutonium used in the ‘Fat 
Man’ bomb dropped over Nagasaki, Japan, in August of 1945. Five days 
after the bomb was deployed, World War II ended. (“B Reactor”) 
By emphasizing the historic significance of the building and drawing a direct connection 
between the Reactor and the end of WWII, the DOE implicitly argues that the danger and 
waste created by the Reactor were justified. But mere justification is not enough; to 
transform the Reactor in the public imagination, the agency tries to give it new, positive 
associations. In some cases, the DOE attempts to put a positive spin on the facts simply 
by placing an exclamation point at the end of a sentence: “The Du Pont Corporation was 
the main contractor during construction of the reactor, agreeing with the United States 
government to build the reactor—and indeed the whole Hanford Engineer Works—for 
costs plus $1. As Du Pont’s team completed the project early, they were only paid 67-
cents profit for the project!” Sentences like this demonstrate the degree to which the DOE 
hopes to turn the B Reactor into the stuff of American myth. In the DOE’s story, DuPont 
is not a corporation that did the government’s bidding despite extreme hazards and 
 213 
appalling environmental consequences but is instead a patriotic organization that 
contributed to a miracle of American engineering. 
 Though the B Reactor, which operated from 1943 to 1968, was slated to be 
“cocooned” (contained in concrete until its radioactivity decayed) like the other reactors 
at Hanford, it acquired a fan club that launched it on the road to preservation (“B 
Reactor”).11 Local people, including former Hanford workers, wanted to preserve the 
reactor and so formed the B Reactor Museum Association (BRMA) in 1991. The BRMA 
is dedicated to the goals of restoring the reactor building, opening it to the public, and 
creating exhibits there to interpret the history of the Manhattan Project (B Reactor, 
“Vision Statement”). The DOE began offering tours of the B Reactor once Hanford tours 
were resumed in 2004, and, at that point, former Hanford employees (often from the 
Site’s early missions) gave walking tours of the B Reactor (Sinclair 3). The tour program 
has grown since then, and, in 2008, the Reactor was recognized with the highest 
designation available from U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) when it was named a 
National Historic Landmark. 
 At the ceremony that marked the National Historic Landmark designation, local 
Hanford enthusiasts as well as the Deputy Secretaries of the DOI and the DOE 
repeatedly—and vaguely—spoke about the “significance” of the Reactor and its impact 
on the world. In a video of the ceremony (posted on YouTube by the DOE), Hanford 
historian Michele Gerber stands at a podium in front of the B Reactor face and explains 
why the crowd has gathered to give the Reactor a new designation: 
This machine changed the world. It changed the lives of every one of us 
standing here today [. . .]. So why do we come here today to honor B 
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Reactor? We come because we have to. We’re driven to it. It’s in our 
blood and our genes as humans to want to and to need to come to places 
where significant things happened. 
Without acknowledging that not everyone would choose to “honor” the Reactor, Gerber 
repeatedly offers imprecise descriptions of the its influence on the world, insisting that it 
“changed” everything and that it is a place where “significant things happened.” She and 
the other speakers at the ceremony scrupulously avoid making reference to the 
radioactive poisons the Reactor produced. After Gerber’s speech, Deputy Secretary of the 
DOE Jeffrey Kupfer reminds the crowd that the 2,000 spots on the DOE bus tour of 
Hanford are “snapped up” within a few hours every time they are advertised. He says this 
as if to legitimize the Reactor tours by offering evidence of the public’s interest in them. 
Kupfer also promises that the DOE will protect the Reactor’s place in history: “We at the 
Department are very committed to preserving the significance of the Reactor and to 
making it more accessible.” Here, Kupfer makes a telling slip. Though he means to 
suggest that the DOE is “committed to preserving” the reactor as a public museum, he 
actually says that it is “committed to preserving the significance of the Reactor.” The 
DOE is, in fact, more interested in keeping the Reactor relevant—in maintaining it as a 
symbol of the supposed good that can be done by nuclear weapons (since many people 
believe that the bomb dropped on Nagasaki helped to end WWII)—than it is in 
preserving public access.  
 The public dedication of the B Reactor helped to normalize not only the Reactor 
but also the concept of visiting it. The DOE’s “Tour Information” webpage about B 
Reactor Tours (available on Hanford.gov) performs similar work. The page cites the large 
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number of people who have participated in B Reactor Tours and then uses that to explain 
why the agency lowered the minimum age for Reactor tourists: “More than 40,000 
visitors have toured the B Reactor since 2009 from all 50 States and over 68 countries. 
This has culminated in the reduction of the minimum age requirement from eighteen to 
twelve years in 2012.” This passage exhibits characteristic avoidance; it seems to suggest 
that the agency lowered the minimum visitor age in response to enthusiastic public 
interest in the tours, but it never says why there was an age minimum in the first place. 
The DOE’s press release about the policy change quotes the DOE’s Richland Operations 
Office manager, Matt McCormick, who emphasizes the safety of visiting B Reactor: 
“‘The facility has safely hosted more than 25,000 visitors over the last three years and is 
carefully maintained for public access’” (“DOE Lowers”). The press release does not say 
specifically what the threats might be, and visitors are justified in wondering whether 
there is any lingering radiation inside the reactor (given the massive cleanup project 
going on outside of it). Instead of addressing those concerns, the DOE has publicized the 
visits of school groups to bolster its case that the B Reactor is a safe and compelling 
tourist destination. Shortly after the first school group visited the reactor, the agency 
posted a video on YouTube of the students entering the reactor. The students walk into the 
Reactor’s central room slowly, and the camera captures their surprised and excited 
reactions. Many of them immediately lift their phones to take photos of the reactor face 
(HanfordSite “Delta”). By posting this video, the DOE suggests not only that the reactor 
is safe but also that it offers an amusing experience. The DOE is not alone in its 
excitement about offering tours to teenagers; the press release mentions the support of 
several Northwest politicians, including Senator Patty Murray, who claims that the 
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change is “great news for families and the local community” (“DOE Lowers”). By 
holding tours and opening them up to adolescents, the DOE has convinced a range of 
visitors and observers that the B Reactor is a family-friendly tourist destination. 
 The DOE largely avoids addressing whether it is safe to visit Hanford, but there 
are two places on its tour registration website where the agency acknowledges potential 
dangers. The “Tour Information” page of Hanford.gov assures the public that the DOE is 
concerned about visitors’ safety: “The Department of Energy has gone to great lengths to 
ensure that the facility is safe and that any potential hazards for your child have been 
removed or sealed to prevent any contact with our visitors. The facility is vigorously 
inspected prior to each tour to ensure a safe and enjoyable visit” (“B Reactor Tours Tour 
Information”). Here, the agency suggests that it has been proactive about addressing 
safety issues, but it does not say what hazards could be present or how it “vigorously 
inspects” for them. Instead, the agency essentially requires the public’s trust in exchange 
for access to the Hanford Site. Visitors may be skeptical of the DOE’s reassurances, 
though, since tour participants must agree to a “disclaimer” when they sign up for tours at 
Hanford.gov: “Due to the industrial nature of the Hanford Site neither the Government, 
nor DOE and its agents, employees or contractors [. . .] will be held responsible for any 
personal injury” (“Hanford Site Public Tours”). Here, the DOE identifies the “industrial 
nature” of the Hanford Site as a potential threat to visitors, avoiding concerns about 
exposure to chemical and radioactive contamination. The agency makes a similar move 
when it describes the hazards particular to the B Reactor: “The B Reactor is a historic 
building that retains many of its original conditions. It has not been updated to modern 
building or seismic codes and therefore may pose safety hazards and risks for participants 
 217 
entering the building” (“B Reactor Tours Registration”). By strategically avoiding 
mention of the threats that would be particular to a highly contaminated structure like B 
Reactor and instead claiming that the threats posed by the facility are common to all 
“historic buildings,” the DOE attempts to normalize the unique dangers inherent in the 
use of nuclear technologies.  
The DOE’s claims that B Reactor is safe are complemented by the tone and 
content of its tours of the facility. The tour script focuses almost solely on the science and 
engineering that allowed the B Reactor to produce plutonium for twenty years. Former 
DOE employees (some of whom are wearing B Reactor trucker hats) guide visitors 
through the interior of the reactor and explain how a nuclear chain reaction inside the 
reactor’s giant graphite block worked. When I took a whole Site tour (which includes a 
walking tour of the B Reactor), the tour guides described the plutonium production 
process in the first person, as if they were there when it happened. It was obvious that the 
guides admired the engineering of the reactor, which they referred to as “truly a marvel of 
engineering.” By focusing on the engineering details of the reactor’s operation, the guides 
were able to avoid prolonged discussion of the social and political context in which the 
reactor operated, the wastes it generated, and questions about whether it is safe for 
tourists to visit the facility. Once we had listened to the tour script, those of us on the tour 
were set free to visit other accessible portions of the building, which consisted mostly of 
control rooms.   
The DOE and the BRMA’s assurances about safety and enthusiasm about 
preserving the reactor have paved the way for its commodification. Over time, the 
BRMA has added more exhibits to the interior of the B Reactor and made tours available 
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to the public on a more frequent basis. The Atomic Heritage Foundation has also created 
a virtual tour guide for the B Reactor; visitors can now visit Rangerinyourpocket.org to 
watch informational videos before and during their visit to the reactor (Cary, “New”). 
These videos honor the reactor as a historic site and celebrate the history of the 
Manhattan Project through videos about General Groves (the director of the Manhattan 
Project), DuPont’s role at Hanford, and specific aspects of the reactor’s operation. Thus, 
when you are standing inside the facility, listening to the DOE tour guide and perhaps 
following the Atomic Heritage Foundation’s story about Hanford on your smartphone, it 
is easy to be dazzled by stories and displays about Hanford and momentarily to forget 
that you are inside a nuclear reactor and not just a museum modeled as one. One tourist 
writing about his experience for the New York Times described the reactor as 
simultaneously forbidding and harmless: “The reactor itself stood silent and massive, a 
three-story square of iron, steel and Masonite housed in [a] block of graphite [. . .]. 
Staring into a decommissioned reactor is perhaps what it might be like to come face to 
face with the Grim Reaper without his scythe: defanged but still producing an ominous 
sense of awe” (Schlegel). The DOE counts on visitors to experience this paradoxical mix 
of feelings—to be in the awe of the Reactor and yet feel that it is harmless.  
 The DOE also offers a second type of tour, the Hanford Site Public Tour, which is 
a four-hour bus trip that takes visitors through most areas of the Site. Because this tour 
accesses so much of the Site (and not just a single facility), there are stricter security 
requirements. Tourists must be American citizens who are at least 18 years old, and they 
cannot bring cell phones, recording devices, or cameras. Visitors are required to check in, 
receive a paper security badge, and remain with the tour group. The tour route changes 
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from year to year, but in 2014, the Site tours are visiting Hanford’s 300 Area, the 100 
Area (which includes views of all nine Site reactors and a walking tour of the B Reactor), 
the original Hanford and White Bluffs town sites, the Cold Test Facility, the Plutonium 
Finishing Plant, the 200 West Groundwater Treatment System, the Environmental 
Restoration Disposal Facility, and the Waste Treatment Plant (USDOE Hanford 
“Hanford Site Public Tours”). By adding new tour destinations like the groundwater 
treatment facility, the DOE intends to showcase its commitment to investing in new 
waste treatment technologies that will ensure more thorough and less expensive cleanup.  
During these tours, the DOE attempts to create the impression that everything you 
see at the Site is simultaneously spectacular and routine. The agency represents the Site’s 
waste problems as remarkable in order to justify its huge expenditures of taxpayer 
money, but also frames those same problems as routine in order to normalize the 
processes of manufacturing nuclear weapons and then cleaning up after them. The height 
and power of the B Reactor offers a spectacle that connects tourists with the Atomic Age, 
and the gigantic size of the Hanford Site makes the argument that Hanford’s problems 
require an enormous effort. At the same time, explanations of how remediation works—
how workers scrape waste tanks clean and remove gloveboxes contaminated with 
plutonium—communicate that everything is proceeding as expected at Hanford.  
In other words, the DOE uses Hanford tours just as it uses all of its other forms of 
publicity—to deny the Site’s most serious problems. When I took a tour of Hanford in 
May 2013, the tour guide did not mention that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board had just identified serious flaws in the design of the vitrification plant (Wald). 
When he did mention the Site’s leaking waste tanks, it was only to set the stage for 
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explaining how waste is removed from them. At no point in the tour did the guide 
represent Hanford’s problems as anything but surmountable. Instead of addressing the 
Site’s remediation challenges, the tour script focuses on what might be considered less 
controversial aspects of Hanford history and cleanup, such as explanations of how 
cleanup technologies work. On my tour of Hanford, the first stop was the Cold Test 
Facility, a “full-scale mockup of a single shell [waste] storage tank at Hanford” (U.S. 
DOE Hanford “Cold”). A representative for one of the contractors met us near the tank to 
explain the three different types of waste found in Hanford tanks (supernate, sludge, and 
saltcake) and how difficult they are to remove. He then explained how removal of each 
type of waste requires different technology and, perhaps to provide some entertainment, 
spoke at length about the Mobile Arm Retrieval System (MARS), a robot that workers 
send down into the tanks to mobilize contaminants that are otherwise hard to reach and 
remove (because the environment is far too radioactive for workers to enter). Once robots 
finish their work, they are left in the bottom of the tanks, and they themselves become 
radioactive waste. Tank waste is so dangerous that the robots become too contaminated to 
retrieve. Thus, even the agency’s waste retrieval mechanisms can result in more waste. 
While the spokesperson described in detail how the MARS robot works, he said nothing 
about the ways it represents the ironies of cleanup.  
The DOE and its contractors are adept at hiding the realities of cleanup. One way 
they do so is through euphemisms. On my Hanford tour, we visited the Plutonium 
Finishing Plant (PFP), a plant where plutonium liquids were turned into plutonium 
“buttons” during the Cold War. PFP stored such dangerous materials that armed 
personnel guarded the facility for decades. The last of the plutonium stored at PFP was 
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shipped to the DOE’s Savannah River Site in 2009, and the DOE now intends to 
decontaminate and demolish the structure. My Hanford tour guide detailed PFP’s history 
and described the facility as “one of the most mucked up buildings” on the Hanford Site. 
Though “muck” refers generally to waste, it is usually used to refer to manure or other 
relatively harmless waste products. By referring to PFP as “mucked up,” the tour guide 
domesticated Hanford waste and dismissed the special dangers it presents. To reduce the 
audience’s perception of threat even further, the tour guide claimed that workers have to 
dress “in their whites” to do remediation at PFP. While this phrase could easily be 
mistaken as referring to a white uniform or even to white collar work, it actually alludes 
to the fact that Hanford workers have to wear personal protective clothing (also known as 
hazmat suits) when they enter PFP because the contamination there will easily penetrate 
clothing and human tissue. Thus, the terms of nuclear waste and danger—“mucked up” 
and “whites”—seemed to be a part of everyday language at Hanford, perhaps because 
workers have to understate the threats they face each day in order to keep their jobs. 
 My DOE tour also revealed the degree to which the DOE and its contractors 
believe—or want the public to believe—that they can completely repair the damage at 
Hanford. As he was pointing out significant landforms present on the Site, my tour guide 
explained that, decades ago, the DOE drilled holes in Gable Mountain to determine 
whether it would be a suitable place to store nuclear waste. Gable Mountain, which is 
located northwest of the 200 Area, has been recognized as a traditional cultural property 
because of its sacredness to local Native American tribes, but that did not prevent the 
DOE from conducting experiments to determine whether its volcanic rock could be a 
stable home for radioactive waste. According to my tour guide, when the DOE instead 
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decided not to create a deep geological repository at Hanford (because it had decided to 
build one at Yucca Mountain in Nevada), the agency put Gable Mountain “back to the 
original.” His statement indicated that the DOE believes it can simply gut and then 
reassemble a sacred, geologically and ecologically complex feature of the landscape. In 
another, similarly dissonant moment of the tour, our guide told us about Hanford’s 
newest pump and treat system, the 200 West Groundwater Treatment Facility. The 
facility runs all day and all night, pumping water from the ground beneath it, removing 
contaminants, and returning the water to the ground. When my tour guide was explaining 
the facility, he claimed that it sends water back into the ground “better than ever” as if to 
suggest that the pump and treat system is not only capable of filtering out all 
contaminants but also of making the water cleaner than it was prior to Hanford’s 
production era. These statements are misleading at best and betray a failure to recognize 
the limits of remediation.  
 The DOE goes to great lengths to ensure that its tour program creates a favorable 
impression of Hanford cleanup, but there is always a chance that Site visitors will see 
through the agency’s presentation. To limit the possibility of such an outcome, the DOE 
makes the tours relatively inaccessible to people who live outside the Tri-Cities. People 
have to first discover that the tours exist then register months in advance via an online 
registration system. The system accepts reservations beginning on a particular day and 
time, and all of the seats are generally taken within a few hours. Tickets are competitive 
largely because people have been kept off the nuclear reservation for so long, and tours 
are the only chance people have to see the Site.12 Hanford is also a relatively long drive 
from anywhere but the Tri-Cities, and full Site tours are only available in the middle of 
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the week, when most people are working. The DOE claims that it moved full Site tours to 
the weekdays to allow visitors to see cleanup in action, but, in reality, holding tours in the 
middle of the week makes it difficult for many people (especially those who live outside 
the Tri-Cities) to make the trip.13 
Despite this, the tours have become such a hot commodity that tourists have rated 
them on the popular consumer review websites Yelp and Trip Advisor. All of the reviews 
on these two sites enthusiastically recommend Hanford tours and demonstrate the degree 
to which the DOE has been able to convince the public to be both grateful for access to 
the Site and awed by what they see there. One reviewer at Trip Advisor left a review 
titled “A nuclear site with style” on June 9, 2011. After explaining that tours are difficult 
to obtain (because of competition for registration), the reviewer excitedly praises them:    
It’s a bit sobering to see all of the excavated areas that were contaminated, 
the armed guards, all of the signs indicating radiological risk areas… but 
it’s thrilling at the same time, too. The best part of the tour is when you get 
to go into the B Reactor, the facility that turned good ol’ uranium into 
plutonium. It’s like breathing science, standing in there. The reactor core 
towers above you and is absolutely BEAUTIFUL, a marvel of 
engineering, imagination, and grace. The tour is safe, you don’t need to 
worry about getting irradiated, all you have to do is enjoy the scenery… 
and be impressed with how well the clean-up efforts really are going, and 
with how much raw power was contained in that section of the state, back 
in the day. It’s a history trip, it’s a science trip, it’s a political trip. Take 
the tour!” (Traveler0237) 
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This review demonstrates that people pick up on the language the DOE gives them for 
talking about the Hanford Site. Few people would look at the B Reactor and 
independently refer to it as “beautiful.” The words “marvel of engineering” come straight 
from the DOE’s descriptions of the Reactor. Besides giving people language for 
interpreting the Site, the DOE has instilled such a sense of gratitude and awe in the 
visiting public that visitors begin to lose sight of what the Reactor produced and the 
danger it has posed to the region. This reviewer claims that “you don’t need to worry 
about getting irradiated, all you have to do is enjoy the scenery,” which is exactly what 
the DOE hopes people will believe. 
 
Though the DOE already hosts hundreds of tours annually, a new initiative to 
establish a multi-site Manhattan Project National Historical Park (MPNHP) may bring 
even more tourists to Hanford in the coming years. If the park proposal is approved, 
Hanford’s B Reactor will be included in the MPNHP and will thus be given yet another 
federal protected status (in addition to the National Historical Landmark designation). 
The proposal to establish the park has met with strong resistance, but its supporters—
including members of the B Reactor Museum Association—have been tireless in their 
efforts to establish Hanford, Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge as national sites of memory that 
would tell the story of the Manhattan Project. 
Preservation groups and government agencies have advocated for the creation of a 
MPNHP for over a decade. The proposal began to take shape in 2001 when the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation recommended that the DOE preserve key sites 
associated with the Manhattan Project, in partnership with the National Park Service 
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(NPS). In 2004, Congress asked NPS to examine whether such a park would be feasible 
and appropriate. The NPS prepared an Environmental Impact Statement and consulted 
with the DOE to develop five possible alternatives, which the Park Service presented to 
the public in 2007. In 2011, the NPS and DOE recommended that Oak Ridge, Hanford, 
and Los Alamos be included in this park (DOE “Manhattan Project National”). If the 
park is established, the partnership between the DOE and NPS would be similar, in some 
ways, to the one that exists between the DOE and U.S. Fish and Wildlife (FWS) at the 
Hanford Reach National Monument, in that the DOE would continue to own and operate 
the three sites while the NPS would provide interpretation and visitor access.14   
Though the two agencies are now supportive of the park, both had reservations 
about what its creation would mean. Each had something to lose in the arrangement: 
“The NPS had initially been reluctant to take on responsibility for industrial properties 
located within security areas and potentially containing legacy contamination from 
wartime operations. Similarly, the DOE had been reluctant to participate in a park 
experiment that might jeopardize control of its own property and restrict any aspect of 
future mission-critical work” (McGehee and Isaacson 52). Like the FWS at the HRNM, 
the NPS did not want to deal with contamination or public safety issues at Manhattan 
Project sites. For its part, the DOE did not want to disrupt “mission-critical work,” 
including nuclear weapons research, development, and stewardship, waste storage, and 
environmental remediation. In the end, the NPS was convinced that it would not be asked 
to manage risk at nuclear sites, and the DOE was assured that it would retain ultimate 
control of its nuclear sites, which are still operational. 
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Though the MPNHP has yet to be created and many details of its management 
therefore have yet to be worked out, the DOE publicizes the park on its website, 
Energy.gov. There, the agency emphasizes its ownership of Manhattan Project sites and 
its involvement in the park establishment process: 
The Department, as the direct descendent of the Manhattan Engineer 
District, owns and manages the Federal properties at most of the major 
Manhattan Project sites. [. . .] For over a decade, the Department, in 
cooperation with other Federal agencies, state and local governments, and 
other stakeholders, has pursued the possibility of including its most 
significant Manhattan Project properties within a Manhattan Project 
National Historical Park. (“Manhattan Project National”) 
In this description, the DOE portrays itself as a benevolent landlord that is generously 
willing to share its “most significant Manhattan Project properties” with the public. The 
agency also argues that it deserves some of the credit for preserving what it elsewhere 
refers to as its “Signature Facilities” even though the NPS will ultimately carry out 
interpretation at the MPNHP (US DOE, “Manhattan Project”).  
 For its part, the NPS emphasizes that it is the appropriate agency to preserve and 
interpret sites of national significance like Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Hanford. In its 
Special Resource Study/Environmental Assessment on Manhattan Project sites, the NPS 
claims that the park proposal presents a unique opportunity to protect sites at a national 
level: 
Cultural resources associated with the Manhattan Project are not currently 
represented in the national park system, and comparably managed areas 
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are not protected for public enjoyment. The comprehensive story of the 
Manhattan Project is not interpreted by other federal agencies; tribal, state, 
or local governments; or the private sector. Various sites have some 
protection (such as those managed by the Department of Energy), and 
some sites and museums tell parts of the story, but the comprehensive 
story of the nationally significant Manhattan Project is not told anywhere. 
Including Manhattan Project-related sites in the national park system will 
expand and enhance the protection and preservation of such resources and 
provide for comprehensive interpretation and public understanding of this 
nationally significant story in 20th century American history. 
The NPS has not previously been involved in Manhattan Project preservation, but it 
believes such places might be prime sites for “public enjoyment” of the nation’s history. 
Further, the agency is prepared to step in and tell the “comprehensive story of the 
Manhattan Project” (though many would argue that the comprehensive story would be 
one in which all affected parties had a voice). In 2011, National Park Service Director 
Jonathan Jarvis argued that the NPS is uniquely positioned to interpret Manhattan Project 
sites: “There is no better place to tell a story than where it happened, and that’s what 
national parks do [. . .]. The National Park Service will be proud to interpret these 
Manhattan Project sites and unlock their stories in the years ahead” (McArdle). Many 
groups are skeptical of how the agency will “unlock” those stories. 
 Though the DOE, NPS, and heritage groups have worked diligently to push the 
MPNHP proposal forward, the bill that would establish it has stalled in Congress largely 
because powerful voices believe that such a park would “inappropriately celebrate the 
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atomic bomb and the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II” 
(Meeks). While no one has proposed explicitly to celebrate the incineration of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, preservation advocates’ patriotic rhetoric and celebration of weapons 
science have sparked concern that a MPNHP would glorify war. In September 2012, U.S. 
representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio argued that creating a national park is not an 
appropriate way to memorialize the Manhattan Project, saying “We’re talking about the 
devastation of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—hundreds of thousands killed, [a] 
$10 trillion Cold War between the U.S. and Russia, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons 
which today threaten the existence of the world—and this is something we should 
celebrate?” (Robbins). Many anti-nuclear activists share this belief that a MPNHP would 
celebrate the bomb. For example, Greg Mello, co-founder of the anti-nuclear Los Alamos 
Study Group asked, “‘Are we really poised to make a national park out of a few shabby 
ruins where we built instruments of mass murder, delivered to statesmen the instruments 
of universal destruction, and destroyed the marriage between science and human 
values?’” (Associated Press and Tri-City Herald).  
 Some activists (including Mello) have strategically framed their opposition to the 
MPNHP by arguing that creating such a park would sully the National Park System. 
Michael Mariotte, who is the executive director of the anti-nuclear group Nuclear 
Information Resource Service, told The New York Times that “National parks are national 
treasures, and glorifying a weapon of mass destruction is certainly not among the 
purposes of a national park” (McArdle). Similarly, Mello claimed that “what we risk is 
harming the national park system as a whole and the idea of national parks just when we 
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need to protect the environment the most” (McArdle). Both of these arguments appeal to 
the widely held sense that national parks are places of purity. 
Despite resistance from a handful of politicians and anti-nuclear activists, most of 
which is based on the assumption that a MPNHP would discourage sober reflection on 
the Bomb’s devastating effects on public and environmental health, many politicians who 
represent atomic communities, federal officials, and historical preservationists support 
the creation of a MPNHP. Congressman Doc Hastings, who represents central 
Washington State in the U.S. House, has been one of the most vocal supporters of the 
MPNHP bill. Hastings has an obvious personal and political stake in whether a national 
park is established at Hanford, since many of his constituents take pride in their 
contribution to nuclear weapons production and would benefit from the tourism dollars 
that such a park would generate. He thus portrays the preservation of buildings and 
artifacts at MPNHP sites as a win-win situation that would open Hanford, Los Alamos, 
and Oak Ridge to public access and reduce the exorbitant costs of fully decommissioning 
nuclear sites. According to a report Hastings submitted along with the bill that would 
establish the park (H.R. 208), many facilities at the three nuclear sites 
are currently scheduled to be destroyed by the Department of Energy, but 
their preservation for public visitation would instead reduce federal 
spending by millions of dollars. For example, the first full-scale nuclear 
reactor ever built, the B Reactor at the Hanford Site, would alone cost tens 
of millions of dollars to demolish, while facilitating safe and secure public 
access to the structure can occur at a small fraction of the cost.  
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In other words, preserving nuclear sites for public visitation would be cheaper than 
decommissioning them. This argument would seem to indicate that Hastings values 
saving money more than he values public safety, but he insists that the DOE and NPS 
could ensure “safe and secure public access” to structures at nuclear sites. He also argues 
that the federal government ought to open nuclear sites in order to promote public 
education and patriotism. He insists that the U.S. was justified when it used the Bomb on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and he claims that the MPNHP bill would open B Reactor up 
“to schoolchildren and others to see what we did to preserve freedom” (Cary, “Ohio”). 
The MPNHP’s opponents and scores of others would, of course, disagree that the U.S. 
needed to use the atomic bomb to end WWII, but in today’s political climate, the vague 
idea of “preserving freedom”—which ultimately means assuring U.S. dominance in 
world politics—holds sway with many U.S. citizens. 
 While the priorities of Hastings’s home district influence him to support the 
MPNHP, not everyone who defends the park proposal is as obviously biased by political 
expediency as Hastings. In June 2013, Stephanie Meeks, President of the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation, wrote an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times that countered many 
of the arguments against establishing such a park. Meeks claimed that a MPNHP would 
open people’s eyes to the legacy of the Manhattan Project: 
As a nation, we have a responsibility to grapple openly and objectively 
with the Manhattan project’s complex legacy. To do that, we need a space 
for reflection. [. . .] Opening up these sites as a national park would 
provide an opportunity for Americans to consider the Manhattan Project in 
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its full scope and complexity, encouraging the sort of thoughtful reflection 
that is the best way to avoid glorifying the bomb. 
While many would argue that the very act of turning these three sites into a national park 
would wrongfully celebrate the Bomb, Meeks argues that they would actually be the best 
place for honest, informed consideration of the bomb’s deep and lasting effects. She 
claims that this type of park would “encourage visitors to consider the Manhattan 
Project’s many ethical, cultural and scientific implications.” Historians and other 
researchers also argue that we would lose an understanding of our national history if 
these sites were demolished or kept off-limits to the public. Ellen McGehee, a historian 
and archaeologist at Los Alamos, argues that if the buildings used to assemble and house 
bombs during the Manhattan Project are not “maintained or managed, they will go 
away.” According to McGehee, this would prevent people from fully comprehending the 
Manhattan Project since “You can’t really understand how the scientists were working, 
what conditions they were working under, unless you come out to the place where history 
really happened” (Cowan).  
 Firsthand knowledge is indeed significant to the public’s understanding of the 
Manhattan Project, and there is no substitute for visiting a nuclear site—for witnessing its 
massive production equipment or its bomb craters. However, the public’s understanding 
of nuclear sites is deeply influenced by their narrative presentation. Though the NPS 
expresses the importance of telling the “comprehensive story” of the Manhattan Project, 
it is impossible to believe that the agency’s MPNHP narrative would depart much from 
the interpretation the DOE currently provides at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Hanford. 
Given the fact that the country’s other DOE-supported atomic museums and tours glorify 
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nuclear weapons, hide the contradictions in U.S. nuclear policy, and portray the DOE as a 
responsible environmental steward, the public can only assume that a MPNHP would 
perform similar rhetorical work. The DOE claims that “[I]f a Manhattan Project park is 
authorized, the NPS would work with the Department and consult with the public and 
other stakeholders to develop a management plan” (“Manhattan”). However, the federal 
government would ultimately control the public participation process, and the DOE 
would inevitably exert a strong influence over the outcome. Preservationists and federal 
agencies have argued that “preservation does not imply moral endorsement,” but the 
country’s atomic museums and nuclear tour programs demonstrate that they tend to go 
hand in hand (Broad). 
Supporters of the MPNHP may not have all the information and context necessary 
to make a decision about whether the park would provide interpretation from multiple 
perspectives and whether it would be safe. People living in atomic communities are 
pushing for more access to nuclear landscapes—including those at Hanford—without 
foregrounding the potential consequences of encouraging tourism at a site where disaster 
is still unfolding. A Manhattan Project National Historical Park will bring more visitors 
to Hanford at a time when conditions at the Site are disconcertingly unstable. If one 
believed the DOE’s reports about Hanford, though, one might not perceive that 
instability.  
 
 In his New York Times essay on Hanford tourism, Jeff Schlegel observes that the 
people of the Tri-Cities support Hanford tourism because it boosts the local economy: 
“locals hope the unusual pairing of World War II and cold war history with the region’s 
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natural beauty will play a bigger role in a tourist trade that already lures visitors with its 
wineries, golf courses, desertlike climate and ample sunshine.” Indeed, Tri-Citians rely 
on Hanford not only for the success of their tourist industry but also for the prosperity of 
their regional economy. Hanford cleanup costs $2 billion per year, and much of that 
money is injected directly into the Tri-Cities. The DOE has taken advantage of this 
dependent relationship as well as local enthusiasm for historic preservation and tourism 
in developing its museums and tour programs.   
 As long as the DOE retains ownership of the nation’s nuclear weapons sites, it 
will continue to be the principal entity influencing how they are interpreted for the public. 
This is dangerous considering the state of preservation and tourism in the weapons 
complex today. All of the DOE’s atomic museums and its tour programs adhere to a 
predictable narrative that embraces militarism and technological positivism. Many of 
them can be said to look back on the Manhattan Project and the Cold War with nostalgia. 
Even when interpretation is carried out by other government agencies like the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service or by local preservation groups, the DOE’s biases emerge.  
Many would argue that nuclear tourism helps people understand the complexities 
of nuclear weapons and environmental remediation, but in today’s weapons complex, it 
contributes more to the DOE’s rhetorical purposes than to public education. In an era that 
is nominally devoted to cleanup and transparency, the DOE can no longer keep all of 
Hanford’s secrets from the public. Thus, its strategy is to hide Hanford in plain sight—to 
invite tourists to see the Site’s reactors and waste facilities for themselves. This 
opportunity to shape the public’s perceptions of Hanford is particularly valuable to the 
DOE for two reasons. First, it improves public relations about a site that has failed to 
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meet many important cleanup milestones and that has been in environmental remediation 
for twenty-five years. Second, interpretation that celebrates both production and cleanup 
helps the government normalize the contradictions surrounding nuclear weapons. By 
suggesting that weapons production and environmental remediation are normal and 
natural, the federal government and its contractors pacify the public and remain free to 




1 At the Fernald Preserve Visitors Center Grand Opening, acting Deputy Secretary 
of Energy Jeffrey Kupfer closed his dedication speech by saying, “And so today as we 
remember and seek to preserve the many contributions Fernald has made to our national 
security, we also celebrate Fernald’s future—the future of America—as we forge ahead 
to achieve energy security in an environmentally responsible way.” Kupfer’s speech 
exemplifies the DOE’s attempts to shift public attention from the nuclear weapons 
complex to the agency’s “environmentally responsible” energy projects and to frame 
those projects as patriotic. The Energy.gov homepage rarely features anything about 
environmental remediation of nuclear weapons sites—though this costs the agency 
approximately $6 billion per year—whereas it continually promotes the DOE’s work on 
renewable energy and green building projects. 
2 Though the DOE never funded a Rocky Flats Cold War Museum, there is now 
an organization called the Rocky Flats Institute and Museum (RFIM), which has a 




Institute and Museum seeks to foster dialogue about critical international and local 
nuclear realities, building on the diverse narratives and legacies of the Rocky Flats 
Nuclear Weapons Plant to inform, educate, and empower the public” (RFIM, “Home 
page.”). The organization’s emphasis on dialogue may explain why it did not acquire 
DOE funding. 
3 There is irony in the work of the Office of Legacy Management. Though the 
DOE refers to the waste leftover from weapons production as the “legacy” of the 
Manhattan Project and the Cold War, “legacy” usually refers to something valuable (such 
as money or property) passed down by a predecessor—not unstable, long-lasting 
pollution. Through the Office of Legacy Management, the DOE attempts to manage not 
only the threat posed by that pollution but also history itself.    
4 The Rocky Flats Museum and Institute currently operates in a temporary 
location in Arvada, Colorado, but without DOE backing, it is so constrained by budget 
concerns that it cannot pay museum staff. Financial uncertainty makes the museum less 
visible and accessible than the DOE’s museums in places like Oak Ridge and Los 
Alamos. 
5 Rebecca Solnit offers a helpful explanation of why it is inappropriate to refer to 
the bomb detonations that occurred at NTS as “tests”: “Test is something of a misnomer 
when it comes to nuclear bombs. A test is controlled and contained, a preliminary to the 
thing itself, and though these nuclear bombs weren’t being dropped on cities or strategic 
centers, they were full-scale explosions in the real world, with all the attendant effects. I 




rehearsal may lack an audience but contains all the actions and actors” (5). Indeed, people 
living outside NTS suffered “all the attendant effects” of the hundreds of explosions that 
occurred there, though they were not identified as the bombs’ intended targets. 
6 Rothstein further notes: “The military, in fact, was almost zealous in its urge to 
demystify [. . .]. The exhibition also cites a military leader’s comment in 1948 that if 
atomic testing wasn’t conducted within the United States, the lack of direct American 
experience would result in an ‘unhealthy, dangerous and unjustified fear of atomic 
detonations.’” 
7 Nuclear testing had an enormous impact on the economy of Las Vegas: “In 1970 
the test site was credited with adding $1 billion a year to the Nevada economy” 
(Rothstein). 
8 The DOE “Hanford Site” Facebook page provides photographic evidence of this 
effort to identify and preserve artifacts from the Hanford Site. Though the agency has not 
said what it will do with these artifacts, the Tri-City Herald interviewed Colleen French, 
DOE government affairs program manager, who reported that “‘The ultimate idea is to 
keep the collection together so it can be displayed and interpreted.’” Thus, the DOE has 
plans to “make the collection available to the community,” though it has not announced 
what those plans are (Cary, “Hanford”). 
9 Though the DOE does not say so directly, it may be intending to display these 
artifacts at the Manhattan Project National Historical Park, should Congress approve it. 
Until then, the public can only view DOE-owned equipment and facilities on a Hanford 




10 Mission Support Alliance, LLC (owned by Lockheed Martin/Jacobs/WSI) 
manages the DOE tour program for the DOE, but the DOE has ultimate authority over 
Hanford operations, so I describe the tour program as DOE-run. 
11 In DOE jargon, “cocooning” is known as Interim Safe Storage (ISS). It 
involves removing as much contamination as possible from the inside of a reactor, 
sealing the reactor shut, and placing a new roof on top of it. This is meant to prevent 
intrusion by water, animals, and any other trespassers. Reactor cores remain in ISS for 
decades while some of their radioactivity decays. 
12  People are eager to access off-limits areas of the nuclear reservation, partially 
because they are forbidden and partially because people want to know what is there. For 
example, hundreds of people sign up for Hanford Wildflower Tours, which the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife has led for the last few years. There is so much demand for the tours that 
Fish and Wildlife holds a lottery to choose guests. The tours showcase the wildflowers of 
the Hanford area, but perhaps more significantly, they give access to the Arid Lands 
Ecology Reserve on the Rattlesnake Unit of the Hanford Reach National Monument, an 
area that is normally closed to the public. This year, Fish and Wildlife sent emails to 
those who were unsuccessful in the lottery noting that 608 people were vying for 160 
available tour spaces. In the same email, FWS admitted that the wildflower displays are 
not even that impressive at Rattlesnake: “We wish you better luck in the future. However 
to be honest, the wildflower viewing is actually better on the Saddle Mountains, and that 




up for the tour simply to see wildflowers; many are just curious about Rattlesnake 
Mountain. 
13 The tour program manager claims that the DOE began to hold tours on 
weekdays in order to allow visitors to see cleanup in action and give them “the 
opportunity to get off the bus to listen to subject matter experts describe current Hanford 
cleanup work and present future plans for the site. Now, rather than just driving by 
buildings, visitors can see and come to appreciate the difficulty of the work and 
commitment of the workers cleaning up the site” (Sinclair 4). The DOE believes that the 
more people appreciate the “difficulty of the work” and the “commitment” of the 
workforce, the more they will support the DOE’s cleanup plans. 
14 According to the current MPNHP proposal, the DOE would continue to own 
and manage its facilities, such as B Reactor, but the park would also include some private 
and county land (particularly in Los Alamos) (McGehee and Isaacson 51).  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 
 In March 2014, twenty-six workers were exposed to chemical vapors at Hanford’s 
waste tank farms. Tank vapor incidents have been occurring at Hanford since the tanks 
were built, but, since the early 2000s, the rate of chemical exposures has increased 
because the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors have been pursuing 
“faster, cheaper cleanup” (Carpenter and Gilbert 24).1 The workers exposed to vapors in 
March have reported a range of symptoms, including headaches, persistent cough, sore 
throat, and a metallic taste in the mouth. After being exposed, one worker’s nose bled for 
days, and her doctors eventually cauterized it to stop the bleeding (Frame, “Sick”). Other 
employees working in the tank farms have suffered from long-term (and sometimes fatal) 
medical conditions, including neurological problems. 
 Shortly after the tank farm exposures, the DOE held public meetings about 
Hanford cleanup progress at which its representatives only reluctantly discussed the 
vapor exposure incidents. “State of the Hanford Site” meetings, which give the public an 
opportunity to discuss cleanup progress with the DOE, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and Washington Department of Ecology (WA DOE), are supposed to be 
held annually, but the federal government shutdown in 2013 pushed that year’s meetings 
to April 2014. At the April 16 State of the Site meeting in Portland, Oregon, the agency 
representatives presented on Hanford cleanup successes and challenges but again 
strategically avoided the recent vapor exposure incidents.  
At the end of the meeting, I stood at the microphone and asked the representatives 
of the DOE, EPA, and WA DOE several pointed questions about the vapor incidents. I 
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wanted to know why the agencies had not mentioned the exposures in their presentations 
and how they were going to protect workers in the future. Kevin Smith, manager of 
Hanford’s Office of River Protection, claimed to take my concerns seriously but the 
language he used to describe the vapor incidents suggested otherwise. Smith promised to 
seek new solutions to keep workers safe, but he also noted that workers have the option 
of wearing respirators whenever they are working in the tank farms. He insisted that 
Hanford’s waste tanks have always been “stinky” and indicated that some workers are 
especially “sensitive” to “smells” emitted from the tanks, comparing Hanford’s tank 
waste vapors to ordinary garbage. 
But the vapors released from Hanford’s tanks are more than just unpleasant odors; 
they may consist of “any number of more than 1,200 organic and inorganic chemicals, in 
addition to radiation” (Carpenter and Gilbert 24). By referring to chemical vapors as 
“smells,” Smith trivialized and domesticated a problem that has made countless Hanford 
employees ill. By arguing that workers could do more to prevent these incidents, he 
blamed victims for their own exposures.2 Though Smith promised greater protections for 
workers at the State of the Site meeting, as of June 1, 2014, six more employees have 
received medical treatment for inhaling chemical vapors at the tank farms (Frame, “6 
Hanford”). 
Hanford’s remediation crews are canaries in the coalmine; epidemics of sick 
workers tell us that Hanford is not operating safely and that the government has not 
stabilized the Site’s chemical and radioactive waste. And yet there is painful irony in 
allowing humans to serve as canaries; workers have to become seriously ill for us to 
 241 
understand that Hanford endangers inhabitants of the mid-Columbia Basin, communities 
downstream on the Columbia River, and people living across the Northwest.  
Though science has confirmed a direct link between illness and exposure to the 
types of toxins in Hanford’s tanks, the DOE and its contractors can conceal the danger of 
chemical and radioactive waste by manufacturing “an ambiguous climate for public 
discourse” (Cable, Shriver, and Mix 380). The agency does this by both ignoring 
exposure incidents (as its representatives did in their presentations at the Portland State of 
the Site meeting) and minimizing workers’ claims to illness (as Smith did when I pressed 
him on the subject). The DOE’s response to the recent vapor incidents mirrors its general 
strategy of avoiding accountability by denying problems. Worker illness makes visible 
the physical consequences of Hanford waste, which are otherwise invisible as a result of 
the DOE’s denial and the long latency period of toxin-induced sickness. 
This dissertation has argued that the federal government is using web 
communication, nature reserves, and nuclear tourism to control the discourse about 
Hanford, and that Hanford is a case study in an even larger problem. The DOE now 
employs new methods of containing scandal that are required by the advance of the 
Information Age. Instead of pursuing secrecy to manage discourse, the DOE and other 
federal agencies overseeing preservation at Hanford now engage in online publicity, 
preservation, and tours to redirect the public’s attention from the uncontained 
environmental disaster to a neatly subdivided and managed patchwork of government-
managed lands.   
New information about waste tank leaks has emerged since I began writing this 
dissertation. The DOE confirmed in March 2014 that double-shell tank AY-102 has 
 242 
sprung a third leak (Cary, “More”). When the first leaks in AY-102 were reported in 
2012, the DOE claimed that the tank had special construction flaws that made it prone to 
leak and that “it seems unlikely that the other double-shell tanks in similar circumstances 
would have been similarly affected” (Washington River Protection Solutions ES-2). 
However, in February 2014, the Associated Press reported that there are “significant 
construction flaws” in other double-shell waste tanks that could cause them to fail as AY-
102 has. Surveys of the tanks show that thirteen additional tanks could be prone to leak. 
Though the DOE has been charged with transferring waste from single-shell tanks to 
double-shell tanks, the future of the double-shell tanks is far from certain. The DOE has 
announced that it will not meet legal deadlines for pumping tank waste and completing 
construction of the vitrification plant (meant to stabilize tank waste in glass logs), which 
the Washington State Department of Ecology (WA DOE) finds unacceptable (Cary, “No 
Decisions”). Negotiations between the DOE and WA DOE over how the DOE will meet 
court-enforced deadlines are, as of early June 2014, at a standstill.3  
Meanwhile, neither Hanford.gov nor the Hanford Site Facebook page—two of the 
most conspicuous sources of information for members of the public interested in Hanford 
cleanup—provided any updates on the tanks leaks, the construction of the vitrification 
plant, or the tank vapor incidents. The DOE operates these web and social media sites 
about Hanford, ostensibly to increase transparency about how money is spent, where 
contamination exists and how it is cleaned up, and how decisions are made. And yet, 
these sites say nothing about the most dangerous events occurring at Hanford. Instead of 
explaining the DOE’s position on waste tanks or announcing how the agency intends to 
prevent future vapor exposures, the Hanford Site Facebook page celebrated recent events 
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at Hanford, including the DOE’s donation of computers to the Hanford Reach 
Interpretive Center, the Site’s annual Health and Safety Expo, the DOE’s celebration of 
Women’s History Month, and the achievement of several cleanup milestones. It also 
offered several reminders about opportunities to offer public comments or go on 
government-led tours (of both the Hanford Site and the Hanford Reach National 
Monument). Mixed in with these updates were several explicit reminders that the DOE 
and its contractors are protecting the local environment. One status update from March 
25, 2014, which included photos of bald eagles roosting at Hanford, boasted that “DOE 
and contractor Mission Support Alliance received the Presidential Migratory Bird Federal 
Stewardship honorable mention award for the second time. (See Appendix C a screenshot 
of the status update.) While work at Hanford focuses on cleanup, this award illustrates the 
continued dedication to environmental stewardship by DOE and its contractors.” The 
DOE continues to offer the eagles as a symbol of Hanford’s ability to support life.   
 Also since writing the preceding chapters, discussions about what will be done 
with lands remediated and released by the DOE have intensified. These conversations 
hinge on whether lands along the Columbia River, which the DOE expects to have 
cleaned up by 2015, ought to be made accessible to the public. In March 2014, an official 
from the DOE’s Office of Environmental Management said that the federal government 
would seek to “turn some of that land back over to the community for reuse” (qtd. in 
Cary, “Federal”). The federal government and community leaders appear to agree on this 
subject, except that the Tri-City Development Council (TRIDEC) and the Tri-Cities 
Visitor and Convention Bureau, along with other local leaders, are concerned that 
remediated lands will be transferred to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and not 
 244 
opened to public access. The federal government claims that land may be transferred to 
the FWS for addition to the Hanford Reach National Monument, but local leaders argue 
that “adding additional property to an already underfunded and understaffed agency 
could be doing a complete disservice to both the Fish and Wildlife Service and our 
community” (Cary, “Tri-City”). TRIDEC and the Visitors Bureau have put forth a 
proposal that would open remediated lands to “controlled public access for hiking, 
biking, and camping.” Local people want more access to remediated lands and the 
Monument, but some areas that have been released from Hanford cleanup are still 
dangerous; as I discussed in Chapter III, Monument lands serve as a buffer between 
Hanford’s radioactive materials and nearby communities. 
 TRIDEC and the Visitors Bureau have proposed to partner with the National Park 
Service (NPS) as well as the DOE in developing plans to open remediated lands to 
tourism. Though the Manhattan Project National Historical Park (MPNHP) proposal has 
repeatedly died in Congress, Hanford boosters see the park’s creation as a foregone 
conclusion. In a recent attempt to get the proposal passed, Doc Hastings, the Natural 
Resources Committee Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives, sponsored an 
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 that would create the 
MPNHP. The bill has passed the House. Advocates for the Park, such as Hastings, argue 
that it has bipartisan support and that park advocates and historic preservationists are 
backing the project (Atomic Heritage Foundation). This makes it appear as though 
reasonable people of all political orientations support the idea of bringing more tourists to 
Hanford at a time when conditions at the Site are disconcertingly unstable.  
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 The proliferation of DOE representations of Hanford online as well as the 
increase in the number of nature reserves and historic sites within the nuclear 
reservation’s bounds suggest not that the DOE is becoming more transparent and Hanford 
is becoming safer for human visitors and non-human inhabitants but rather that the 
federal government is trying to clamp down on this contested site. DOE Facebook photos 
of dump trucks carrying contaminated soil to Hanford’s giant low-level waste landfill and 
FWS webpages about the health of Columbia River salmon may demonstrate the genuine 
pride of government employees who are working to stabilize waste and protect wildlife, 
but they do not represent government openness.  
Even when the government conveys substantive information about the weapons 
complex via its websites and Facebook, the public cannot count on that information to be 
available later. The government’s web communications are strikingly ephemeral; as I was 
writing this dissertation, several Hanford websites were moved, altered, or deleted 
entirely. Their availability was also subject to the vagaries of national politics; for 
example, the FWS website about the Hanford Reach National Monument was completely 
unavailable for the first two weeks of October 2013 because Congress could not agree on 
a budget and the federal government had entered a shutdown. Such events demonstrate 
that the government’s Hanford-related websites offer only a façade of openness and 
accountability.  
And yet that façade is believable enough to convince people to take tours of 
Hanford. When the agency posts photos of bald eagles roosting at the Site and jokes 
about cleanup workers having a “glowing good time,” it gives outsiders the impression 
that it might be safe—and even amusing—to visit Hanford. By expressing pride in the 
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work done at the Site and by representing the cleanup as nearly complete, the DOE 
controls public perception and makes Hanford seem like a reasonable tourist destination. 
The rise of the Internet has given governments powerful new tools for managing their 
citizens, and the DOE has made extensive use of those tools at Hanford.  
Though the government bombards us with a constant stream of meticulously 
crafted information about Hanford, its plans to bring more tourists to the Site suggest 
that—after decades of failed cleanup—it has grown increasingly desperate to appease the 
public. The DOE and FWS have long been managers at Hanford, but the proposal to 
create a MPNHP and bring NPS into the mix of federal agencies operating at the Site 
represents the government’s frenzied effort to give Hanford the appearance of order. In 
the past, most of the designations given to Hanford lands kept the public off the nuclear 
reservation and its former buffer zone (as in the case of the Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, 
which is only open to scientists). Today, the DOE has shifted tactics and begun to bring 
more tourists to the Site. This increased openness on the part of the federal government 
shows not that Hanford has become safe and habitable but that government officials 
know they need to offer more public access to demonstrate that they have made progress 
on cleanup. Since the government can no longer maintain secrecy, it must hide the extent 
of Hanford’s contamination in plain sight. 
 Hanford’s chemical and radioactive poisons have affected people living in the 
Hanford area most directly, but many Tri-Citians are clamoring for more access to 
Hanford lands (whether for recreation or development). This may seem puzzling, given 
that many people in the area have personal experience of the Site’s health impacts, but 
people living in places irreversibly contaminated by government and industry have both 
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more and less perspective on local conditions. They have direct experience of living and 
working in toxic environments, and thus they may possess greater insights into associated 
risks. At the same time, government agencies and contractors working in their 
communities often lie to them about the extent and location of contamination as well as 
the dangers it poses. In the Tri-Cities, local people may support government cleanup, 
preservation, and tourism because they see these activities as being in their best interest, 
but often, that support can translate to public support for DOE deception and 
containment. 
 Hanford’s future looks bleak not only because of the DOE’s mismanagement of 
an already impossible task but also because of the way the federal government is—as one 
Washington Department of Ecology employee said—“consistently in denial” at Hanford 
(Frame, “Feds”). However, this is where we—as members of the public—might step in 
and contribute to reducing Hanford’s threats. By paying close and sustained attention to 
the contours of the DOE’s discourse about Hanford, we might begin to resist that denial 
and pursue a better future for Hanford workers and everyone living downwind and 
downstream of the Hanford Site. When we see that the government has only reluctantly 
pursued transparency at Hanford, that its web communications are lacking in substantive 
information and are subject to disappearance, that it deploys nature to suggest that 
Hanford is safe, and that it would bring tourists to the Site even as tank workers are 
falling ill due to exposure to toxic vapors, we can begin to recognize a pattern of 
deception and denial. This recognition, coupled with an effort to find more accurate 
sources of information, can help us make better decisions and begin to articulate a more 
effective protest.  
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 There are some immediate, material solutions that might help to stabilize the 
situation at Hanford. The Site’s regulators and the State of Washington might step in to 
ensure that workers have better protections from tank waste exposures. Workers should 
have access to supplied air, particularly when they are working in or near the tank farms. 
The DOE can invest in new waste tanks to contain waste until the vitrification plant is 
fully functional. To make certain that the vitrification plant is built to operate safely and 
effectively, the DOE can stop rewarding contractors with bonuses for work shoddily 
done. To accomplish all of this, the federal government may need to bring more or 
different regulators to the Site. The DOE has repeatedly demonstrated its inability to 
pursue safe and efficient cleanup, and so it may take oversight by yet another entity to get 
Hanford cleanup under control. 
 None of this can happen unless the narrative about Hanford changes. Since I 
began my research on Hanford, I have been struck first by the degree to which the DOE 
controls the current narrative and second by the fact that most essays, articles, and 
television news stories do little to move beyond the most basic details about Hanford. 
Because the majority of people do not even know that Hanford exists, scholars and 
journalists are obliged to rehearse Hanford’s fundamentals. This demonstrates not the 
ignorance of the American public but how effective the DOE has been at discursively 
containing the Site’s problems. In 2014, twenty-five years after the U.S. government 
signed a legal agreement saying that it would properly treat, stabilize, and dispose of 
Hanford waste, we must hold it to that promise. And we must do so before more workers 
get sick and before a fire, earthquake, or waste tank explosion brings to light what a 




1 Tom Carpenter and Clare Gilbert cite a 2003 Government Accountability 
Project (GAP) report that noted a “drastic increase in the rate of workers being exposed 
to chemical vapors at [Hanford] and requiring medical treatment.” Carpenter and Gilbert 
argue that the increase in exposures and worker illness will only get worse if the DOE 
continues to aggressively pursue cleanup goals: “The more intense the cleanup effort, the 
more tank waste is agitated, escalating the release of pent-up toxic vapors into the work 
environment” (27). This is the flip side of quicker cleanup; more and more workers are 
made seriously ill in the process. When public interest groups press for better and more 
thorough Hanford cleanup, they must do so with the possible consequences for workers 
in mind. Hanford Challenge (which Carpenter directs) is a cleanup watchdog that 
specializes in protecting Hanford workers (whistleblowers and exposure victims alike). 
2 Hanford workers claim that management discourages them from wearing 
respirators, because getting workers suited up takes extra time and money (Frame, 
“Calls”). The DOE has complete authority over workplace safety at Hanford, so outside 
agencies like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration can neither investigate 
working conditions at Hanford nor ask the DOE to improve safety protocols. 
3 Both the WA DOE and the Hanford Advisory Board have called for the DOE to 














Figure A1. Many photos posted on the Hanford Site Facebook page feature workers 
laboring under vast blue skies to dismantle weapons-era infrastructure. Here, a former 
reactor intake pipe dwarfs nearby workers. Photos like this attempt to capture the 
immense size of the Site in order to demonstrate the difficulty of its waste problems. 
Caption: “Workers navigate around the large piping and rubble from the N Reactor’s 
water intake facilities. Some of the piping was more than 9-feet in diameter.” Date 








Figure A2. Many photos create a sense of intimacy with Hanford workers, who are 
frequently pictured in radioactive protective clothing. In this photo, the photographer 
places the viewer in the midst of workers removing a 10-ton plutonium glovebox from 
the Plutonium Finishing Plant (a building where Hanford workers took plutonium that 
had been chemically separated from irradiated fuel rods and turned it into metal buttons 
for nuclear weapons). Caption: “Workers prepare the sections of the glovebox for 
separation. Altogether, the glovebox was approximately 10-tons in weight and two stories 





Figure A3. The Public Affairs Officers who operate the Hanford Site FB page are fond of 
wordplay, as evidenced by this update, which plays on the popular misconception that 
radioactive substances glow, in order to suggest that workers enjoy handling radioactive 








Figure A4. The Hanford Site FB page often demonstrates cleanup progress by posting 
photos of demolition and dumping. This photo was posted in an album titled “Hanford 
Landfill Reaches 14 million tons disposed.” The Environmental Restoration Disposal 
Facility (ERDF), a low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste landfill near the 
center of the Hanford Site, accepts up to 600 truckloads of waste each day. Though the 
DOE often refers to Hanford “cleanup” (which might suggest that waste is removed from 
the Site), it often measures progress in tons of waste moved to ERDF. Caption: “Workers 
dispose of concrete debris off a dump ramp at the Environmental Restoration Disposal 
Facility. Several dump ramps are regularly operating on a daily basis.” Date posted: 








Figure A5. Often, when the Hanford Site FB page posts information about a specific 
aspect of Hanford cleanup, it emphasizes that the job is being performed safely. The page 
also distracts from some of the larger safety issues related to chemical and radioactive 
waste by posting photos of safety training exercises like the one depicted above. Caption: 
“Hanford commonly experiences icy wintery conditions, making slips and falls on ice 
common on the site. The goal is to give workers safety training to prevent slips and falls.” 





Figure A6. Numerous photos posted on the Hanford Site FB page depict wildlife and 
nature scenes, as in this photo of a coyote padding through the snow. These photos often 
portray Hanford’s nature as serene and intact (as in the photo above, which includes no 





Figure A7. Hanford receives many visits from local, state, and national politicians as well 
as outsiders (like engineers from the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan) who come to 
study Hanford’s remediation projects. The Hanford Site FB page also posts photos of 
Native American visitors, though it says nothing about how local tribes view Hanford. 
Caption: “Virginia Beavert, one of a few Native Americans who still practice and teach 
Waashat religious practices, speaks to Richland Operations Office employees about the 
Sahaptin language. Ms. Beavert was born in a bear cave in Oregon’s Blue Mountains and 
worked at Hanford after WWII. She is 80 years old and pursuing her doctorate at the 
University of Oregon. She is studying linguistics and teaching her native Sahaptin 





Figure A8. The Hanford Site FB page frequently posts information about the Department 
of Energy’s public outreach efforts. This photo shows a Hanford Public Affairs Officer, 
Cameron Salony, speaking to a group of local high school students. Salony is smiling at a 
student who is demonstrating the white radioactive protective clothing that many people 
associate with the Site. Photos like this suggest that the DOE is preparing the local 
community for several more decades of cleanup. Caption: “Hanford Speakers Bureau 
visit Kiona-Benton High School Friday in Benton City. Speaker Cameron Salony talks 
about personal protective equipment (PPE) with students.” Date posted: December 17, 
2012.  
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Figure A9. Few posts on the Hanford Site FB page communicate information about 
Hanford’s most troubling waste problems. When the DOE has posted details about the 
recent leak of tank AY-102—as in this post, which includes a photo of the tank’s 
annulus—it has carefully avoided making any admissions about the nature of the “ 




PHOTOGRAPHS OF HANFORD REACH NATIONAL MONUMENT SIGNS 
 
 
                
 
Figure A11. Photograph of FWS interpretive sign at the Wahluke Unit of HRNM. 
Though FWS obviously did not intend for it, the most prominent feature of the sign is a 
collection of bullet holes shot through a drawing of a Western meadowlark. 
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Figure A12. One of few signs erected by FWS at HRNM alerts people that they have 
reached a “DEAD END.” The road does eventually stop, but it ends at an overlook with a 



























Figure A14. This status update from the Hanford Site Facebook page included eight 
photos of Site artifacts that the DOE collected and tagged for preservation. Date posted: 






Figure A15. The DOE has posted about the presence of eagles at Hanford on its Hanford 
Site Facebook page several times. In this status update, the agency boasts that the DOE 
and its contractor, Mission Support Alliance, have been recognized for their “continued 
dedication to environmental stewardship.” Date posted: March 25, 2014. 
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